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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia at 
the turn of the 21st Century. Humanitarian assistance is considered as an 
ideal and the key question is, can it be effective in a chronic emergency? 
Humanitarian assistance itself is examined in detail and placed in a broader 
context of ideas of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity in response 
to disasters. The thesis is grounded on evidence based evaluation to 
generate conclusions for programme and project management.  
 
The method taken is one of using conventional social science methods to 
come to evaluative judgement. The nature of evaluative judgement requires 
an understanding of the purpose and content of evaluation itself, which is 
extensively discussed in the methods chapter. The ethics of work in disaster 
situations is also addressed.  
 
The case material comes from two evaluations namely for Action by Churches 
Together and Norwegian Church Aid conducted in Somalia in 2006-07. The 
key findings from the case material is that humanitarian projects in chronic 
emergencies must be delivered within the cultural context i.e. religion 
supported delivery. The reasons for this are that such delivery pays attention 
to the critical role of beneficiaries in ensuring effective and sustainable project 
implementation. This raises key issues about the validity of the top down 
delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as an understanding of chronic 
emergency as development rather than disaster projects.  
 
The thesis concludes with observations on the limitations of evaluation in the 
context of humanitarian assistance. It reinforces the central directive of 
humanitarian delivery as ‘do no harm’ and shows that there are opportunities 
to ‘do some good’. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The Context 
This thesis essentially tries to unpick three recurring themes. These are: 
  What is the nature of humanitarian assistance in the 21st century? The 
formal humanitarian principles for humanitarian action are humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and operational independence (OCHA, 2010). By 
definition humanitarian aid must be provided without discrimination as 
to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion 
and relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs (United 
Nations, 1991). But is this really what happens? At the present moment 
almost half of all humanitarian assistance is financed by a combination 
of the United States Government and the European Commission. 
Eighteen of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian aid between 2000-
2010 were affected by conflict for five or more years. Out of these 
countries, 14 of them receive long-term assistance, but is this really 
humanitarian aid (GHA, 2012)?  
  What happens in complex emergencies such as the case of Somalia 
where delivery is clearly hampered by protagonists in that complex 
emergency; the concerns of acting agencies for their own safety; and 
the desire of the donors to seek involvement even if it is at a distance. 
Can the Somali case study provide evidence of sustainability that 
suggests a transition from emergency assistance to a normal 
development path? 
  The third theme is to ask what is the value of evaluation in 
humanitarian assistance especially, in such cases where 
humanitarianism itself is severely compromised. Evaluation always 
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accepts the policy framework and in the Somali case this policy 
framework was that western donors would continue funding a low level 
of assistance in the continuing chronic emergency to explore strands of 
livelihoods sustainability. Could evaluation findings support such a 
policy intervention? 
 
1.2. Background 
The researcher’s background provides an insight into the researchers 
orientation and thinking. My undergraduate degree was a joint degree in 
Geography and Environmental Management with an emphasis on sustainable 
development. On graduation in 2003, I took employment as a Sustainability 
Planning Policy Officer in a UK Local Authority. I began working internationally 
through the Netherlands Climate Assistance Programme at ETC UK in 2004. 
This work was with teams in Mozambique and Tanzania to explore the 
impacts of climate change and develop programmes and ministerial policies 
to support community level adaptation to climate change. During this time, I 
completed an MSc in Clean Technology, which was an engineering based 
programme that focused on renewable energy technologies. I also spent 
several years summarising literature and researching climate change 
mitigation and adaptation for the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Conference of Parties under the Kyoto Protocol Agreement, 
drafting papers on the challenges of developing country adaptation 
(Conference of Parties 10-12 in Argentina, Canada and Kenya).   
 
I consider myself as someone with three strands to their professional 
existence. The first is that I am a professional researcher with wide 
experience of embedded enquiry in both the developed and the developing 
world. The second is that I consider myself to be an academic, even though 
my career path at the present moment has not produced the traditional 
academic post of researcher/teacher; despite this I have a history of peer 
reviewed publications in the area of natural hazards and climate change, 
which shows continued engagement with the academy. The third is that I 
have become and am regarded by others as a senior evaluator who has 
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actually led evaluations in complex emergencies. Evaluation requires that 
those who commission the evaluation and the beneficiaries of the 
programmes under evaluation trust the integrity and judgement of the 
evaluation leadership. In some sense this thesis lays bare several of the 
questions that an evaluator must ask of herself. 
 
While conducting my first evaluation of humanitarian aid in Sudan, I began to 
notice the top down nature of the humanitarian aid compared to the very light 
and peripheral involvement of the beneficiaries. I asked myself two questions: 
if the humanitarian organisations withdrew tomorrow, would the beneficiary 
communities be any better placed to face the next acute emergency? In one-
two year’s time, would the humanitarian projects implemented have created 
sustained positive improvements for the local communities? The answer to 
these questions was mostly ‘no’, which led to further questions of how can 
humanitarian aid that has been delivered to communities for years have such 
little impact or do nothing to break the cycle of chronic-acute crisis within 
complex emergencies? These questions became the driver behind this 
research – to understand how we were getting humanitarian aid in chronic 
complex emergencies so wrong and to strive to develop an alternative 
approach that would help us to get it right.  
 
I continued to conduct evaluations of humanitarian aid in chronic complex 
emergencies with the aim of collecting research to answer the above 
questions and generate a collection of case studies to offer insight into the 
potential strategies for improving the delivery of humanitarian aid in chronic 
complex emergencies. An evaluation approach gave the researcher access to 
all project and programme documentation including confidential documents; 
access to field and project staff; and access to beneficiaries and project sites. 
In most chronic complex emergencies, the only point of entry to the field is 
through either involvement in humanitarian aid delivery or as an evaluator of 
that aid. Ultimately evaluations provided the vehicle for my PhD fieldwork. All 
contracting agencies were made aware of this and they were happy for me to 
tailor the evaluation framework, model and methods accordingly (see Chapter 
4 Methodology for further details).  
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1.3. Research Questions  
In conventional doctoral thesis term, there is need to focus on specific 
questions that can be answered from empirical evidence. These questions 
are: 
 
1. What involvement or role do beneficiaries and affected populations 
have in the process of humanitarian interventions? 
2. When delivering humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies 
are interventions relevant and appropriate and if so how? 
3. To what extent are humanitarian interventions during complex 
emergencies effective and sustainable? 
4. To what extent can humanitarian aid deliver to long-term emergencies? 
a. Can these interventions have a real impact?  
b. If yes, what are the criteria for such projects and how do so 
many fail to be sustainable or have impact? 
 
1.4 Fieldwork and Evaluation Experience 
My fieldwork and evaluation experience began as a member of the second 
global evaluation for humanitarian assistance, which was commissioned by 
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My specific experience within this 
work was in South Sudan where I examined the SC-UK programme, which 
was largely focused on water and sanitation. I also evaluated programmes of 
CARE International and UNICEF. I was a member of the team that produced 
the overall report to the Dutch Parliament (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2006). Following this I was asked to join two evaluation teams in 
Somalia. The first commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the second commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Chapter 5 of 
this thesis reflects evidence from the evaluation report of Norwegian Church 
Aid. With this experience behind me I was asked to lead an evaluation team 
for Action by Churches Together International in Somalia; reflections on this 
evaluation are contained in Chapter 6 of this thesis. After Somalia the 
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Norwegian Refugee Council requested me to conduct an evaluation in Liberia 
consolidating my leadership of evaluation in humanitarian assistance.  
 
I could have presented three separate case studies on Somalia or included 
the Sudan and Liberian material to examine the issues of humanitarian 
assistance in complex emergencies and the value of evaluation in these 
circumstances. I have chosen instead to present the two case studies of 
Norwegian Church Aid in Somalia and Action by Churches Together in 
Somalia. I did this because despite the difficulties, these programmes 
uniquely carried hints of sustainability that were unobtainable in the other 
Somalia South Sudan and Liberia experiences. Quite consciously I am 
searching for positive results that reinforce livelihoods.  
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is fairly conventional and as such might limit wider 
policy discussion. The second chapter considers the nature of 
humanitarianism itself noting the changes in organisation especially with the 
rise of complex emergencies. This second chapter takes humanitarian 
assistance and examines it in the context of the natural hazard paradigm 
including notions of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity. Thus, 
linking the humanitarian assistance debates to the current international 
engagement with policy response to climate change. The third chapter 
presents an account of the emergence of the complex emergency in Somalia 
with an emphasis on the chronic nature of the emergency rather than an 
acute disaster. It does so by providing an overall account of access to 
essential services that underpin basic needs. The fourth chapter is a 
methodological chapter required of a conventional doctoral thesis. However, 
the exploration of methodological issues is less about methods per se and 
largely about the challenge of evaluation using existing quantitative and 
qualitative techniques available to the social sciences. It also clearly raises 
issues of ethics and safety.  
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Chapter five is based on the evaluation commissioned by Action by Churches 
Together. The essential conclusion of this chapter is that under chronic 
emergencies it is possible to build sustainable projects as long as they are 
delivered in a specific cultural context i.e. religion supported delivery and 
embedded within a community that has control of the resources. Chapter six 
is based on the evaluation commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid and 
reinforces the message in Chapter five, but in many senses is a more 
reflective chapter for it is the evaluation, which I led and in which I had to 
reconsider the issue of community control in complex emergencies. Chapter 
seven offers a conclusion, but in many senses this conclusion raises more 
questions than it offers answers. However, the essential conclusion is that 
chronic emergencies are more akin to development projects where 
interventions have to be embedded and owned by the local community if they 
are to be sustainable.  
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Chapter 2 
Humanitarian Assistance 
 
2.1 The Emergence of the Humanitarian System 
Humanitarian assistance is the international efforts provided for people in 
distress by individuals, organisations or governments where the prime 
motivation is to prevent and alleviate human suffering (International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1994).  
 
In 1859, a Swiss businessman named Henry Dunant was appalled at the 
suffering of thousands of men who were left to die due to a lack of care after 
the Battle of Solferino. He proposed the creation of national relief societies 
made up of volunteers to provide neutral and impartial help to relieve suffering 
in times of war. In response to these ideas a committee, which later became 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was established in 
Geneva and in 1863 the founding charter of the Red Cross was established. 
Henry Dunant went on to propose that countries should adopt an international 
agreement that would recognise the status of medical services and of the 
wounded on the battlefield (British Red Cross, no date). This agreement, 
adopted in 1864, became known as the Geneva Convention. These actions 
marked the beginnings of formal humanitarian movements.  
 
The United Nations (UN), a term coined by Franklin Roosevelt during World 
War Two in 1942, came into official existence in 1945. Its predecessor – the 
League of Nations – was an organisation conceived under similar 
circumstances during the First World War in 1919 (United Nations, 2005). The 
United Nations original 51 members signed the United Nations Charter with 
the aim of maintaining international peace and security; achieving 
international cooperation in solving international problems; and promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (United Nations, 1945). 
Since its first coordinated humanitarian relief operations in Europe, following 
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the devastation and massive displacement of people in the Second World 
War, the United Nations has been relied upon by the international community 
to respond to natural and conflict-related disasters that are beyond the 
capacity of national authorities alone (United Nations, 1999).  
 
There are three fundamental principles of humanitarian intervention that 
originated from operational humanitarian practice and are reflected to varying 
degrees in the Charter of the United Nations, International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law (United Nations, 1991a). These three 
core principles are impartiality, neutrality and independence (OCHA, 2010). 
Impartiality means no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, religious 
beliefs, class, gender or political opinions: humanitarian interventions must be 
guided solely by needs. Neutrality demands that humanitarian agencies do 
not take sides in either hostilities or ideological controversy. Showing 
humanity means human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, 
with particular attention to the most vulnerable. Independence requires that 
humanitarian agencies retain their autonomy of action (United Nations, 
1991a). These three principles underlie any humanitarian actions whether in 
response to conflict-related or natural disasters. 
 
Natural disasters are the consequences of natural hazards, which are 
naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by rapid or slow onset 
events having atmospheric, geologic and hydrologic origins for example, 
earthquakes, floods, droughts, hurricanes and Tsunamis (UNESCO, 2010). A 
complex emergency is a  
 
“humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or 
considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict 
and what requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or 
capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country 
program” (IASC, 1994, p. 8).  
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Complex emergencies are often exacerbated by natural disasters and require 
large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance that is hindered by security 
risks and political and military constraints (WHO, 2002).  
 
Since the early 1990s, there has been both an increase in the number of 
disasters – both natural and complex – and a change in the nature of 
emergencies leading to a substantial increase in humanitarian assistance. 
Natural disasters have increased drastically. During 2000-2009 there were 
385 natural disasters, an increase of 233 percent since 1980-1989, and of 67 
percent since 1990-1999. The annual death toll for the 2000-decade was 
78,000, which is considerably higher than the 43,000 average of the previous 
decade (UNISDR, 2010; UNISDR and CRED, 2010).  
 
Complex emergencies, characterised by high levels of civilian casualties, 
deliberate destruction of livelihoods and welfare systems, collapse of the rule 
of law and large numbers of displaced people, have increased drastically 
since the end of the Cold War. According to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, between 1975 and 1985 there were five such emergencies 
worldwide each year, comparatively by the mid-1990s there were 50 serious 
armed conflicts ongoing in the world (Hansch, 1995). By 1995 conflict had 
taken over from drought as the primary cause of famine. The number of 
serious armed conflicts has decreased slightly and as of 2008 there were 36 
armed conflicts ongoing worldwide (UCDP, 2009). However, despite the slight 
decline in number, more than 740,000 people die each year as a result of 
armed conflict (Alexander, 2009) and more disasters worldwide are now 
classified as complex emergencies (Hearns and Deeny, 2007). Internal 
conflict is the main cause of refugee crises (FAO, 2010) and in 2009 there 
were more people displaced within their country by conflict and violence than 
at any point since the mid-1990s. Since 1997 to 2012 the number of refugees 
worldwide has remained fairly stable fluctuating between 13-16 million, 
however, an alarming total of 26.4 million people were internally displaced 
and almost half of these were in five countries – Colombia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan (IDMC and NRC, 2010; UNHCR, 
2011).  
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2.2 The Humanitarian System and Actors 
The humanitarian system has undergone numerous changes and reforms 
over the years in order to improve its response to emergencies and address 
the changing nature of emergencies. Today, the international humanitarian 
system consists, principally, of four sets of actors: donor governments, 
including the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the United 
Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC) 
and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Local NGOs and 
beneficiaries have little voice in the system. 
 
The United Nations (UN) as lead agency has an effective division of labour 
that sees the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) 
in charge of the policy and planning framework (ReliefWeb no date); the 
World Food Programme (WFP) responsible for emergency food delivery and 
logistics (WFP, 2010); the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) is responsible for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
and is the lead agency for shelter (UNHCR, 2010; UNHCR, 2010a); the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) focuses on education and child 
health (UNICEF, 2010); and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) is 
responsible for emergency agriculture, which if successful should mark the 
end of the emergency and the diminution of the role of WFP.  
 
Ironically, the health sector is the only sector not delivered directly by the UN. 
This rests largely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), who arguably are the only two absolute 
humanitarian organisations (ICRC, 2009 and MSF, 2010). The World Health 
Organization (WHO) is largely involved with programming and policy, less 
involved with the management of medical delivery, and not at all involved in 
medical delivery (WHO, 2006 and United Nations, 1999). Despite this there 
are three distinct areas in which the UN delivers what can broadly be 
described as medical interventions – food security (including nutrition), 
shelter, and water and sanitation. 
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On-the-ground management of relief remains a contentious subject and is 
closely tied to the issue of coordination. The United Nations system, through 
OCHA, is usually responsible for the coordination of ground-level 
management (United Nations, 1991), increasingly through the ‘Cluster 
Approach’. The Cluster Approach was established in 2005 and identifies a 
lead agency to coordinate efforts in a specific sector (OneResponse, 2010). 
The ad hoc, unpredictable nature of many international responses to 
humanitarian emergencies prompted the Emergency Relief Coordinator 
(ERC) in 2005 to launch an independent Humanitarian Response Review of 
the global humanitarian system. The review assessed the humanitarian 
response capacities of the international humanitarian actors to identify critical 
gap areas and make recommendations to address them. The review identified 
the Cluster Approach as a method of addressing the gaps and strengthening 
the effectiveness of humanitarian response through building partnerships. 
Moreover the Cluster Approach clarifies the division of labour among 
organisations and better defines agency roles and responsibilities. The 
Cluster Approach aims to make the humanitarian community more structured, 
accountable and professional, so that it can be a better partner for host 
governments, local authorities and local civil society (HSRU, 2010). In 
general, however, information sharing for on-the-ground management, and 
effective coordination, remains the weakest link in humanitarian delivery 
(Minear, 2002; Stephenson and Kehler, 2004). 
 
2.3 Humanitarian Sectors 
The ultimate aim of humanitarian interventions is to reduce the loss of life. In 
order to survive people need food and water, shelter from the elements and 
the injured and sick need healthcare. There are other humanitarian sectors 
such as education and agriculture however, it is ultimately the former four 
aspects that determine a person’s survival. The main issues surrounding the 
delivery of humanitarian aid in each of these four sectors are discussed briefly 
below.  
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2.3.1 Health 
Everyone has the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health and everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of themselves and their family, including food, 
clothing, housing, medical care, and social services (United Nations, 1948). 
 
Disasters usually generate significant impacts on the public health and well-
being of affected populations. These impacts can be described as direct (for 
example, death, injury, or psychological trauma) or indirect (such as increased 
rates of infectious disease, malnutrition, complications of chronic disease). 
Conflict obviously produces deaths and injuries on the battlefield, however the 
indirect, or secondary, public health effects are also catastrophic, with most 
deaths during complex emergencies occurring due to preventable causes, 
such as increased rates of infectious diseases and malnutrition (Brennan and 
Nandy, 2001; Connolly, 2004). In fact, complex emergencies account for more 
death, disease and disability than all other types of disaster combined 
(Ormhaug, Meier and Hernes, 2009).  
 
The severity of direct and indirect health impacts and the subsequent need 
and type of relief operations depend upon several factors. First, the type of 
emergency or disaster situation: different types of disaster are associated with 
differing scales and patterns of mortality and morbidity. The public health and 
medical needs of an affected community will therefore vary according to the 
type and extent of disaster. Earthquakes, for example, cause many injuries 
requiring medical care, whereas floods cause relatively few. In general, public 
health interventions of humanitarian assistance are designed to ensure the 
greatest health benefits are provided to the greatest number of people. 
 
Second, the ability of existing services and resources of a country to cope 
greatly determine the level and type of health humanitarian assistance 
required. Natural disasters can cause serious damage to health facilities, 
water supply, and sewage systems, having a direct impact on the health of 
the population dependent on these services. The earthquake that struck 
Mexico City in 1985, for example, resulted in the collapse of 13 hospitals. In 
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just three of those buildings, 866 people died, 100 of whom were health 
personnel. As a result of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the water supply systems of 
23 hospitals in Honduras were damaged or destroyed, and 123 health centers 
were affected and the Asian earthquake in 2005 destroyed 100 hospitals in 
Pakistan (NWHO, 2005). 
Existing health services in most developing countries are already inadequate 
or unable to cope with current demands, therefore automatically exacerbating 
the need for health humanitarian aid when an emergency strikes. In complex 
emergencies, health infrastructure, services, and the staff themselves can be 
targeted and destroyed (Burkle, 1999). In addition, inadequate food supplies, 
damaged water and sanitation facilities, lack of shelter, and overcrowding can 
have the indirect impact of increasing rates of infectious diseases such as 
cholera, typhoid, and measles. 
Third, the current health status of the population can affect the severity of 
direct and indirect health impacts and the need for humanitarian assistance. 
Populations already suffering a lack of health services, food shortages, and 
poor water and sanitation facilities will be inherently weak. These populations 
are extremely vulnerable to external shocks, and should a disaster occur, 
injuries are likely to be more severe, casualties higher, and the need for 
humanitarian assistance greater. Chronic development conditions are the 
driver for many acute emergencies (Drimie, 2004). 
Health humanitarian assistance is delivered largely by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). 
Both ICRC and MSF have an extensive range of guidelines they use and 
follow when implementing relief operations. ICRC, the UN, and most NGOs 
accept the Sphere Standards (see Box 1) and targets in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.  
MSF assisted with the establishment of the technical standards and key 
indicators of the Sphere Standards but prefer to use their own technical 
standards, which strongly acknowledge the conditionality of intervention by 
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individual disaster (Giesen, no date). MSF usually use Sphere Standards and 
indicators as a starting point in collaboration with their own ‘Clinical 
Guidelines’. 
(Source: The Sphere Project, 2010) 
2.3.2 Food 
Minimum dietary energy requirements are the amount of dietary energy that is 
considered adequate to meet the energy needs of a person for light activity 
and good health. This requirement is expressed in kilocalories (Kcal) per day. 
On average, a healthy adult requires approximately 2,070 kilocalories per day 
(WHO, FAO and UNU 1985). Although, this varies depending on age, sex, 
lifestyle, daily level of activity, height, weight, body composition, and current 
medical status. 
It is a human right to have adequate food and be free of hunger (United 
Nations, 1999a) yet the number of food emergencies has continued to rise 
from an average of 15 per year during the 1980s to more than 30 per year 
since the turn of the millennium. In 2009 the number of hungry people grew to 
more than one billion – the highest on record and the World Food Programme 
The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs 
and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Sphere is based on two 
core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human 
suffering arising from calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by 
disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. 
These organisations framed a Humanitarian Charter and identified minimum 
standards to be attained in disaster assistance in key sectors including health, 
food, shelter and water and sanitation. This process led to the publication of 
the first Sphere handbook in 2000. The Sphere minimum standards and 
accompanying key indicators are the most widely acknowledged international 
standards and have been ratified by over 400 organisations representing 80 
countries.
Box 1 The Sphere Standards 
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responded by delivering food aid to 101.8 million people – 84 million of them 
women and children – across 75 countries (WFP, 2010).  
States and non-state actors have responsibilities to fulfill the right to food. 
There are many situations in which these state obligations, however, are 
violated for example, the deliberate starvation of populations or the 
destruction of their livelihoods as a war strategy. President Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe has on numerous occasions prevented NGOs distributing food aid, 
which at times has placed most the Zimbabwean population at risk of 
starvation (Raath, 2008). In these situations, humanitarian actors must aid the 
populations affected through providing food assistance via methods that 
respect national law while meeting international human rights obligations. 
Natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, land/mud slides and 
volcanic eruptions can severely affect food availability. Standing crops can be 
completely destroyed, and seed stores along with family food stocks can be 
totally lost. Similar to most humanitarian needs, the need for food aid depends 
upon the severity of the disaster. 
Access to food and the maintenance of adequate nutritional status are critical 
determinants of people’s survival in an emergency situation. During the first 
days after a disaster, the extent of damage is often unknown, and 
communications are difficult. As such no detailed calculations need be made 
of the precise vitamin, mineral, or protein content in the food distributed in the 
initial phase, but supplies need to be acceptable, palatable, and provide 
sufficient energy. During this stage of the emergency it is simply important to 
provide a minimum of 6.7 to 8.4 megajoules (1,600 to 2,000 kcal) per person 
per day. At the onset of an emergency, a one-time rapid assessment can be 
used to identify immediate needs and individuals likely to be most at risk 
(WHO, 1995). Nutritional surveillance should be initiated soon after, if not 
immediately (depending on staff and resources available), to identify the 
nutritional status of the population and provide warning of any deepening 
crisis (WHO, 2010). 
16
The decision to distribute large amounts of food aid should be based on the 
most accurate information available. If unnecessarily large quantities of food 
are brought into an area, recovery can be hindered. Excess food aid can flood 
the market, depressing prices, and as a result render the crops that were 
harvestable worthless. This can have serious effects on livelihoods. Farmers 
unable to make a profit will have insufficient funds to purchase the seeds, 
tools, or livestock necessary for the next harvest (Gidley, 2005; Shah, 2005). 
Thus, more developmental aid would be necessary in the form of seeds and 
tools to restart the local economy and prevent a dependence on relief from 
emerging. If continued food aid is required after the initial shock of the 
disaster, an appropriate general ration must be established. There has been a 
marked shift from an old model of warehousing with food stores sourced 
externally to a local purchasing model that involves prioritising local and then 
regional markets (WFP, 2008).  
If there is a failure in the general food pipeline or if acute food insecurity or 
malnutrition is already present amongst the population, a general food ration 
can prove insufficient or inappropriate. Moderate malnutrition can be 
addressed through improving the general food ration, ensuring food security, 
and establishing access to health care, sanitation facilities, and potable water. 
Measuring malnutrition is detailed in Box 2. Enhancing the general food ration 
by ‘targeted supplementary feeding’1 is usually the primary strategy for 
correction of moderate malnutrition and prevention of severe malnutrition. 
When rates of malnutrition are high, targeting the moderately malnourished 
can be inefficient and therefore all individuals meeting certain at-risk criteria 
(for example, pregnant women and those aged 6–59 months) become eligible 
for supplementary feeding. This is known as ‘blanket supplementary feeding’ 
(UNHCR/WFP, 1999). 
Severe malnutrition is corrected through therapeutic care. This can be 
1 The aim of a targeted supplementary feeding programme is to prevent the 
moderately malnourished becoming severely malnourished and to rehabilitate them. 
These types of programmes usually provide a food supplement to the general ration 
for mild and moderately malnourished individuals and for selected pregnant and 
nursing mothers and other nutritionally at-risk individuals (UNHCR/WFP, 1999).  
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delivered as 24-hour in-patient care, day care, and home-based care 
(UNHCR/WFP, 1999). The provision of in-patient care depends on other 
standards, such as the provision of functioning water and sanitation facilities. 
(Source: World Health Organization, 2006a) 
Blanket feeding can be used at the start of an emergency, as implementation 
of a full general food distribution programme takes time. Blanket feeding can 
also be initiated when there is a severe food crisis or when a significant and 
persistent deterioration in food availability is expected even prior to nutritional 
problems arising. Supplementary feeding is usually necessary in a food crisis 
or famine situation in which malnutrition rates exceed 15 percent. A 
Therapeutic Feeding Center (TFC) should be established when the absolute 
The World Health Organization (2006a) has developed a series of child growth 
standards using a range of measurements to provide guidelines for identifying the 
healthy growth of children. Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) and Body 
Mass Index (BMI, also referred to as weight for height) are measurements 
generally taken from children to assess and identify levels of malnutrition. MUAC 
is a measure of thinness or wasting from the left mid-upper arm. It is only 
sensitive in children 1–5 years. A MUAC measure of more than 135 mm is 
normal, and children with an MUAC less than 135 mm are measured using their 
weight/height ratio to see whether they should enter the malnutrition programme. 
The weight/height ratio is considered the most reliable indicator in emergencies of 
the nutritional status of a child. A MUAC of 110–124 mm illustrates moderate 
malnutrition and less than 110 mm demonstrates severe malnutrition. When 
measuring MUAC, colored bands are used to help illiterate workers classify 
children’s nutritional status. BMI is an index of weight for height (BMI 1⁄4 weight 
(kilograms)/height (meters squared)), which can identify moderate and acute 
malnutrition as a measure of wasting. According to the WHO Global Database on 
Body Mass Index (WHO, 2006a), the normal range is 18.50–24.99; underweight 
is 18.5; moderate thinness is 16–16.99; and severe thinness is less than 16. 
Box 2 Measuring Malnutrition 
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number suffering severe malnutrition exceeds 30 patients and the prevalence 
of severe malnutrition is above three percent, providing that staff and other 
resources are available. When the numbers are smaller, it is more appropriate 
to support existing health structures in the provision of therapeutic feeding 
care rather than implementing a new programme. 
 
The Sphere Handbook (Sphere Project, 2004) outlines the standards that 
food aid should meet, according to various levels of need and the severity of 
the situation. It includes standards and indicators for general nutritional 
support, moderate malnutrition, and severe malnutrition. There are also 
standards for the correction of micronutrient deficiencies, but these largely 
rely on the achievement of standards in health systems and infrastructure and 
the control of communicable diseases. 
 
Food distribution centres and hospitals treating malnutrition often become 
quickly overcrowded in times of humanitarian crisis. People camp near them 
to ensure they have a secure source of food and medical treatment, 
especially in rural areas in which villages are sparsely populated and the 
nearest food distribution center can be several miles away.  
 
In 1999, Andre Briend, a French scientist, developed ‘Plumpy’nut,’ a peanut-
based food for use in famine relief. It is a ready-to-use therapeutic food in a 
foil pouch, which contains 500 kilocalories and weighs only 92 grams. 
Plumpy’nut can be administered to treat both moderate and severe 
malnutrition although the majority of aid agencies concentrate Plumpy’nut 
usage for the treatment of severe malnutrition (MSF, 2007; Gammon, 2009). 
Once opened, Plumpy’nut has a shelf life of two years, which is advantageous 
in locations where refrigeration or storage is a problem. Plumpy’nut also 
allows parents to care for their own children at home as opposed to in 
crowded hospitals. This both frees up much needed hospital space and 
returns responsibility and control of feeding children to the parents/guardians 
(Wines, 2005). The major advantage of Plumpy’nut is that unlike powdered 
milk given to malnourished children, no water or preparation is necessary, 
which is important in areas where water supplies may be disrupted, scarce, 
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contaminated, or unsafe (Getachew, 2007). Plumpy’nut was first used on a 
large-scale during 2005 for the crisis in Darfur in western Sudan (initially 
feeding 30,000 children). It has since been used in Ethiopia, Congo, Malawi, 
and Niger, and according to aid agencies is cutting malnutrition by half 
(Clayton, 2005). Current projects are under development in Malawi, Ethiopia 
and Niger to begin producing Plumpy’nut locally, which is essential to 
reducing costs and building the capacity and resilience of affected 
populations. Plumpy’nut is now a used by many organisations in responding 
to famine. 
 
2.3.3 Shelter 
Hypothermia is a decrease in body temperature to 94 degrees Fahrenheit or 
lower. At low temperatures the body’s organs become less effective and slow 
down. If body temperature falls below 86 degrees Fahrenheit, organs are 
likely to stop working and death is probable. Hyperthermia is an increase in 
body temperature above 99 degrees Fahrenheit (Beers, 2004). When a 
person’s surroundings are hotter than his or her body temperature, heat 
cramps, heat exhaustion, or heatstroke can occur. Both hypothermia and 
hyperthermia are preventable. Key aspects of avoiding hypothermia include 
maintaining a warm environment, wearing several layers of clothes, and 
eating warm food and fluids. Hyperthermia can be avoided through wearing 
light clothes that allow air and moisture to pass through easily, replacing fluids 
and salts lost through sweating, and using shade, air-conditioning or fans. 
 
On 8 October 2005, an earthquake hit South Asia, mostly affecting northern 
Pakistan. Approximately 73,000 people were killed, over 100,000 people were 
injured, and 3.3 million people were homeless and in need of shelter as 
hundreds of thousands of buildings collapsed (Oxfam, 2005). Shortly after the 
earthquake hit, snow started to fall as the harsh Himalayan winter set in. The 
UN declared that 210,000 tents and two million sleeping bags were needed 
immediately to stop people from dying of the cold (OCHA, 2005). 
Unfortunately, 75 percent of the 400,000 tents rushed to the earthquake zone 
in the aftermath of the quake were unsuitable for the winter conditions 
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(USAID, 2005). As a result, most NGOs and INGOs spent their time 
‘winterizing’ the tents and providing materials to build sturdier shelters. 
Furthermore, only a handful of the camps that were established met the 
Sphere Standards, and sanitation quickly became a major problem (Lilly, 
2006). Cold-related injuries, such as pneumonia, soared as temperatures fell 
and people, mainly children, began dying as a result (Spry-Leverton, 2005; 
Miller, 2005).   
 
Shelter, and most importantly appropriate shelter, is a crucial element of 
humanitarian assistance and a critical determinant for survival in the initial 
stages of a disaster. The most basic response to the need for shelter is the 
provision of clothing, blankets, and bedding that maintain health, privacy, and 
dignity; that is, delivery at a personal level before the delivery of buildings 
(Sphere Project, 2004a). Beyond survival, shelter is necessary to provide 
security and personal safety, protection from the climate, and enhanced 
resistance to ill health and disease. People also require basic goods and 
supplies to meet their personal hygiene needs, to prepare and eat food, and 
to provide necessary levels of thermal comfort. The type of aid required to 
meet these needs is determined by the nature and scale of the disaster, the 
climatic conditions, local environment, political and security conditions, and 
the ability of the community to cope. 
 
According to the Sphere Standards (Sphere Project, 2004a), the priority is 
encouraging affected households to return to the site of their original dwelling 
when possible, or if this is not possible, the affected populations should settle 
independently within a host community or with host families. When these 
options are not possible, affected households should be accommodated in 
large shelters or temporary camps, also referred to as ‘transitional 
settlements’ (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005). The physical planning of these 
shelters or settlements must use local planning practices when possible and 
must be able to provide suitable privacy, safe access to water, sanitary 
facilities, health care, and solid-waste disposal. For longer-term shelters, 
graveyards, schools, places of worship, meeting points, and recreational 
areas must be considered. The design of the shelter and materials used 
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should be familiar to the affected population when possible and provide 
sufficient thermal comfort, fresh air, and protection from the climate. Dadaab 
in Kenya is a camp or transitional settlement first established in 1991 when 
Somali’s began crossing the border after fleeing conflict in their country (Care, 
2006). Dadaab is now the world’s largest transitional settlement and as of 
mid-2009, 280,000 Somali’s were living there after fleeing the ongoing civil 
unrest in Somalia (Associated Press, 2009).  
 
2.3.4 Water and Sanitation 
A human being on average can survive on three litres of water per day. Basic 
needs, however, go beyond what we need to drink or ingest through our food 
for daily survival. It is estimated that one person requires 15 litres per day to 
maintain a basic standard of personal and domestic hygiene sufficient to 
maintain health (Sphere Project, 2004b). 
 
Clean water is a basic requirement for life and health. Sufficient and safe 
water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, reduce the risk of 
water-related disease, and provide for cooking, and personal and domestic 
hygienic requirements. Sanitation has proven equally critical in preventing ill 
health and is also recognised as a basic human right (Vidar and Mekouar, 
2002). 
 
The need for safe water and sanitation becomes elevated in the initial stages 
of a disaster when people are more vulnerable as a result of injuries, 
malnourishment, and stress, and diseases are able to spread easily through 
overcrowding and contaminated water supplies. Preventable diseases such 
as diarrhea kill more people in chronic emergencies than any other factor, 
including conflict (Connolly, 2004 and Hargreaves, 2003).  
 
In 1994, for example, approximately one million Rwandans fled conflict and 
genocide and crossed the border into Zaire, exhausted, hungry, and scared. 
The small town of Goma in Zaire was overrun with Rwandan refugees, who 
were forced to settle 25 miles from the nearest water source. The average 
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available water was evaluated at 200mm3 per person per day. The initial camp 
was built on a lava bed, making latrine building almost impossible. Within the 
first week of arriving, almost 50,000 refugees died as epidemics of cholera 
and Shigella dysenteriae swept through the camps (Goma Epidemiology 
Group, 1995). This devastating cholera outbreak was a result of inadequate 
clean water, poor sanitation, a lack of hygiene and the level of health among 
the refugees.  
 
Every year millions of people receive emergency water and sanitation 
(WATSAN) aid. The Sphere Handbook details the minimum requirements for 
this aid, which includes standards and indicators regarding water quality, 
supply, use, and sanitation facilities. 
 
Simply providing sufficient water and sanitation facilities, however, will not 
ensure optimal use or impact on public health unless coupled with an 
understanding of hygiene. The affected population must possess the 
necessary information, knowledge, and understanding regarding water- and 
sanitation-related diseases. When this knowledge does not exist, this relies on 
information exchange between the aid agency and affected community in 
order to identify the key hygiene problems, existing awareness, and required 
knowledge to ensure optimal use of water and sanitation facilities (Sphere 
Project, 2004c). This information enables the design, implementation, and 
monitoring of water and sanitation aid to have the greatest impact on public 
health. The Sphere Standards recognise the importance of hygiene promotion 
and incorporate appropriate standards to ensure that hygiene-promotion 
messages and activities address key behaviors and any misconceptions. 
 
Initially the delivery of water and sanitation aid was dominated by the 
provision of clean water, whereas sanitation facilities were often inadequate if 
not totally absent. Politicians, decision makers, and donors did not consider 
sanitation to be of equal importance to water supply (De Jong, 2003). They 
failed to recognise, for example, that while investments in water quality and 
quantity could reduce deaths from diarrhea by 21 percent, sanitation could 
reduce these by 37.5 percent and hygiene promotion by 33 percent (WHO, 
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2004). In recent years, however, research and an expanse of literature and 
information available have ensured that the importance of sanitation and 
hygiene has become more internationally recognised:  In 2005 sanitation was recognised as a basic human right (United 
Nations, 2005a).  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000) include a target to 
halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation.  The Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC) 
(1990) was established, which has a special interest in sanitation and 
hygiene and emphasises the need to view water, sanitation, and 
hygiene as inseparable. (WSSCC exists under a mandate from the 
United Nations and is governed by a multi-stakeholder steering 
committee. It focuses exclusively on people around the world who lack 
water and sanitation).  The internationally used Sphere Handbook (2004) has a specific 
chapter detailing standards for water supply, sanitation, and hygiene 
promotion.  The UN declared 2005-2015 the Water for Life Decade to set the world 
agenda on a greater focus on water-related issues.  
 
Sanitation is becoming recognised as an essential element of humanitarian 
assistance that is as equally important as supplying clean water, food, and 
medical care in ensuring the health of populations. Furthermore, these 
international initiatives, together with an increase in research and publications, 
have highlighted that water and sanitation must come hand in hand with 
hygiene promotion to ensure the optimal use of humanitarian aid. 
 
From an end user perspective gender has frequently been raised as a lens to 
understand the sourcing of water. In a special edition of Gender, Place and 
Culture (2009) however, there is a mixed reaction to how powerful a gender 
perspective can be in delivering improved water and sanitation. Ahlers and 
Zwarteveen (2009) and Walker and Robinson argue (2009) that a focus on 
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‘women’ hides other significant factors in access to water such as class and 
age and social relations both at household and community scales. Such 
analysis tends to lead to individualising assumptions that allow neoliberal 
water and sanitation policies to be developed working against marginalized 
groups including women.  
 
2.4 Vulnerable Groups 
There are a number of vulnerable groups in humanitarian emergencies that 
usually require special attention and must be considered in all aspects of relief 
operations. The disabled, elderly, and children are immediately identifiable 
groups that have special needs such as particular dietary requirements or 
medical attention. In certain societies women are particularly vulnerable for 
example, some countries do not allow women to travel alone and without a 
male relation as an escort women become trapped or at increased risk of 
attack (Starkey and Sengupta, 2009). Other vulnerable groups can prove 
more difficult to identify, and their needs and effects upon emergencies 
appear less apparent; for example, people living with HIV/AIDS and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs). 
 
2.4.1 HIV/AIDS 
In 2011, 1.7 million people died of HIV/AIDS, and the pandemic is turning into 
a large-scale chronic disaster as estimates indicate 34 million people are now 
living with HIV/AIDS (amfAR, 2012). Rehabilitating agriculture generally marks 
the end of emergency aid and a return to development, but the advancing 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has produced a ‘new variant famine’ in which the lack of 
healthy labor retards that transition and creates food insecurity (de Waal and 
Whiteside, 2003). 
 
People living with HIV/AIDS need a nutritious, well-balanced diet. Poor 
nutrition can reduce medication efficacy and adherence and can accelerate 
the progression of the disease. A recent USAID study found that, compared to 
an average adult, people living with HIV/AIDS require 10 to 15 percent more 
energy and 50 percent more protein per day (FAO, 2003). HIV damages the 
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immune system, which reduces appetite and the body’s ability to absorb 
nutrients. As a result, the person becomes malnourished, loses weight, and is 
weakened. One possible sign of the onset of clinical AIDS is a weight loss of 
about 6–7 kilograms for an adult (WHO and FAO, 2002). Should a person 
already be underweight, this further weight loss would be extremely 
damaging. 
 
The spread of HIV/AIDS is also of concern in complex emergencies. The risk 
of HIV infection is exacerbated by the high incidence of sexual violence and 
sexual exploitation in conflict situations. Humanitarian interventions must 
recognise the importance of providing aid appropriate to, and that protects the 
rights of, people living with HIV/AIDS. Consequently, the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC; IASC is a forum involving key UN and non-UN 
humanitarian partners) has produced ‘Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions 
in Emergency Settings’ (2004), which aims to integrate HIV/AIDS components 
into all relevant programming areas. 
 
2.4.2 Internally Displaced Persons 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people who have been forced from 
their homes but have not crossed international borders, as a result of, or in 
order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict or situations of generalised 
violence. The legal position of IDPs in terms of existing human rights and 
humanitarian law was established in the United Nations ‘‘Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement’’ (1998). Unlike refugees, whose movement across 
national borders provides them with special status in international law with 
rights specific to their situation, IDPs have no such entitlement (Bradley, 
2012). Humanitarian assistance is thus limited, in principle, to supportive 
actions undertaken with the consent of the country in question. When 
governments are unable or unwilling, however, to provide protection to IDPs, 
humanitarian organisations have sought to assist these groups, grounding 
their right to provide assistance on existing provisions of international 
humanitarian law to war victims and on human rights treaties (de Mello and 
Deng, 1998).  
 26
 
The Kampala Convention, which came into force in December 2012, is a 
historic milestone and the first of its kind. It is a continental instrument that 
binds governments in Africa to provide legal protection for the rights and well-
being of those forced to flee inside their home countries due to conflict, 
violence, natural disasters or development projects. The Kampala Convention 
currently legally binds 15 countries and a total of 37 African countries have 
signed the convention but are not yet legally bound by its contents. Through 
the Kampala Convention national authorities must:  Gather data on and identify IDPs to understand where they are and what 
they need;  Provide personal ID documents;  Trace family members and help to reunite them; and   Consult with IDPs in decisions related to their needs  
(IDMC, 2012).  
 
While 15 countries are now legally bound by the Convention, there is still a 
long way to go before this is the case for all 53 countries in Africa. The major 
challenge now lies in transforming the convention into tangible improvements 
in the rights and wellbeing of IDPs across Africa (Bradley, 2012).  
 
Identification of IDPs, the different groups of displaced persons, and the 
varying needs of these groups are all issues that need consideration in the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. IDP groups can mix among resident 
communities, gather in camps, disperse throughout a territory, or be mixed 
with combatants who divert relief supplies and create serious security 
problems. A special category of IDPs that generates extreme concern to the 
humanitarian community is demobilised soldiers, as their displacement is not 
only from their homes but also their livelihoods. Under these circumstances, 
trauma, mental health, and psychological health problems often occur. 
Humanitarian organisations must address all these issues while upholding the 
principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence if humanitarian aid in all 
sectors is to prove adequate, appropriate, and effective. 
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2.5 Funding Humanitarian Aid 
The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) was established in 1991 and 
facilitated by OCHA with the aim to raise funding and assist organisations in 
planning, implementing, and monitoring their activities in crisis regions 
(Coppola, 2007). The CAP has since become the humanitarian sector’s main 
tool for coordination, strategic planning, and programming. Since 1992, over 
100 donor countries have provided more than US$42 billion to address the 
needs of people in more than 50 countries and regions (CAP, 2010).  
 
Total humanitarian assistance has been generally increasing although, there 
was a sharp peak in 2005 at US$13.1 billion compared with previous years 
and almost trebling that provided in 2004 (see Figure 1 below). The drastic 
peak in 2005 is largely a result of several major catastrophes including the 
Asian Tsunami that struck late December 2004, hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
August 2005 and the South Asian earthquake in October 2005.  
 
Despite small declines that generally occur after a peak, and as Figure 1 
illustrates, overall humanitarian aid budgets have continually increased since 
the 1980s (Buchanan-Smith and Randel, 2002). With the exception of 
particularly severe and large-scale natural disasters such as those in 2005, 
the growth in aid budgets is primarily linked to the predominance of complex 
emergencies. In 2001, donors contributed US$2.1 billion in response to 20 
complex emergencies, and US$311 million for 49 natural disasters. Although 
the number of people and countries affected by natural disasters is greater 
than for complex emergencies, conflict-related crises usually cause greater 
loss of life and entail more expensive response operations (ibid). There is of 
course an open question of whether humanitarian assistance in complex 
emergencies is actually a substitute for effective foreign policy. There remains 
an ongoing tension between humanitarianism as solely the relief of human 
suffering and humanitarianism as a tool in the foreign policy armoury 
(Munslow and O’Dempsey, 2010). This issue will be revisited in the 
conclusion and discussion section (Chapter 7). 
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Figure 1 Global Humanitarian Contributions and Commitments 2000-
2012 
 
* These figures do not account for charitable donations from individuals or groups, 
such as churches and they do not capture non-western assistance such as that 
provided by Islamic entities. 
(Source: Financial Tracking Service, 2013) 
 
The critical sectors in any emergency - health, food, shelter, water, and 
sanitation – are intricately linked and must all be delivered in a humanitarian 
crisis to ensure the survival and recovery of the affected population. The 
successful implementation of these sectors during a humanitarian emergency 
depends upon the levels of funding received. Table 1 illustrates the 
percentage of CAP requests fulfilled per sector. 
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Table 1 Humanitarian Consolidated and Flash Appeal Requirements Met 
Per Sector 
Sector 
% Contributions Met 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Food 89% 88% 88% 92% 77% 79% 96% 
Health 32% 49% 48% 47% 56% 64% 54% 
Shelter and Non-
Food Items 
27% 41% 51% 54% 55% 37% 39% 
Water and Sanitation 30% 44% 53% 49% 47% 46% 45% 
 (Source: Adapted from OCHA, 2012) 
 
Despite the overall growth in humanitarian funding, 100 percent of 
humanitarian appeals are rarely met and key sectors remain severely 
underfunded (Bailey, 2010). Table 1 indicates that food aid appeals are 
largely met through the CAP whereas health; shelter and Non-Food Items; 
and water and sanitation appeals rarely receive half of the requested funds. 
The links between these sectors are clear, and the repercussions of 
insufficient humanitarian aid in one will detrimentally affect the others for 
example, a lack of water and sanitation is likely to result in water-borne 
diseases such as diarrhea, which causes people to lose vital nutrients and 
become weak and as such need increased food and nutrition and in serious 
cases they will need medical attention and healthcare.   
 
In response to funding shortfalls, the Central Emergency Response Fund 
(CERF), a United Nations relief fund, was officially launched in March 2006. 
The objective of the CERF is to provide urgent and effective humanitarian aid 
to regions threatened by, or experiencing, a humanitarian crisis. The CERF 
was adopted in December 2005 and upgrades the loan mechanism under the 
1992 Central Emergency Revolving Fund from US$50 million to 
approximately US$450 million. The CERF is administered under the 
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator 
in consultation with humanitarian agencies. The CERF is not meant to detract 
from voluntary contributions to humanitarian programmes, or to replace the 
 30
consolidated appeals process or additional funding channels. Rather, it is 
meant to mitigate the unevenness and delays of voluntary contributions and 
provide funding to under-supported operations (OCHA, 2006). 
 
2.6 Accountability of the Humanitarian System 
The last two decades saw a dramatic expansion in the mechanisms available 
to the international community to provide humanitarian aid. This included 
rising aid budgets, the development of specialist UN agencies, military 
humanitarianism and the massive development of the non-governmental 
organisation sector (Macrae and Leader, 2000). In essence, although natural 
disasters and complex emergencies were an old phenomenon, the abilities of 
humanitarian organisations to respond on such a large scale was 
revolutionary.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s humanitarian organisations were largely exempt 
from serious evaluation or critical analysis (Crisp, 2000). However, the ability 
to deliver aid in increasingly complex environments; the greater absorption of 
public and private funding by humanitarian organisations; and increasing 
ability of the international media to document such emergencies placed 
growing pressure on the humanitarian system to deliver results and 
demonstrate accountability. This pressure erupted in 1994 during the 
Rwandan crisis where 500,000-800,000 people were violently killed over three 
months and the entire international community failed to respond adequately or 
timely both before and during the genocide (Sphere Project, 2006). The 
humanitarian response to the Rwandan genocide was the largest ever 
conducted at the time and attracted intense media scrutiny, with over 500 
journalists monitoring the effort (Eriksson, et al. 1996). In order to examine the 
failings of the humanitarian system in response to the genocide, an evaluation 
team was established – the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda (JEEAR). With 52 researchers and at a cost of over a million dollars, 
a five-volume evaluation report was produced. Whilst the Rwanda evaluation 
was somewhat unique in scale, its approach presented a new standard of 
good practice in evaluating humanitarian assistance – transparent, 
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consultative, multidisciplinary and independent (Crisp, 2000). Humanitarian 
agencies began embracing evaluations with the major humanitarian actors – 
AusAid (Australian Government Overseas Aid Program), DANIDA (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Denmark), ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian 
Office), OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 
SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and UNHCR 
(United Nations High Commission for Refugees) – all producing their own 
evaluation policies, guidelines and manuals. Evaluations of humanitarian 
efforts are now common practice and have attracted unprecedented levels of 
donor funding and agency commitment, as well as public and political interest. 
With a growing number of humanitarian evaluations and a need to 
demonstrate accountability during the mid-1990s the Active Learning Network 
of Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) was established.  
 
ALNAP was developed following the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) as a mechanism to provide a forum on 
learning, accountability and performance issues for the humanitarian sector. 
The JEEAR was the most comprehensive system-wide evaluation of an 
international humanitarian response and its results led to demands for 
increased professionalisation of the humanitarian sector and its reporting 
(ALNAP, 2009). ALNAP quickly developed a reputation for developing high-
quality tools and analysis on learning and accountability issues for the 
humanitarian sector. In particular, ALNAP has developed research and tools 
on the evaluation of humanitarian action and has become a leader for setting 
good practice in evaluating humanitarian assistance.  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)2 published a set of evaluative 
criteria for assessing international development interventions during 1986 
(OECD, 1986). These evaluation criteria were adopted by all major 
development agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2006). ALNAP 
                                            
2 DAC is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-
operation with developing countries. 
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also adopted these criteria to develop guidance on evaluating humanitarian 
assistance for the humanitarian sector – Evaluating Humanitarian Action 
using the OECD-DAC Criteria (ALNAP, 2006). These evaluation criteria are 
now at the heart of most humanitarian evaluations (see Table 3).  
 
2.7 Chronic Complex Emergencies 
Despite rising aid budgets and drastically improved reporting and 
accountability mechanisms, a number of countries remain in a state of chronic 
emergency with little progress or improvements evident despite receiving 
continuous flows of aid. Chronic complex emergencies such as those 
occurring in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Territories, 
the Philippines, Somalia and Sudan, are characterised by cumulative stresses 
that culminate to induce a need for humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 
2010). At least 16 of the 36 ongoing complex emergencies in the world have 
been in this situation for more than a decade (GHA, 2009). These countries 
are effectively receiving long-term humanitarian assistance. Since 2002, long-
term humanitarian assistance has accounted for over half of humanitarian 
spending and in 2003 and 2004, long-term humanitarian spending accounted 
for 79 percent and 76 percent respectively (GHA, 2009a). Humanitarian relief 
procedures and methods were designed to save lives in the face of temporary 
threats to lives and livelihoods, acute, rapidly onset disasters and one-off 
events (Schafer, 2002; Longley, Christoplos and Slaymaker, 2006). The 
provision of aid in contexts of chronic complex emergencies presents 
significant challenges for existing aid structures and institutions.  
 
Unlike one-off disaster events, chronic complex emergencies have an 
impoverishing effect as they continuously weaken individuals, households and 
communities (Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004). The combined effects 
of ongoing complex emergencies create much deeper and more complicated 
problems than one-off disaster events. Livelihoods are gradually destroyed as 
assets, coping mechanisms and supportive institutions are eventually eroded, 
devastating societies to generate extreme chronic vulnerability (Kellenberger, 
2010). As the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (GHA, 2008) discusses, 
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people receiving long-term humanitarian assistance move between endemic 
food insecurity, chronic poverty and periodic acute crisis. During the height of 
these acute emergencies, resources for relief are usually generous, however, 
once the acute emergency subsides, funding evaporates, with little investment 
having been made to create the necessary conditions for the populations to 
rebuild resources, reduce their vulnerabilities or become resilient against 
future crises (Diriba, 2008). Humanitarian responses to chronic complex 
emergencies generally consist of a series of ad hoc emergency interventions 
with little attention given to either sustainability or the long-term. Both time and 
opportunities are lost by not exploiting the relief momentum to create such an 
enabling environment. This pattern of acute emergency, humanitarian 
response, then recovery to a state of chronic poverty is a cycle in which 
vulnerability begets reactive relief efforts that can even further undermine 
fragile market and social institutions, leaving populations more vulnerable to 
the next adverse shock than they were to the first (Barrett and Carter, 2002).   
 
Humanitarian assistance is traditionally distinguished from development 
assistance through its short-term, life-saving characteristics rather than 
longer-term, poverty reducing developmental assistance that promotes 
sustainability (GHA, 2009). When emergencies continue for such extended 
periods of time, conventional relief responses are inadequate and traditional 
humanitarian and development paradigms are not suitable for guiding an 
effective approach. Traditional humanitarian aid alone will not eradicate this 
state of permanent emergency (Duffield, 1994). Humanitarianism has evolved 
through a context of enormous changes in the politics, economics and 
technologies of war and peace (Munslow and O’Dempsey, 2010). Despite 
these changes, humanitarian aid provides relief of the symptoms of disasters 
but remains to do little to reduce people’s vulnerability to disasters and enable 
them to re-establish their lives and livelihoods (Macrae and Leader, 2000). As 
Hoffmaster (2006) expressed, relief organisations tend to focus on what they 
are doing for the person, rather than on persons and their vulnerability in 
themselves. The needs in chronic complex emergencies differ significantly to 
those of one-off disaster events and there is no clear and straightforward 
transition from relief to development (Munslow and O’Dempsey, 2010). 
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Consequently the nature, delivery and approach of any humanitarian 
assistance must be different if both immediate humanitarian needs and 
chronic poverty and vulnerability are to be effectively addressed 
(Frankenberger, Drinkwater and Maxwell, 2003).  
 
The situation that exists today keeps millions of people living on the edge, 
vulnerable to even the smallest of shocks (Diriba, 2008). If the most 
vulnerable people do not gain access to the long-term entitlements and 
capacities that permit them to avoid a state of humanitarian emergency the 
need for humanitarian aid will not cease (IFAD, no date).  
 
These arguments are framed by one of the key debates discussed by Barnett 
and Weiss (2011, 106): “should humanitarianism limit itself to saving lives at 
immediate risk or be more ambitious?”. Although this dilemma is directed at a 
specific situation it also relates to broader considerations about global justice. 
Should humanitarian reform or revolutionise the world? The ICRC for 
example, does not attempt to transform the world but merely make it less 
horrible. The ICRC is not anti-war and does not endeavor to eliminate war but 
rather ensure that combatants abide by certain rules that make armed conflict 
somewhat less barbaric. In chronic complex emergencies however, this 
means maintaining a status quo that will see millions of people remain in a 
state of chronic emergency living on the brink with little to do other than wait 
for the next acute emergency phase. This is essentially a policy discussion 
rather than a judgement of what works on the ground at project level.  
 
Emergency relief acknowledges that coming to the rescue is not ambitious, 
but it is a well-defined goal that can be accomplished. Conversely, if 
humanitarians set out to tackle the causes, not only do they frequently not 
know what to do but they also find access to affected populations limited as a 
result. Nation leaders do not welcome interfering aid agencies yet as Barnett 
(2011) states, humanitarianism is a mixture of care and control; to make the 
world a better place requires power. The more that humanitarianism aligns 
itself with the State, however, the more it sacrifices the humanitarian ideals of 
neutrality and independence (ibid.). Despite this, is not knowing what to do or 
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that there will be increased muddied waters and challenges enough to do 
nothing? Or does this mean that it is time to rise to the challenge, work harder 
and strive further? The policy discussion encourages the drive for a stronger 
evaluation of what works at project level i.e. delivery on the ground.  
 
While chronic complex emergencies continue, the question arises how should 
long-term humanitarian assistance differ in its approach from traditional 
humanitarian aid? How can the cycle of reactive, long-term humanitarian aid 
and a state of permanent emergency be broken to enable households and 
communities to secure their basic needs and to maintain their livelihoods and 
public services, such as health and education? Lautze and Roberts (2003) 
note, that a focus on sustainability has limited relevance given the challenges 
of chronic complex emergencies whereas a more appropriate focus would 
appear to lie in the dual realms of vulnerability and resilience (O’Brien and 
O’Keefe, 2010). Rather than engaging in ad hoc relief programmes (PAHO, 
2004), interventions need to examine longer-term strategies that reduce 
vulnerability, promote resilience and support and build upon local institutions. 
In order to reduce the need for long-term humanitarian aid through building 
resilient households and communities that are less vulnerable to shocks it is 
necessary to have a thorough understanding of these concepts – vulnerability 
and resilience - their origins, limitations and the opportunities they offer. 
 
2.7.1 Vulnerability 
The concept of vulnerability was introduced within the discourse of natural 
hazards and disasters in the 1970s by O’Keefe, Westgate and Wisner (1976). 
These authors insisted that socio-economic conditions are the cause of 
natural disasters. They highlighted that disaster risk is a combination of the 
factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to particular 
types of natural hazard and fundamentally on how social systems and their 
associated power relations impact on different social groups (through for 
example, their class, gender, ethnicity). To understand disasters, it is 
necessary to understand the type of hazard that might affect people but 
equally the different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people must 
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be understood. They concluded that this vulnerability is determined by social 
systems and power, not by natural forces (Wisner et al., 2003).  
 
Since its introduction to the discourse, the concept of vulnerability has been 
widely used and subsequently various definitions have emerged, including:  “Vulnerability refers to contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping 
with them. Vulnerability has thus two sides: an external side of risks, 
shocks, and stress to which an individual or household is subject; and 
an internal side which is defenseless, meaning a lack of means to cope 
without damaging loss” (Chambers, 1989, p. 33).   “Vulnerability is essentially about the human ecology of 
endangerment…and is embedded in the social geography of 
settlements and land uses, and the space of distribution of influence in 
communities and political organisation” (Hewitt, 1997, p. 143).  “…set of characteristics of a group or individual in terms of their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of 
a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the 
degree to which someone’s life and livelihood is at risk by a discrete 
and identifiable event in nature or society” (Blakie et al., 1994, p. 9).  “Vulnerability has three connotations: it refers to a consequence (e.g. 
famine) rather than a cause (e.g. drought); it implies an adverse 
consequence (e.g. households are vulnerable to hunger); and it is a 
relative term that differentiates among socioeconomic groups or 
regions, rather than an absolute measure of deprivation” (Downing, 
1991, p. 372).  “Vulnerability is the differential capacity of groups and individuals to 
deal with hazards, based on their positions within physical and social 
worlds” (Dow, 1992, p. 4).  “Vulnerability may be defined as the probability of an individual, a 
household or a community falling below a minimum level or welfare 
(e.g. poverty line), or the probability of suffering physical and socio-
economic consequences (such as homelessness or physical injury) as 
a result of risky events and processes (such as forced eviction, crime 
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or flood) and their inability to effectively cope with such risky events 
and processes” (UN Habitat, 2007, p. 4).   “Vulnerability is the expected value of the ratio of sensitivity to the state 
relative to a threshold based on the frequency distribution of the 
stressors of concern” (Luers, 2005, 214).  “Vulnerability is best defined as an aggregate measure of human 
welfare that integrates environmental, social, economic and political 
exposure to a range of potential harmful perturbations. Vulnerability is 
a multilayered and multidimensional social space defined by the 
determinate, political, economic and institutional capabilities of people 
in specific places at specific times” (Bohle, et al. 1994, p. 37-38).  “The conditions determined by physical, social and environmental 
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community 
to the impact of hazards” (UNISDR, 2004, pp. 382). 
 
The above list of definitions of vulnerability is by no means exhaustive and 
simply illustrates the extensive application, interpretation and use of the 
concept. The original work on vulnerability by O’Keefe et al. (1976) was 
essentially a macro overview of hazards related to poverty paralleled by more 
recent macro work that relates vulnerability to a lack of security (Munslow and 
O’Dempsey, 2010); other authors largely work in a micro scale to other 
independent variables such as gender, age and ethnicity.  
 
There remains no single agreed definition of vulnerability in the field of 
disasters and emergencies. Liverman (1990) noted that vulnerability has been 
redefined many times and related or equated to concepts including resilience, 
marginality, susceptibility, adaptability, fragility and risk. Timmermann (1981) 
argued that vulnerability is a term of such broad use it is almost useless as a 
description at the present, except as a rhetorical indicator of areas of greatest 
concern. Webb and Harinarayan (1999) drew attention to the danger of 
generalising vulnerability in that levels of vulnerability are not uniform across a 
group, country or continent. For example, despite an overall trend for women 
and young children to be the most vulnerable, this does not mean that all 
 38
women and children are vulnerable and nor does it mean that no one in other 
population groups are not vulnerable (Wright and Vesala-Husemann, 2006).   
 
Evidently, there is no single correct or universally agreed conceptualisation of 
vulnerability that would apply to all contexts (Bogardi, 2006). Despite this, the 
concept of vulnerability continues to be widely used in the disaster 
management discourse. Clearly the inability to arrive at a universally accepted 
definition of vulnerability does not mean we do not recognise its importance in 
the discourse of disasters and emergencies. As Fussel (2006) notes, the 
diversity of conceptualisations is seen primarily as a consequence of using 
the term ‘vulnerability’ in different policy contexts, referring to different 
systems exposed to different hazards. Human society is the main focus of 
most concepts of vulnerability within the disasters discourse; however, 
vulnerability cannot be adequately viewed without considering surrounding 
structures, politics and the environment (Birkmann, 2006). As other authors 
such as Vogel and O’Brien (2004) have stressed, vulnerability is 
multidimensional and differential as it varies across physical space and 
among and within social groups; it is scale dependent with regard to time, 
space and units of analysis such as individual, household, region or system; 
and it is dynamic, the characteristics and driving forces of vulnerability change 
over time (Birkmann, 2006). In essence, vulnerability is local, contextual and 
site specific and as such the concept can only be applied and used effectively 
at a local level. This is supported by the various definitions of vulnerability 
illustrated above, whereby the majority refer to vulnerability in the context of 
an individual, household, community3 or group.  
 
Understanding the key vulnerabilities that underlie a disaster can help both 
policy makers and those who provide assistance to identify why a community 
is unable to cope and then try to ensure those gaps in coping ability are 
targeted. Disasters magnify vulnerabilities (Comfort et al., 1999) and 
                                            
3 Community is used here to mean some definable aggregation of households, 
interconnected in some way, and with a limited spatial extent. 
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recognising and understanding vulnerabilities in the context of disaster 
management and response is fundamental to attempts at eradicating 
permanent emergencies and long-term recovery.  
 
2.7.2 Resilience 
Resilience is often referred to as simply the flip side of vulnerability, as a 
resilient system is less vulnerable than a non-resilient system, however, 
relation does not necessarily imply symmetry (Gallopin, 2006). Mallak (2006) 
notes, the absence of vulnerability does not make one resilient. Resilience 
and vulnerability are complex, multidimensional and not unconnected 
concepts however; they are governed by diametrical assumptions. 
Vulnerability discourse grounds itself upon real or perceived weaknesses and 
dependence on external controls in collapsing, often dysfunctional systems; 
while resilience brings to light existing strengths of substance and function 
associated with disaster preparedness, responsiveness and flexibility.  
 
When represented on a graph, vulnerability and resilience are perpendicular 
to one another (one is represented by the ‘X’ axis and the other represented 
by the ‘Y’ axis) (Bogardi, 2006a). While they might interact with respect to 
their effect on community capacity, they are not directly congruent to or 
correlated with each other. According to Sapirstein (no date), vulnerability and 
resilience are measured in different units. Vulnerability is the degree to which 
people will be impacted by a hazard (natural or human-made). Vulnerability is 
measured primarily through cost, be it economic or human. In other words, 
how much will it cost if a hazard occurs in a given community and how many 
lives will be lost or affected? Resilience, in contrast, is measured by time. 
Specifically, how long would it take for the community to respond to the event, 
self organise and incorporate the lessons learned before returning to a (new, 
more knowledgeable) normal way of functioning (Sapirstein, no date).  
 
Throughout history, people have always been intrigued by stories of 
individuals who overcome adversity to succeed in life. The systematic study of 
human resilience however, began only shortly before 1970 and focused 
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mainly on psychiatry and psychology around young people (Masten, 2001; 
Masten and Powell, 2003). This research transpired around the same time as 
ecological resilience theory emerged (Holling, 1973). Ecological resilience 
was originally defined as the amount of disturbance that an ecosystem could 
withstand without changing self-organised processes and structures whilst 
later definitions included ecological resilience as the return time to a stable 
state following a perturbation (Gunderson, 2000).  
 
From its origins in psychology and ecology, resilience has been applied and 
used in various disciplines including, environmental science, engineering, 
management, and organisational behaviour research. As a concept, resilience 
continues to evolve and be applied to new areas and in recent years it has 
gained prominence in the field of disaster research and emergency 
preparedness (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007; IISD, 2010). In a highly resilient 
system risk is distributed, challenges are commonly understood, and 
response efforts are coordinated. In low resilient systems, risk has a 
disproportionate impact on certain sectors, and a society struggles to cope 
with and rebound from a crisis. The challenge therefore, is in crafting high-
resilience societies (Brunner and Giroux, 2009). 
 
As with vulnerability, the international community has no single agreed 
definition of resilience. In developmental science, individual resilience refers 
to the processes of, capacity for, or patterns of positive adaptation during or 
following exposure to adverse experiences that have the potential to disrupt or 
destroy the successful functioning or development of the person (Masten, 
Best and Garmezy, 1990). This broad definition covers three distinct 
phenomena:  
1. Achieving better than expected outcomes in high-risk groups of people, 
sometimes referred to as overcoming the odds; 
2. Sustaining competence or maintaining effective functioning under 
highly adverse conditions, sometimes referred to as stress resistance; 
and 
3. Regaining or attaining effective or normal functioning following a period 
of exposure to traumatic experiences or conditions of overwhelming 
 41
adversity, often described in terms of recovery or bouncing back. This 
includes recovery after a crisis or catastrophe as well as normalisation 
onto positive developmental trajectories in response to improved 
conditions.  
(Masten and Obradovic, 2008). 
 
Resilience is the positive capacity of people to respond to, and cope with, 
stress and catastrophe. It also includes the ability to bounce back to 
homeostasis after a disruption. However, for disruptive events resilience can 
be described as bouncing forward. It is a measure of the capacity to move to 
a new reality that has been brought about by exceptional change (Manyena et 
al., 2011). It can be used to indicate having an adaptive system that uses 
exposure to stress to provide resistance to future negative events. In this 
sense, as Pearson (2010) notes, ‘resilience’ corresponds to cumulative 
‘protective factors’ and is used in opposition to cumulative ‘risk factors’. 
 
The abundance of definitions for “resilience” and the fact this concept is 
shared by many different disciplines make it particularly difficult to define 
uniformly. One especially comprehensive definition states resilience as:   
 
“The ability to face internal or external crisis and not only effectively resolve it 
but also learn from it, be strengthened by it and emerge transformed by it, 
both individually and as a group” (Brenson-Lazan, 2003, p. 5).  
 
The above definition includes four main components: response, self-
organisation, learning, and adaptation. These elements necessitate voluntary 
participation by all involved. As Sapirstein (no date) notes, one cannot force or 
require an individual, household or community to be resilient. Rather, 
resilience is the outcome of developing those four components. Moreover 
these components apply equally to all social units – from individuals, through 
households to communities or organisations.  
 
In accordance with the four main components of resilience identified above, 
the determination of resilience largely involves two fundamental judgements: 
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1. The criteria for judging threats or challenges to a system: whether there 
has been exposure to significant adversity or risk; and  
2. The criteria for judging the adaptation of a system: whether the person 
or community is functioning effectively and doing what it is supposed to 
be doing. 
(Masten and Coatsworth, 1998, Masten, 2001). 
 
Sapirstein (no date) noted that resilience is developed community by 
community. Adoption of this decentralised component and bottom-up process 
is a critical aspect to enhancing social resilience. Evidently, synonymous with 
vulnerability, resilience is local, contextual and site specific and as such the 
concept can only be applied usefully at a local level. 
 
As Tobin (1999) argues, disaster resilience is not a new concept in practice 
and it is linked to community development in the 1970s. It has, however, 
prompted a new way of conceptualising hazards and their consequences. It 
suggests building something up rather than simply reducing something 
(Collins, 2005), which is the case when discussing poverty or vulnerability 
reduction. Resilience appears to orient interventions beyond the capacity of 
communities to respond or absorb the impact and integrate the essential and 
non-essential elements of community systems to adapt and survive shocks. 
Evidently, as vulnerability and resilience address different albeit related areas, 
one concept should not be used in lieu of the other. Rather, when responding 
to chronic complex emergencies both concepts should be applied in order to 
develop a holistic understanding that can then be used to formulate and 
deliver an effective response. Hence, to eradicate the need for long-term 
humanitarian assistance both local resilience should be promoted and 
vulnerability reduced.  
 
It is often argued that ‘all disasters are local’, at least in the short-term. In a 
similar stance, resilience and vulnerability are local, emerging from the actions 
of individuals and small groups of people in relation to each other and 
powered by the adaptive systems of human life and development. Larger 
systems such as governments facilitate this resilience and vulnerability but 
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are not generally directly available during an unfolding disaster. When a 
person, household or community is vulnerable or non-resilient, they possess 
limited capacity to cope with shocks. As ALNAP (Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) (2003) discusses, 
external assistance must assess community resilience capacity and 
complement local coping efforts and recovery planning. In this way, the 
populations own capacities will be strengthened and they will be better able to 
carry on effective response and recovery activities long after external 
assistance has ceased. Both vulnerability and resilience influence adaptive 
capacity.  
 
2.7.3 Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity in regards to disasters emerges from the natural hazards 
literature, which is applied to climate change (Klein, Nicholls and Thomalla, 
2004). As early as 1980, Butzer considered ‘cultural adaptation’ (human 
ingenuity including technological innovation and long-range planning) in light 
of predicted climate change and its anticipated impacts on world food supply. 
Societies and economies have been making adaptations for centuries for 
example, to changing markets, cultures, weather patterns and conflicts. Most 
communities can cope with or adapt to moderate deviations from the norm, 
however, exposures involving extreme or prolonged events can lie beyond the 
coping range, exceeding the adaptive capacity of a community (Adger et al., 
2004). When this occurs communities need external support such as 
government support or humanitarian assistance to aid their return to normal. 
In the case of chronic complex emergencies, however, a return to normal 
transpires to a return to a state of chronic poverty and chronic vulnerability. A 
lack of adaptive capacity amongst the community remains as any capacity 
has been eroded through the prolonged state of emergency and gradual loss 
of livelihoods, assets and supporting structures. Thus, no options or capacity 
to adapt ensures the community remains extremely vulnerable to any future 
shocks or stresses and the cycle of reactive, long-term humanitarian aid and a 
state of permanent emergency continues.  
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One of the main conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s Third Assessment Report (chapter 18) states, planned adaptation 
strategies have the potential to reduce vulnerability or exploit emerging 
opportunities even further. According to UN/ISDR (2009), capacity is "a 
combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within a 
community, society or organisation that can be used to achieve agreed 
goals". This includes infrastructure and physical means, institutions, societal 
coping abilities, as well as human knowledge, skills and collective attributes 
such as societal relationships, leadership and management. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) indicates that capacity for emergency management 
consists of "information, authority, institutions, partnerships" and the "plans, 
resources and procedures to activate them" (WHO, 2002, p. 19).  
 
Enabling communities to increase this capacity is a major concern in the area 
of disaster preparedness. ‘Capacity building’ is a frequently used term in 
disaster literature. It describes efforts to develop human skills or societal 
infrastructures within a community to reduce the level of risk, and has also 
included developing financial, political, and technological resources within a 
society (UN/ISDR, 2004). Adaptive capacity represents the combination of 
vulnerability to damages and resilience or ability to cope. According to 
Dayton-Johnson (2004), it can be understood as a combination of vulnerability 
and resilience. Adaptive capacity can be defined as the vulnerability of a 
society before disaster strikes and its resilience after the event. As Seck 
(2007) notes, “enhancing adaptive and coping capacity ensures a degree of 
resilience on the part of the populations that are affected” (p. 7) and as the 
IPCC Working Group II (2001) note “enhancement of adaptive capacity is 
necessary to reduce vulnerability” (para. 2). 
 
The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concentrate their 
work on climate-related stresses and disasters, however, their work and 
conclusions of adaptive capacity are transferable throughout the field of 
disasters and complex emergencies. The authors of the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report emphasised that adaptive capacity varies significantly 
from system to system, sector to sector and region to region. Indeed, the 
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determinants of adaptive capacity include a variety of system, sector, and 
location specific characteristics: 
 
1. The range of available technological options for adaptation, lack of 
technology limits the range of adaptive capacity; 
2. The availability of resources and their distribution across the 
population, both the availability of and entitlement to, resources raises 
adaptive capacity; 
3. The structure of critical institutions, the derivative allocation of decision-
making authority, and the decision criteria that would be employed. 
Well-developed social institutions increase adaptive capacity; 
4. The stock of human capital including education and personal security. 
Lack of skilled or trained personnel reduces adaptive capacity; 
5. The stock of social capital including kinship and access to social 
networks;  
6. The system’s access to risk spreading processes; 
7. The ability of decision-makers to manage information, the processes by 
which these decision-makers determine which information is credible, 
and the credibility of decision-makers themselves;  
8. The public’s perceived attribution of the source of stress and the 
significance of exposure to its local manifestations; 
9. Access to economic resources, lack of financial resources limits 
adaptive capacity; and 
10. The infrastructure available, greater variety of infrastructure can 
enhance adaptive capacity as it provides greater options. 
(Adapted from Yohe and Tol, 2002; and Bhadwal, 2006). 
 
As Adger et al. (2004) and the IPCC Working Group II (2001) notes, adaptive 
capacity is context-specific and varies considerably from country to country 
and community to community, among social groups and individuals over time. 
The scales of adaptive capacity are not independent: the capacity of a 
household to cope with a disaster depends to some degree on the enabling 
environment of the community and the adaptive capacity of the community is 
reflective of the resources and processes of the surrounding region (Smite 
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and Pilifsova, 2003). Although, the capacity of individuals to adapt to disasters 
is a function of their access to resources, the adaptive capacity of societies 
and communities depends on their ability to act collectively in the face of 
threats (Adger, et al., 2004).  
 
The concept of adaptive capacity is used to cover a multitude of factors and 
as with the concepts of vulnerability and resilience there is no general 
agreement as to what the factors of adaptive capacity constitute (Adger et al., 
2004). Broadly speaking, adaptive capacity can be described as the ability of 
a system, household or community to modify or change its characteristics or 
behaviour so as to cope with existing, anticipated or sudden external stresses 
and shocks (ibid.) 
 
Lasting change within chronic complex emergencies may take many years to 
achieve and aid agencies need to be realistic in their objectives. 
Consideration needs to be taken of resources available, and possible conflicts 
between the priorities of agencies and those of communities. It is unethical to 
impose externally designed projects or to commence ambitious plans, only to 
withdraw while the work is still uncompleted, potentially leaving the community 
in a worse state than before. The affected community itself possesses 
knowledge about local needs and capabilities and as the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies World Disasters Report 
(2003) notes, the role of external organisations is not to take over but to 
enable the community, thereby increasing their capacity to build resilience 
and take control over the decisions that affect their lives. Capacity building 
needs to be fostered, and the community enabled to progress to a position of 
greater preparedness for future eventualities. This involves building long-term 
capacity and not just coping with immediate issues. According to Wright and 
Vesala-Husemann (2006), unless underlying vulnerabilities and their relation 
to disaster preparedness are addressed this process cannot take place.  
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2.8 Conclusions 
In all of this literature some very strong arguments emerge that outline the 
three key themes detailed in chapter one 
 
The failings of Rwanda (Barnett, 2002) have produced a more focused 
humanitarianism that has simultaneously removed decision making power 
from beneficiaries. The Sphere project itself, with its determined technical 
focus is a prescribed top down method, which can frequently exclude local 
communities from participation. Evaluations themselves are frequently used to 
ensure top down control with an emphasis on management by measurement. 
It can be hard argued therefore that there has been a shift from a focus on 
duties with an emphasis on deontological ethics to an emphasis on outcome 
with its implied consequentialist ethics. Perhaps the whole discourse on 
evaluation itself masks the drift in power towards donors and away from 
recipients. This raises the question emphasised in the third key theme of what 
is the value of evaluation in humanitarian assistance?  
 
If the technical issues have been changed in such a way to reinforce top down 
planning the changes in the philosophical and legal basis for humanitarianism 
have also significantly altered. Gone is the simple commitment to 
humanitarian aid with its emphasis on independence, neutrality and 
impartiality not least because humanitarian agencies have wanted to have a 
continuity of work that links them to the development agenda through the 
disaster-development continuum. Embracing the development discourse in 
the early 21st Century requires addressing the human rights discourse, which 
is frequently at odds with the humanitarian agenda not least because 
advocacy overrides impartiality. The humanitarian and development agendas 
have different legal discourses with justicability stronger in humanitarian law 
than human rights. Yet these clashes of political and legal philosophies must 
at all times be open to the importance of local tradition in terms of what is 
defined as participatory where participation implies local ownership and thus 
greater opportunity for continuity and sustainability. This presents the 
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questions raised in key theme one, ultimately, what is the nature of 
humanitarian assistance in the 21st Century? 
 
The development debate itself has heavily critiqued the so-called knowledge 
production that is gained from processes such as evaluation, of particular 
importance is the work of Scott (1998) who basically argues that the 
development of such knowledge is a simplification process. In this 
simplification process the State is likely to misinterpret action and thus, 
provide policy options that are inappropriate to the development solution. 
Seeing like a State essentially is a method of blindness not least because it 
seeks to obscure ecological and cultural differences that are frequently the 
basis of sustainable livelihoods. Hence, the second key theme, which seeks 
to understand whether humanitarian aid can deliver sustainable impacts in a 
chronic complex emergency.     
 
The field of chronic complex emergencies has complex issues whose factors 
contribute to vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity. The social levels 
that may exhibit vulnerability and resilience, and the dynamic aspect of time, 
change from location to location and specificity to each emergency. Given 
this, as Buckle, Marsh and Smale (2001) notes, there is little value in 
adherence to a single definition of vulnerability or resilience. Rather this 
research accepts that vulnerability is a broad measure of susceptibility to 
suffer loss or damage. The higher the vulnerability, the greater exposure there 
is to loss and damage. Resilience is broadly the capacity of a group or 
organisation to withstand loss or damage or to recover from the impact of an 
emergency or disaster. The higher the resilience, the less likely damage may 
be, and the faster and more effective recovery. Additionally, adaptive capacity 
is broadly the ability of a community to change or modify its behaviour, 
systems and processes to cope with external stresses and shocks and also 
remove itself from the zone of risk.   
 
The goal of most humanitarian assistance is to ensure minimal loss of life and 
livelihoods following a disaster and for the affected population to return to 
‘normal’ within the shortest possible time. This indeed is a positive objective, 
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however, in chronic complex emergencies there is no return to ‘normal’ in the 
cycle of reactive, long-term humanitarian aid and state of permanent 
emergency. Utilising the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive 
capacity can provide a holistic understanding to inform a humanitarian 
response that aspires to move people out of the zone of risk altogether and 
potentially break this cycle.  
 
Communities and people are dynamic, non-linear and complex and as such 
require a tailored, holistic approach. Yes, during the first stages of an 
emergency saving lives is the priority, but then and especially during chronic 
emergencies, humanitarian aid should be designed around and tailored 
specifically for each community, region and nation with an aim to reduce 
vulnerability, increase resilience and strengthen adaptive capacity to break 
the cycle of chronic vulnerability. Given the highly context-specific nature of 
livelihoods and chronic conflict, there is no blueprint approach to breaking this 
cycle, however, an understanding of all variables, community participation and 
capacity building are all essential elements (Longley, Christoplos and 
Slaymaker, 2003).  
 
This research will draw on the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and 
adaptive capacity to examine through an evaluative methodology, the delivery 
of humanitarian aid in one such chronic complex emergency and assess 
whether communities can move beyond the state of chronic emergency. The 
following chapter discusses the selected chronic complex emergency and 
focus of this research – Somalia. 
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Chapter 3 
Somalia 
 
“For every generalization about Africa, Somalia is always the exception. And 
Somalis know it” (Dowden, 2008, p. 93). 
 
After almost two decades of civil war, Somalia is a country today most known 
for conflict and devastation. But how did Somalia evolve into its current state? 
The following chapter explores Somalia, its people, its history and most recent 
events in attempt to understand better the context of delivering humanitarian 
aid in Somalia and the challenges both humanitarian organisations and the 
Somali people face.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Somalia is Africa’s easternmost country located in the Horn or Africa (see 
Map 1). It has the longest coastline on the continent, which lies along the Gulf 
of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It is bounded by Djibouti in the northwest, 
Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest. With a land mass of 
627,339km2, it is marginally smaller than Texas in area and has an estimated 
population of slightly less than 10 million people. The capital city, Mogadishu, 
is located along the south east coast. Today Somalia is divided into three 
main areas – Somaliland in the north west, Puntland in the north east and 
Somalia comprising the south and central areas (Map 5). 
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(Source: FSAU, 2005) 
 
Somalia’s terrain consists largely of plateaus, plains and highlands. The 
central and southern areas of Somalia are flat whereas the northern part of 
the country is hilly with the rugged east-west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains 
in the far north.  
 
Somalia lies at the extremity of the sub-Saharan zone most commonly known 
as the Sahel, which traverses the continent from Senegal to Somalia. The 
climate is arid, hot, dry desert with semi-arid conditions generally prevailing at 
higher altitudes. Mean daily temperatures throughout Somalia range from 30-
400C although temperatures can reach below freezing in the highlands in 
December (Metz, 1992). 
 
Somalis recognise four seasons, two rainy – Gu and Deyr – and two dry – 
Jilaal and Xagaa. The Gu rains last from April until June and are followed by 
the Xagaa drought from July until September. The Deyr rains follow from 
October to November until the Jilaal dry season from December to March, 
Map 1 Somalia 
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which is the harshest season for pastoralists and their herds. Most of the 
country receives less than 500 millimetres of rain annually. Generally, rainfall 
takes the form of showers or localised torrential rains and is extremely 
variable. The arid climate combined with the rainy seasons cause both severe 
droughts and floods regularly throughout Somalia. Between 1961 and 2004, 
18 floods were recorded in Somalia, killing 2,671 people and affecting the 
lives of almost 1.8 million. In the same period, there were 12 droughts that 
killed 19,671 people and affected almost four million people (Columbia 
University, 2005).  
 
3.2 The Somali People: Lives and Livelihoods 
3.2.1 Clans and Families 
“Somalia is one of two countries on the continent that has only one race, one 
ethnic group, one language, one religion and one culture” (Dowden, 2008, p. 
93).  
 
Somali social and political systems are underpinned by a strict, and 
respected, lineage with divisions along clan, sub-clan and sub-subclan lines. 
Every Somali child is taught to recite their family’s genealogy through the 
male line stretching back at least twenty generations (Meredith, 2006). 
Political allegiances are determined by generation lines and hence, when 
meeting one another Somali’s do not ask each other where they are from but 
whom they are from (Lewis, 1992).  
 
The council of clan elders is the dominant institution in most locales expected 
to provide wisdom and build consensus among clan ranks in matters of clan 
interest especially in times of crisis (UNDP, 1998). All married men can claim 
to be elders and speak in clan assemblies (known as shir).  
 
There are six major clan families in Somalia as illustrated in Figure 2. Four of 
these are predominantly pastoral – Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq – together 
representing approximately 70 percent of the population. The remaining two 
clans – Rahanwayn-Digil and Rahanwayn-Mirifle – are agriculturalists and 
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comprise about 20 percent of the population (see Figure 2). The rest of the 
population includes the urban and coastal people – the Reer, Hamar/Banadir 
and Barwanese people of mixed Arab, Persian, Pakistani, Portuguese and 
Somali heritage; the Bantu riverine agriculturalists; Swahili-speaking Bajuni 
fishing communities; and Arabs of Yemen, Oman and Zanzibar descent.   
 
Figure 2 Somali Clan Lineage 
 
(Source: Menkhaus, 2004) 
Note: The clan structure throughout Somalia is extensive and complex and as such 
there is no formal agreement on the clan and sub-clan structures. The above figure 
demonstrates a broad overview of the Somali clan structure. 
 
‘Clannism’ has proved to be both a divisive and destructive tool in the hands 
of political leaders. Most of Somalia’s armed clashes since 1991 have been 
fought in the name of the clan as tensions erupted over resources and power 
and political leaders manipulate clannism for their own purposes (World Bank, 
2005). Conversely, the clan system has proved a vital source of group 
protection, social security and customary law in the absence of a functional 
state. Individual security in the traditional Somali society was dependent on 
the clans and this situation remains in place today. The clan system has been 
the safety net of the Somali people since the collapse of the government in 
1991 (LandInfo, 2008). Vulnerability and protection in Somalia are therefore, 
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closely linked to a clan’s strength. Although, weak clan’s traditionally seek 
protection from and affiliation to the dominant clans in specific areas. The 
region of Somaliland is relatively peaceful today and its success is largely 
attributed to using traditional methods of conflict resolution – using the clan 
system and Councils of Elders to act as mediators (Yusuf and Mare, 2005).  
 
3.2.2 Religion 
The main religion of Somalia is Islam, which has deep roots in Somalia and 
almost the entire population are Sunni Muslims. Their religious spirit is mixed 
with elements of Somali’s pre-Islamic Cushitic beliefs. Somali’s live their lives 
according to the holy book of Islam, the Qur’an, which influences every aspect 
of Somali life and as such Islamic identity and Somali identity cannot be 
separated (Elmi, 2010). Islamic values provide hope and solidarity to cope 
with the harsh conditions prevalent in the country. They have also been used 
to build trusted institutions, both commercial and juridical. The most visible 
sign of the latter are the Islamic Courts based on sharia law. During the recent 
years of unlawfulness particularly throughout the south and central areas, 
these courts gained increasing popularity within local communities where they 
dispense justice in zones where customary law fails to maintain order.  
 
Historically, Somalia was an oral society and therefore, little is known about 
the when and how Islam was introduced to Somalia. There are two accounts 
that offer explanations, the first, propounds the notion that Islam began in 
Somalia before it was founded in Medina – the first Muslim capital city in 
Islamic history. According to this version, Islam was brought to Somalia by the 
first cluster of Muslim migrants in the seventh century. The second account 
links Somali-Islamic emergence to Muslim migration that had grown 
tremendously after the death of the Prophet Mohamed. The dense population, 
scarce economic opportunities and harsh climate conditions of Arabia and 
Persia at that time motivated scores of Muslims to seek material fortunes 
elsewhere. They also aimed to carry out the Prophet Mohamed’s decree of 
spreading his message, through which they eventually reached Somalia 
(Abdi, 2010).  
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Regardless of how Islam entered Somalia, historians largely agree that 
Somalia’s Islam from the time of inception was based on Sufi order (Lewis, 
1961). The oldest known Sufi sect adopted by Somalis is the Qadiriyah, which 
was founded in Baghdad by Sheikh Abd al Qadir al Jilani (1166 A.D.). The 
Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyah was the second Sufi sect in Somalia, which was founded 
by Ahmad ibn Idris al Fasi (1760-1837) and brought to Somalia by Sheikh Ali 
Maye Durogba of Merca. All other major Sufi sects are derivatives of 
Ahmadiyah and Qadirryah.  
 
Modern political Islam did not arise in Somalia until the 1960s, when Somali 
students mainly those studying at Grand Al Azhar in Egypt were exposed to 
the teachings and public support for political Islam (Abdi, 2010). Although 
Somalis retained their traditions more strongly than any other group in Africa, 
in recent years, their cultural and religious practices have been undermined 
by Arab Wahabi preachers and Saudi money (Dowden, 2008). Until recently, 
Somali women played a major role in society, dressed in bright colours and 
did not cover their heads or arms. Today, Somali women are expected to 
dress in the full Saudi niqab and obey their men.  
 
Radical Islam, organised by a group known as Al-Shabaab, previously known 
as Al-Ittihad, is also a growing trend with a presence throughout south and 
central Somalia (Chazan, 2002). Al-Shabaab are believed to be the largest 
Islamist militia group in Somalia. They have refused to engage in any peace 
process and have waged war against Somalia’s government. The group aims 
to implement its own strict interpretation of Islamic or Sharia law in Somalia. 
Al-Shabaab’s senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaeda and is believed to 
have trained and fought in Afghanistan. The merger of the two groups was 
publicly announced in February 2012 by the Al-Shabaab amir and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda (National Counterterrorism Center, 2013). 
Although the Somali government and Ethiopian forces defeated the group in a 
two-week war between December 2006 and January 2007, al-Shabaab has 
continued its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia. The group 
has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic 
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locations in those areas by recruiting or forcing regional sub-clans and their 
militias, using guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabaab has begun attacking countries 
which supply African Union and United Nations peace keeping troops to 
Somalia, most recently claiming responsibility for a twin bombing attack in 
Uganda, which killed over 70 people (Al Jazeera, 2010). Al-Shabaab’s leaders 
have ordered their fighters – which include Americans and other Westerners – 
to attack African Union peace-keeping troops based in Mogadishu. The group 
gained additional notoriety by blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid from 
western agencies during the 2011 famine that killed tens of thousands of 
Somalis (National Counterterrorism Center, 2013).  
 
2.3 Economy and Livelihoods 
According to the United Nations (UNEP, 2005), there are roughly 9.5 million 
people living in Somalia with an average population density of 15 people per 
square kilometre. The population is predominantly rural (Grundel, 2002) and 
the majority of livelihoods are dependent upon agriculture, pastoralism and/or 
fishing. The urban populations are based in major cities and towns (see Map 
2) including Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Berbera, Bosasso, Garowe, Galkayo, 
Kismayo and Baidoa and urbanisation is an increasing trend throughout 
Somalia (UNICEF, no date, and UNDP, 2001). 
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Map 2 Major Cities and Towns in Somalia 
 
Note: Many place names in Somalia are spelt differently, particularly the number of 
vowels used varies depending on the source for example, Hargeisa or Hargeysa, 
Bosasso or Boosaaso, Garowe or Garoowe and Galkayo or Galcaio. 
(Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). 
 
3.3.1 Pastoralism 
The livestock sector is the largest contributor to Somali livelihoods with over 
65 percent of the population engaged in either nomadic or semi-nomadic 
pastoralism. Livestock and their products account for almost 70 percent of all 
exports (FSNAU, 2010). This figure has been periodically interrupted through 
international export bans imposed on Somali livestock such as that imposed 
by Saudi Arabia in 2000, however, livestock exports continue to remain the 
largest traded commodity for Somalia (UNOCHA, 2006). Livestock are used 
to supply local requirements, are shipped to the Arabian Peninsula, and 
trekked or transported to markets in Kenya and Ethiopia (FAO, World Bank 
and EU, 2004).  
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Somali pastoralism largely involves cattle, camel, sheep and goats. Camels 
are clearly the most valued animals throughout Somalia, which has the largest 
population and highest density of camels in the world (Farah et al., 2004). The 
camel plays a vital role in Somali culture and camel herders are given great 
respect. Somali men own and herd camels whilst women care for sheep and 
goats. Every male Somali pastoralist aspires to own camels and many believe 
camels are of greater value than women (Abokor, 1987 and Dowden, 2008).  
 
The camel is uniquely adapted to the hot and arid environments of Somalia 
and subsequently, contributes significantly to the food security of the nomadic 
pastoral households. The contribution of camels to the welfare of Somalia is 
often obscured through a combination of factors. Firstly, the estimates of 
camel populations are usually inaccurate due to a lack of regular census data 
and secondly their products seldom enter a formal marketing system, thus, 
their contribution to subsistence and the national economy tends to be grossly 
underestimated. Subsequently, less attention has been given to protecting 
camel herds when planning and implementing both humanitarian interventions 
and development (Farah et al., 2004).  
 
In addition to their milk, meat and economic value, camels are of great 
importance to social traditions in Somalia. Camels are used as payment for a 
bride and compensation for injured parties during tribal feuds. Camels are the 
only means of payment of blood money to the lineage of the deceased 
(Hussein, 1993). Somali pastoralists view camels as a banking system and 
security against drought, disease and various natural disasters that affect 
other livestock more seriously.  
 
The possession of a certain amount of livestock are primary determinants for 
survival and success in the demanding environment facing Somali pastoral 
nomads. The climatic and geographical conditions prompt the Somali pastoral 
nomads to pursue animal husbandry with constant movement from one 
location to the next in search of improved pastures and water.  
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There are no reliable livestock data from recent years although estimates 
indicate there are 6.2 million camels, 4.6 million cattle and 31.3 million sheep 
and goats (UNDP, 2001). Nomadic pastoralism is however, under increasing 
pressure. Growing populations, pressure on pastoral grazing areas and the 
economic implications resulting from diseases and lack of veterinary services 
are some of the factors adversely affecting traditional pastoralism in Somalia. 
The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted in the loss of most animal 
health services and especially the important function of certification of live 
animals and products for export (FAO, World Bank and EU, 2004). 
Subsequently, livestock diseases including Rinderpest and Rift Valley Fever 
have spread uncontrollably throughout Somalia devastating many herds. This 
has been compounded by years of inadequate and unreliable water supplies, 
droughts and floods. The timing and amount of rainfall are crucial for 
pastoralists. A lack of reliable rainfall over consecutive years have devastated 
many herds and created the worst drought seen in the horn of Africa for half a 
century, which resulted in the United Nations declaring a state of famine in 
Somalia in July 2011 (BBC News, 2011).   
 
3.3.2 Agriculture 
Agriculture is an important livelihood activity in Somalia for both subsistence 
and income generation through crop sales and agricultural labour 
opportunities. Only 1.6 percent of Somalia's total land area is cultivated, 
whereas 69 percent is permanent pasture. Somalia’s two permanent rivers – 
the Shabeelle and the Jubba – located in the south-west, support 
agriculturalists that constitute the country’s largest sedentary population (see 
Map 3). These riverine areas and favourable soil conditions provide a fertile 
agricultural zone. Agro-pastoralists are found largely in the inter-riverine 
regions of Bay, Bakol, western Hiran, eastern Gedo, Lower Shabelle and 
Lower Juba in southern Somalia (UNOCHA, 2006).  
 
There are two main types of agriculture in Somalia, one indigenous and the 
other introduced by European settlers. The Somalis have traditionally 
engaged in rain-fed, dry-land farming or in dry-land farming complemented by 
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irrigation from the waters of the Shabeelle and Jubba rivers. 
 
Commercial crops, largely consisting of bananas and sugarcane, are grown 
on irrigated land along the two rivers. Bananas constitute the nation's major 
commercial crop; output was 50,000 tons in 1999, down from 110,000 tons in 
1990. Somali and Italian farmers operating the banana farms practice more 
modern European-style techniques, as do some of the newly created Somali 
cooperatives. Sugarcane is cultivated at Giohar and Jilib by a state-owned 
company. Sugarcane production in 1999 totaled some 210,000 tons, down 
from 500,000 tons in 1985. Somalia is also the world's leading producer of 
frankincense (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2013). 
 
Map 3 Somalia Basic Livelihoods Map 
  
 
(Source: USAID, 2009) 
 
Between 1975 and 1991, all land was nationalised. Existing customary rights 
were generally honored, but the state took over large areas of irrigable land in 
the river valleys. Plantations had to register to obtain a concession grant, with 
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the value of the land itself excluded from the selling price. In 1993, 
privatization, which with assistance from Italy (the main market for banana 
exports) began to help revitalise the agricultural sector. In 2001, agricultural 
products accounted for approximately 30 percent of exports and 17 percent of 
imports and there was an agricultural trade surplus of US$10.2 million (The 
Encyclopedia of Nations, 2010). 
 
Despite progress in the early 2000s, continuing conflict, drought and flooding 
over the last decade, has severely damaged Somalia’s agriculture sector 
(USAID, 1998). Consequently, in the last five years Somalia has only been 
able to meet approximately 30 percent of its food needs. Somalia is now a net 
importer of cereal with increasing amounts of the country’s food needs met 
through international food aid (Environment News Service, 2010). A number 
of humanitarian organisations including United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, Islamic Relief and International NGOs such as, Norwegian 
Church Aid are supporting agriculturalists through various projects such as 
the provision of seeds and tools; irrigation projects; and training for farmers 
(FAO, 2009; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2010). Unfortunately, the 
continuing conflict in south and central Somalia limits many agricultural 
activities in these areas.  
 
3.3.3 Fishing and Piracy 
The coastal waters of Somalia are rich in fish resources. Originally, 
subsistence fishing was only practiced by small coastal communities until it 
was promoted by the government in response to a drought during the 1970s. 
By 1984, it was estimated that a million people were inhabiting the Somali 
coast and in 2003, almost US$3.4 million-worth of fish were exported (WRI, 
2003). The Somali fishing sector comprises two distinct parts – the artisanal 
sector, which operates in inshore areas and accounts for 60 percent of the 
landings; and the industrial sector, which accounts for 40 percent of the total 
fishery production (FAO, 2005). The artisanal sector use small boats with 
landlines, gill nets and long lines. There is an abundance of fish both inshore 
and offshore including tuna, mackerel, sharks and lobsters. The industrial 
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sector largely comprises joint ventures involving commercial Somali fishing 
companies and foreign commercial fishing companies. Italy, Korea, Spain, 
Japan, Greece and Egypt are some examples of the joint venture initiatives in 
Somali waters.  
 
The importance of the fishery sector within the overall economy is relatively 
small. Exports of fishery products account for around three percent of total 
exports and it contributes only two percent to GDP (FAO, 2005). The 
importance of the fishery sector for future socio-economic development 
however, must not be underestimated. The inshore fish stocks are only lightly 
exploited and the artisanal sector is comparatively less developed than other 
production systems of the country meaning there is great potential for a steep 
increase in productivity in the fishing sector.  
 
Since 1991, Somalia’s rich fishing resources have been heavily exploited by 
unlicensed foreign-flagged fishing boats and over fishing has now become a 
major economic, environmental and social issue. Hundreds of illegal fishing 
vessels from a variety of nations ply the waters off Somalia and some have 
even attacked Somali fishermen destroying their boats and equipment (UN, 
2005). Somali fishermen documented cases of trawlers pouring boiling water 
on the fishermen in canoes, their nets cut or destroyed, smaller boats 
crushed, killing all the occupants, and other abuses suffered as they tried to 
protect their national fishing territory (Waldo, 2009). A 2005 report from the 
Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG) estimated that the Somali 
economy loses approximately US$90 million a year to illegal, unreported and 
unregulated foreign fishing vessels (UNOCHA, 2006; Fish information and 
Services, 2010). Estimates from the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) report this figure as high as US$300 million a year (Godoy, 2010).  
 
In the early 1990s Somalis began claiming European and Asian companies 
were dumping toxic and nuclear waste in Somali waters. These claims, of 
environmental destruction along Somalia’s coast were continually disregarded 
by the United Nations and the regions maritime authorities. Despite 
international appeals to act on the continued ravaging of the Somali marine 
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resources and dumping of toxic waste the violations were allowed to continue 
because it was claimed there was a lack of evidence (Clair, 2011).  
 
In 2004 the ‘Asian’ Tsunami struck and Somalia was the worst effected 
country in Africa. In addition to the loss of life and livelihoods, the Tsunami 
washed toxic waste barrels and containers onto the shores of Puntland 
(Abdullahi, 2008 and Godoy, 2010). The evidence was finally confirmed by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) “Somalia has been used 
as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and 
continuing through the civil war……since the containers came ashore, 
hundreds of residents have fallen ill, suffering from mouth and abdominal 
bleeding, skin infections and other ailments” (Nuttall, UN Spokesman, 
Abdullahi, 2008, para. 16). The United Nations Environment Programme 
confirmed uranium radioactive waste; lead and heavy metals like cadmium 
and mercury; industrial waste; and hospital waste had all been dumped along 
Somalia’s coastline (Clair, 2011). Despite international recognition of the 
violations occurring the international community failed to act and the offences 
continue (ibid.).  
 
Initially the Somali fishermen used speedboats in attempts to dissuade the 
dumpers and trawlers but this had little effect. The fishermen became more 
organised and began arming themselves to scare off foreign vessels. Over 
time, these groups evolved, modernised their hardware and became more 
aggressive towards foreign vessels. Since 1991, Somali fishermen have 
captured Egyptian, Indian, Italian, Kenyan, Korean, Spanish, Taiwanese, 
Ukranian and Yemenese illegal fishing trawlers and ransoms of various sizes 
have been paid for their release (Waldo, 2009). In 2008, Somalis captured a 
Ukrainian ship accusing European firms of dumping toxic waste off their 
coast. They demanded US$8 million in ransom for the ships return that would 
go towards cleaning up the waste (ibid.). Subsequently, the piracy boom 
began and pirate groups increased in size and number, becoming ever more 
organised in their attacks. Driven by an anger towards illegal fishing and 
dumping vessels; the international community for not preventing the illegal 
fishing or waste dumping; decades of strife, poverty and struggle; and a 
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mixture of greed and the hope for a better life, Somali waters became rife with 
Somali pirates. In 2008 and 2009, Somali pirates earned an estimated 
US$150 million and over US$60 million respectively in ransom payments, 
which is more than Somalia’s national budget (Roble, 2010; BBC News, 
2008). Ransom payments have continued to increase and in 2011, US$250 
million were paid to pirates (The Independent, 2012). This money is 
supporting the Somali economy as the pirates use this money to stock up on 
sheep, goats, water, fuel, rice, milk, spaghetti and cigarettes (Hafner, 2009). 
The ransom money is filtering down to Somalia’s poorest and is buoying up 
the entire economy of the state (Al-Mutairi, 2003). Consequently, the majority 
of Somali’s support the pirates and see them as a form of national defense of 
the country’s territorial waters (Hari, 2010). The pirates are treated as local 
heroes for their work in defending their coastline, they are sought after 
husbands and are well respected in Somali society (The Telegraph, 2009). 
 
Dumping toxic waste, illegal fishing and destroying livelihoods does not justify 
hostage taking and piracy however,  
 
“did we expect starving Somalians to stand passively on their beaches, 
paddling in our nuclear waste, and watch us snatch their fish to eat in 
restaurants in London and Paris and Rome?” (Hari, 2009, para. 12) 
 
A NATO mission and EU naval force were launched in 2008 to protect and 
escort merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden (Sky News, 2008). Various other 
countries including the US and India also mounted anti-piracy patrols in the 
area. The 30 or so international anti-piracy naval vessels now surveying these 
vast waters however, are inadequate and of little deterrent to the Somali 
pirates (BBC News, 2011a; and Shinn and Adjunct, 2009).  
 
Poverty, war, disease and natural disasters have left few livelihood options for 
young Somali men and subsequently many are turning to piracy. Piracy has 
proven lucrative for Somalis and most believe the risks are little in comparison 
to the rewards.  
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In order to seriously and sustainably address the issue of piracy in Somalia it 
is not NATO warships that are needed. The international community must 
correct its past wrongs and help protect the Somali coastline from illegal 
fishing and waste dumping. The international community needs to help Somali 
fishermen reap the full rewards of their resource rich waters and only then will 
Somali men choose a livelihood of fishing over piracy.  
 
3.3.4 Telecommunications and Services 
Despite the ongoing conflict, the Somali service sector has surprisingly 
flourished over recent years. Telecommunication firms provide wireless 
services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the 
continent (CIA, 2010). In 1991, there were only 8,500 operational fixed 
telephone lines in Somalia and many of these were completely destroyed 
during the 1990s. Despite the lack of a functional government or effective 
economy there are now 68,000 phone lines divided between fixed (48,000) 
and mobile (20,000). Internet services have an estimated 4,500 subscribers 
and 18,000 users (Somalia Watch News, 2007).  
 
There is a lack of formal banking systems in Somalia as a result of the conflict 
and insecurity (Bakonyi and Abdullahi, 2006). Money exchange services 
occur through an informal, yet highly efficient system known as ‘Hawala’. This 
system has been practiced throughout Somalia for many years and is often 
used and supported by international organisations. The Somali Diaspora 
relies heavily upon the Hawala system to transfer funds to family and 
extended family members both in times of emergency and on a regular basis 
(Winter, 2004). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
European Commission have both worked with and provided capacity building 
for Somali Hawala organisations.  
 
The Hawala system handles between US$500 million and US$1 billion in 
remittances annually (CIA, 2005) and is an essential finance mechanism in 
Somalia for individuals, businesses and international organisations (Vaknin, 
2005). The Hawala system is favoured as it costs less than transferring funds 
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through traditional banking systems, it operates 24 hours a day every day of 
the year, is completely reliable and involves minimal paperwork. Most 
importantly however, the Hawala system is exceptionally fast – an individual 
or organisation can supply money to a Hawala business or trader in London 
(UK) for example (there are recognised Hawala traders throughout the world); 
a phone call is made to the local Hawala trader in Somalia; and the funds are 
delivered or available for collection usually within hours on the same day 
(Tabacniks, 2009). The system is based entirely on trust, performance and 
honour of a large network of ‘informal bankers’ (ibid.). The Hawala system has 
proven invaluable during conflicts and disasters in Somalia when the timely 
release of funds on the ground to mobilise emergency projects is paramount.  
 
3.4 Basic Indicators in Somalia 
The following sections provide an overview of Somalia’s human development 
indicators including health, education, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, 
and shelter. 
 
3.4.1 Health  
Widespread poverty, civil strife and a lack of resources and skills have placed 
health standards in Somalia amongst the worst in the world. Average life 
expectancy is only 47 years (WHO, 2006b). Preventable diseases including 
diarrhea, respiratory infections and malaria are the main killers of infants and 
young children, together accounting for over half of all child deaths. Somalia 
remains among countries with the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the 
world largely through overcrowded camps or settlements and lack of 
treatment facilities. Infant and child mortality rates are among the highest in 
the world and reproductive health is a major problem with high maternal 
mortality rates (1,044 per 100,00 live births). This places Somali women 
amongst the most high-risk groups in the world (UNICEF, 2008).  
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Female genital mutilation (infibulation) and anaemia significantly aggravate 
the state of Somali women’s health. Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)4 
prevalence in Somalia is approximately 95-98 percent and is primarily 
performed on girls aged 4-11 years old. FGM has severe adverse effects on 
the physical, mental and psychological health of those who undergo the 
practice. The consequences are both immediate and lifelong. Despite 
internationally recognised laws against FGM; proven lack of validation as a 
religious aspect of Islam; and global advocacy to eradicate the practice, it 
remains embedded in Somali culture. The practice itself is generally 
undertaken by untrained midwives who use instruments such as knives, 
razors or broken glass (UNICEF, no date, a). These instruments are often not 
sterilised and the practice usually occurs without anesthesia. The short-term 
consequences can include immediate death as a result of shock, hemorrhage 
or septicemia. The long-term implications are extensive including, chronic 
pelvic complications, recurrent urinary retention and infection and 
complications during child birth. In addition to the direct adverse health effects 
and psychological impacts, FGM increases a women’s biological vulnerability 
to HIV transmission if exposed to the virus.  
 
FGM can have serious impacts upon men as well as women. In many parts of 
Somalia it is a disgrace for a man to be unable to deinfibulate his wife. A 
number of men have committed suicide when they have not been able to 
achieve deinfibulation whilst others have used corrosive chemicals or razors 
in attempts to break the skin (ibid.). 
 
The provision of healthcare services in Somalia are largely dependent on UN 
agencies and NGOs. Unfortunately, high levels of insecurity hinders access to 
much of the population. It is estimated that only 15 percent of people living in 
rural areas and 50 percent of people living in urban areas have access to 
health care (WHO, 2006b). Immunisation rates in Somalia are extremely low 
                                            
4 FGM is defined as procedures involving partial or total removal of female genitalia 
or other injury to female genital organs. The operation generally involves the total 
removal of the clitoris, labia minora and severing of the inner side of the labia majora. 
The sides of the labia majora are then sutured together, leaving a small hole for urine 
and menstrual discharge to pass (UNICEF, no date).  
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with great disparities between urban and rural populations. There have been 
no yellow fever vaccinations for over a decade and only 5 percent of children 
under one have all six recommended vaccinations (UNICEF, 2008).  
 
A lack of child vaccinations, dangerous traditional practices such as FGM and 
inadequate health services mean most Somalis have a poor state of health, 
which increases their susceptibility to illness and disease and their overall 
vulnerability to shocks. 
 
3.4.2 Water and sanitation 
Access to safe water and sanitation facilities is a significant problem in 
Somalia, aggravated by the destruction and looting of water supply 
installations during the civil war, the continuing conflict, and a general lack of 
maintenance. The majority of Somalis access water from shallow wells, rivers 
and Berkads5. As of 2010, only 29 percent of the total population had access 
to improved water sources throughout the year (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). In 
many areas of Somalia such as the Galgadud region, the nearest safe6 water 
source can be 70km or further from settlement areas. Whilst in other areas 
boreholes between 170-240m deep are needed to access water. The basic 
water needs of over three million Somalis are met from water sources that are 
unprotected and often contaminated with micro-organisms. Approximately 71 
percent of the population access their water from unimproved or surface water 
sources7 (UN Cluster, 2006; UNICEF and WHO, 2012). During the dry season 
wells often become saline or contaminated causing severe outbreaks of 
                                            
5 A berkad is a traditional human-made reservoir usually filled by rainfall and runoff. 
They are typically shaded with small bushes, have a capacity of 30 to 400 m3 and 
used for both livestock and human consumption. Berkads were traditionally privately 
owned by households and provided a source of income. 
6 Safe drinking water is water with microbial, chemical and physical characteristics 
that meet WHO guidelines or national drinking water standards. Access to a safe 
water source is the proportion of people using improved drinking water sources, 
which can include a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug 
well, protected spring and rainwater collection (WHO, 2013).  
7 Unimproved water sources include unprotected dug wells, unprotected springs and 
water delivered by cart or tanker. Surface water includes water taken directly from 
rivers, ponds, irrigation channels and other surface sources (UNICEF and WHO, 
2012).  
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diarrhea and other water-related diseases (UNEP, 2005). Acute water 
shortages and contaminated water sources result in poor health for both 
humans and livestock, which further contribute to food insecurity.  
 
Only 23 percent of Somalis live in households with access to sanitary means 
of disposing excreta (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). The majority of the 
population practice open defecation, which is generally close to dwellings and 
water sources (ibid and European Commission, 2007). Approximately 52 
percent of people in urban areas have access to improved sanitation facilities 
whereas 83 percent of people living in rural areas defecate in open areas and 
have no access to sanitation facilities (UNICEF and WHO, 2012). A lack of 
clean water, poor hygiene and environmental sanitation are the main 
underlying causes of diseases such as cholera and dysentery in Somalia. 
Cholera is endemic in Somalia with outbreaks occurring annually from 
December to June, it claims hundreds of lives each year, particularly in 
densely populated areas (UNICEF, no date, b).  
 
Most of the sanitation facilities in Somalia are pit latrines. Few of the latrines 
are equipped with septic tanks and two-thirds of these are not managed, 
which causes contamination of the water table. In areas where displaced 
people have settled, almost no sanitation facilities exist. This forces most to 
resort to open defecation on the periphery of peri-urban areas and camps 
(USAID, 2008). Without access to latrines, many women and girls will only 
relieve themselves at night. This places them at greater risk of physical attack 
and sexual violence and many women and girls are raped when they resort to 
open defecation (UNICEF, 2010a).  
 
A lack of accessible, safe water sources has further negative effects on 
women and children. Collecting water for the family and household is the 
responsibility of women whereas taking herds of cattle and camel to watering 
points is the responsibility of men in Somalia. Many Somali women and 
children walk long distances each day to collect water. This exposes them to 
attacks and sexual violence (IDP Project, 2004; Said, 2010) and the time 
spent collecting water prevents many children, mainly girls, from attending 
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school and women from engaging in other activities including, agriculture or 
income generation (Said, 2010; UN Cluster, 2006). In rural areas, women and 
girls spend two to three hours every day walking to water points that generally 
have poor quality water (UN Cluster, 2006).   
 
Water is a traditional source of conflict in Somali society due to its scarcity. 
Conflicts generally occur over water for two reasons. Firstly, when local 
supplies diminish particularly during dry periods or droughts. This places 
pressure on pastoralists to water their herds and they are forced to travel long 
distances to reach water, for which there is fierce competition. Secondly, 
when a new or displaced group settles in an area where water is scarce, 
tensions rise between the existing inhabitants and the new group (Mohamed, 
no date).  
 
A final challenge for water and sanitation in Somalia is the lack of data and 
knowledge regarding water sources. Many international organisations for 
example, UNICEF, USAID, the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, CARE and Norwegian Church Aid are involved in delivering 
water and sanitation projects throughout Somalia. Numerous agencies have 
drilled deep boreholes to provide water for communities. There is however, no 
understanding of the water table or groundwater levels in Somalia and drilling 
boreholes as a short-term solution today could exacerbate problems in the 
future if the water table becomes over exploited without replenishment.  
 
3.4.3 Food and nutrition  
Typical Somali foods include injera (a type of bread), muufa (a porridge made 
of corn), rice, spaghetti, chapatti, goat meat, camel milk and sweet tea 
(Owens, Piccinin and Lai, 2002). Fruit and vegetables are limited, as crops 
have been destroyed through years of conflict. Somalia is more dependent on 
imported food than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa and millions of 
Somalis face food insecurity throughout the year (World Bank, 1998).  
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Food security is defined as “a situation that exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life” (FAO, 2002, Glossary).  
 
A recent study found that 50 percent of all women living in Somalia, 30 
percent of all school-aged children and 60 percent of children under five are 
suffering anemia and Vitamin A deficiencies (FSNAU, 2010). This is caused 
by a range of factors including frequent exposure to diseases that are 
untreated and the consumption of predominantly cereal-based diets that are 
lacking key vitamins and minerals. Although many children appear healthy, as 
they are not very thin, these underlying deficiencies mean these children are 
malnourished. The required nutrient rich foods such as meat, fish and eggs 
are too expensive for poor households and this is further exacerbated by 
inadequate health care and a lack of clean water and sanitation facilities 
(ibid.). Drought, flooding and conflict are the main underlying causes of food 
shortages throughout Somalia.  
 
Somalia is in a chronic nutrition crisis with rates of acute and chronic 
malnutrition consistently exceeding emergency thresholds. From 1991 to mid-
1999, the World Food Program (WFP) distributed 113,310 metric tones of 
food to an average of 1.3 million beneficiaries a year (IRIN, 2008). The 
number of people in need of food aid has increased over the years and as of 
2012, WFP was providing food aid to 1.5 million people (WFP, 2013). This 
food aid is in the form of general food distributions to rural, urban and 
internally displaced people, school feeding for children and nutrition 
programmes for pregnant women and vulnerable people through ‘food for 
work’ or ‘food for training’ projects (WFP, 2009). Despite food aid, WFP 
estimates that more than 2.5 million people remain in crisis throughout 
Somalia (WFP, 2013) 
 
Food aid has been constantly interrupted in Somalia as a consequence of the 
conflict and insecurity. Delivering food aid to those malnourished and starving 
is a challenge in itself for humanitarian organisations. Food aid must face 
 72
various warlords and militia roadblocks in order to reach those in need and 
deliveries are regularly hijacked or stolen (Thomson, 2006 and Rugman, 
2009). The situation is currently extremely desperate as WFP were forced to 
suspend its operations in early 2010 following attacks on its employees in 
south and central areas. In late 2009, the Islamist military group al-Shabaab, 
who operate in southern and central Somalia, demanded that all women were 
removed from UN employment and the payment of US$20,000 every six 
months for the protection of each regional UN office in Somalia (Howden, 
2010). WFP refused these demands and were subsequently forced to cease 
operations throughout southern Somalia due to the insecurity for its staff. 
WFP only resumed full operations in Somalia in January 2013. They 
conducted an assessment in the southern port of Kismayo in November 2012, 
which found high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity across the city 
(WFP, 2013).  
 
Throughout Somalia insecurity and conflict continue to contribute to poor 
household food security and high rates of malnutrition. WFP is responding 
through implementing a new model of food distribution. WFP is moving away 
from general food distributions to a more targeted means of assistance. One 
critical focus is on nutrition programmes that support the most vulnerable, 
namely women and children. Through supplementary feeding and, where 
possible, through health centres, WFP provides specialised nutritional food 
products to treat and prevent malnutrition. WFP is also however, providing a 
family ration through this distribution with the understanding there is a 
likelihood of other family members also suffering malnourishment (WFP, 
2012). This family ration provides maximum coverage through a targeted 
approach by reaching the most vulnerable families.   
 
3.4.4 Education 
During the last two decades, the Somali education system ceased to function 
(UNFAO, 2005). Somalia has one of the lowest school enrolment rates in the 
world. Only 20.7 percent of primary school-age children in 2008 were enrolled 
in schools and only 24 percent of adults are literate (UNDP, 2010).   
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According to a Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia conducted in 2003-
2004, there are 1,172 operating schools with a total enrolment of over 
285,574 children (GER) (UNICEF, 2005). Enrolment rates are mainly low as a 
consequence of the continuing conflict that has displaced many Somalis; the 
destruction and looting of schools; inability of many parents to afford school 
fees; and a lack of qualified teachers.  
 
Gender disparities in enrolment rates are high and only slightly over one third 
(or 37 percent) of pupils are girls at the lower primary school levels. The 
number of girls attending school decreases further in higher grades. The low 
enrolment and high drop-out rates of girls in most areas are due to a 
combination of girls taking on more roles and responsibilities in the household 
as they grow older and money for education is usually prioritised for boys. 
Female teachers are also under-represented, making up only about 13 
percent of the total number of all teachers (Abdi, Matthews and Yocum, 
2009).  
 
The situation is much better in Somaliland in the north west compared to other 
areas of Somalia. In Somaliland the literacy rate has risen from 20 percent in 
1991 to 45 percent in 2009 (IRIN, 2009). School enrollment rose from 1,019 
pupils in 1991 to 45,223 by 2009. These successes are due to a number of 
initiatives in Somaliland including:   A major awareness raising initiative highlighting the importance of 
education for boys and girls;  Construction of many primary schools;  The construction of technical colleges and vocational schools;  The development of a constitution stipulating that all primary and 
secondary education is free. Only contributions are requested from 
parents to support voluntary teachers.  School initiatives such as, in the Togdheer region where the school and 
teachers follow the pastoralists wherever they go.   A series of boarding schools with feeding programmes that ensure 
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pastoralists’ children are fed while their families are on the move. 
(Source: ibid). 
 
WFP began a school feeding programme in Somalia in 2003. Since then, the 
number of children enrolled in these schools has risen drastically. WFP 
provides school feeding programmes in approximately 373 schools and 
reaches 93,000 primary school children. In 2008, attendance in WFP-assisted 
primary schools in Somalia was 97 percent compared to 92 percent in primary 
schools as a whole (Lambers, 2009).  
 
There are a number of Koranic schools throughout Somalia focusing on the 
Qur’an and to some extent the Arabic language. These schools are generally 
managed with community support and most function under temporary shelters 
(Afrol News, 2002). There is no government formal education system in 
Somalia and schools that do exist are locally managed community schools 
that lack sufficient resources (UNICEF, 2005a). Most schools rely on support 
from UN agencies, NGOs or Somali Diaspora for funding and resources.   
 
Somalia’s Universities are predominantly in the capital Mogadishu and 
through the wars and recent conflict from al-Shabaab many of them were 
forced to close their doors or relocate. The University of Somalia was the first 
to move in 2006 during the Ethiopian invasion, when many students faced 
harassment by both al-Shabaab militia and Ethiopian troops. The University 
opened three separate campuses as some students had links to the 
government and were not able to attend some campuses, and other students 
had links to al-Shabaab and were not able to cross government lines. Hence, 
the University established campuses behind all lines of the conflict to ensure 
access. Student numbers declined during the recent al-Shabaab conflicts 
however, with improved security and increasing Government control through 
2012, enrolment is now increasing (Ali and Mohamed, 2013). Government 
control means students no longer have the daily threat from al-Shabaab. The 
biggest barrier to accessing higher education now in Mogadishu are the high 
fees as most Universities are run by the private sector and scholarships are 
few.  
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Despite progress made in Somaliland; school feeding programmes; and most 
recently in higher education in Mogadishu, the state of primary education in 
most of Somalia remains desperate. There are a lack of schools, teachers 
and text books, which is of little surprise as Somalia finds itself at or near the 
bottom in terms of financial resources available for education (Cummings and 
van Tonningen, 2003). Ranked as having one of the lowest school enrolment 
rates in the world, it is unlikely Somalia will achieve the Millennium 
Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015 (UNDP, 2010).  
 
3.4.5 Shelter  
According to the World Bank and UNDP (2002) only 24 percent of housing in 
Somalia can be considered permanent. Nomadic pastoralists construct 
temporary houses with sticks and sheets as they move (see Figure 3) and the 
majority of all other buildings are constructed from wooden sticks with a mud 
infill.  
 
Figure 3 Typical Nomads Temporary Housing 
 
(Source: Author, 2007) 
 
Large volumes of people have been forced to flee their homes since the early 
1990s as a result of droughts and floods but mostly as a consequence of 
violence and conflict. These people move to neighbouring countries as 
refugees or to different areas of Somalia as internally displaced persons 
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(IDPs). Some reside with extended family members within the host community 
but most establish themselves in camps around villages and towns. In 2010, 
the total number of IDPs was estimated at 1.2 million in south-central 
Somalia, 126,000 in Puntland and 67,000 in Somaliland (see Map 4). Among 
the total figure are the protracted IDPs, who live in overcrowded settlements 
mainly in Galkayo and Bosasso. The IDPs construct shelters from cartons, old 
clothes and broken/rusted tins (United Nations, 2010a). These basic 
structures fail to provide adequate shelter from the elements and with a lack 
of sanitation and poor hygiene conditions, communicable diseases such as 
respiratory tract infections and diarrhea are high. Furthermore, these flimsy 
shelter structures expose women and children to rape and other serious 
violations of human rights (UN Habitat, 2009). Fire outbreaks are also 
common in the IDP settlements as most of the shelters are made of highly 
flammable materials and these fires spread quickly as the shelters are located 
too close to each other.  
 
Further exacerbating the situation for IDPs, in July 2010, authorities in the 
region of Puntland began deporting IDPs – almost 1,000 people were 
deported within one month. Puntland authorities have since begun issuing 
identity cards to its citizens with the aim of identifying them from others who 
arrive from elsewhere in Somalia (UNOCHA, 2010a). Deported with no 
provisions for shelter or food makes IDPs even more vulnerable.  
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Map 4 Somali Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
 
(Source: UNHCR, 2013). 
 
Evidently, the situation that persists in Somalia today is extreme. Complex 
and natural disasters coupled with the collapse of social services and 
devastatingly low development indicators have created a desperate situation 
that has resulted in the classification of Somalia as one of the world’s poorest 
countries. Somalia has been receiving international humanitarian aid for over 
two decades. It has received over US$5 billion over the last decade and as 
Figure 4 below illustrates the amount of humanitarian funding to Somalia has 
increased significantly from 2002 to 2012. Despite levels of aid and continued 
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humanitarian efforts from the international community Somalia’s human 
development indicators have not improved. The number of Somali people in 
need of aid has continually risen throughout the last decade and now almost 
half of the Somali population is in dire need of humanitarian assistance 
(OCHA, 2009).  
 
Figure 4 Consolidated Appeals for Somalia from 2002-2012 
 
(Source: Adapted from Financial Tracking Service, 2012) 
 
In order to fully comprehend the complex current situation in Somalia; the 
difficulties both Somalis and humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia face; 
and to even begin planning an effective humanitarian response, it is 
necessary to firstly understand the cultural and political history and evolution 
of Somalia.  
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3.5 Somalia’s History: Early Somalia 
Between the 7th and 10th Centuries, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians 
established trading posts along Somalia’s Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean 
coastlines. Mogadishu, the capital, began its existence as a trading station.  
 
British, French and Italian imperialism all played an active role in Somalia 
during the 19th Century. Colonialism did not penetrate Somalia as deep as 
other parts of Africa however, it did have the effect of imposing an alien 
political structure – a central state – on a society with a highly decentralised, 
stateless political tradition (UNDP, 1998). Britain, whose concern was largely 
to safeguard trade links with its Aden colony, proclaimed protectorate over 
Somaliland in 1887. France and Britain, after a brief risk of armed 
confrontation in 1888, agreed on a demarcation line carving out Djibouti from 
Somalia. 
 
Italy faced opposition in central Somalia from Somali Sultans and armies until 
they acquired full control over parts of Somalia in 1889. In 1896-97, Italy, after 
suffering Ethiopian defeats in other areas, granted a large Somali region 
known as Ogaden to Ethiopia. This arrangement meant many Somali’s now 
found themselves living within Ethiopia’s border.  
  
The Somali Dervish Resistance Movement established themselves to resist 
colonisation and attack by the Europeans and Ethiopians. In 1920, after a 
quarter of a century of holding the British Empire at bay, the Dervishes were 
finally defeated as a direct consequence of Britain’s new policy of aerial 
bombardment (Hultman, 1993 and Lukacs, 2007). 
 
A new era of conflict began in 1923 with the arrival of the Italian colony of the 
first governor appointed by Italy’s fascist dictator Mussolini. A vigorous policy 
was adopted to develop and extend Italian imperial interests, which 
culminated with the defeat and annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 (Bamber, 
2001). In 1925, an area known as Jubaland was detached from Kenya to 
become the westernmost part of the Italian colony. In 1963, Italian Somaliland 
was combined with Somali-speaking districts of Ethiopia to form a province of 
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the newly formed ‘Italian East Africa’ (BBC News, 2011b). During World War 
II, Italian forces invaded British Somaliland, however, the British, operating 
from Kenya retook the region in 1941 and went on to conquer Italian 
Somaliland. Britain ruled until 1950, when Italian Somaliland became a UN 
trust territory under Italian control (Farah, 2009).  
 
In 1960 Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, 
enabling the two to unite to form the Somali Republic and a civilian 
government was formed (ibid.). The government was faced with a severely 
underdeveloped economy and with a vocal movement that favoured the 
creation of a ‘Greater Somalia’ that would reunite the three large Somali 
groups trapped in other states – the Somali-dominated areas of Kenya, 
French Somaliland (now Djibouti), and the Ogaden and Haud regions in 
Ethiopia.  
 
In 1963 the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of 
Kenya to the Republic of Kenya and consequently Somalia broke diplomatic 
relations with Britain. The nomadic existence of many Somali herders and the 
ill-defined frontiers worsened problems. Hostilities between Somalia and 
Ethiopia erupted in 1964, and Kenya also became involved in the conflict until 
peace was restored in 1967 (Guardian, 2006).  
 
Failure to make progress in reuniting areas of Somalia was largely due to 
western support for Ethiopia and Kenya. Subsequently, Somalia sought 
support from the Soviet Union for military aid. Despite this, Somalia remained 
a fairly neutral stance in international affairs during the 1960s until 1969 when 
the President was assassinated and Siad Barre seized power (Dowden, 
2008). Siad introduced a brutal Marxist dictatorship, insisting upon the 
supremacy of party and nation as opposed to the local clan loyalties.   
 
In 1977, with Ethiopia in chaos after the fall of Haile Selassie, Somalia 
attacked Ethiopian garrisons in the Ogaden region. The Soviet Union, 
however, betrayed Siad Barre as they viewed the new Ethiopia as a 
potentially more important new client. In early 1978, the Ethiopian army, using 
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Soviet equipment and reinforced troops from Cuba recaptured the Ogaden 
region. The result was mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali 
refugees over the borders to Somalia (Arabic Translation Services, 2010). In 
the aftermath of this disaster, clan and regional-based guerrilla groups formed 
in and around Somalia with the intention of toppling Siad’s centralising 
regime. Siad agreed to allow the US use of air and naval facilities that had 
been built by the Soviet Union in exchange for military and economic aid.  
 
By 1988, the continuing fighting with guerrilla groups throughout Somalia 
resulted in full-scale civil war that eventually saw Siad overthrown in 1991. 
One of the main guerrilla groups was the United Somali Congress whose 
chairman was General Mohamed Farrah Aidid.  
 
The collapse of the government in 1991 led to one the fastest and largest 
population displacements ever recorded on the African continent. At the peak 
of this crisis it was thought more than 800,000 Somalis had fled to 
neighbouring countries (Mutahi, 2007).  
 
3.5.1 During the 1990s 
In 1991, the faction controlling the former British Somaliland, the Somali 
National movement (SNM), extensively changed matters by declaring its 
independence as the republic of Somaliland. This was followed in 1998 as 
Puntland, the north east region of Somalia, declared itself an autonomous 
state in attempt to avoid the clan warfare engulfing southern Somalia (Garowe 
Online, 2011 and BBC News, 2011c). Unlike Somaliland, Puntland does not 
want recognition as an independent entity, instead it aims to be part of a 
federal Somalia. Map 5 Below illustrates the division of Somalia into 
Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia as it stands today. 
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Map 5 Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia 
 
(Source: BBC, 2010). 
 
In 1992, the conflicts throughout Somalia had destroyed most of the country’s 
crops, which coupled with Africa’s worst drought of the century, caused 
widespread famine. Over half a million people died and contagious diseases 
spread through refugee camps inside the country. Warring militias looted food 
flown in by international agencies. The starvation and total breakdown of 
public services was publicised in the western media and pressure mounted for 
the UN to act. Consequently, in December 1992, the UN actively intervened 
sending a force of 35,000 troops in Operation Restore Hope. This briefly 
restored calm and fifteen warring groups convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
for peace talks in 1993. General Mohamed Farrah Aidid however, believed 
the UN and the US were attempting to impose colonial rule on Somalia 
(Purvis, 1993). During the Adis Ababa peace talks Aidid said that his faction  
 
“no longer has any confidence in the leadership of the Secretariat of the 
UN…from the secretary-general downwards, they have failed time and time 
again to demonstrate an understanding of the intricate political problems of 
Somalia”. He believed UN officials to be “too meddling, too divisive, and too 
secretive” (Meisler, 1993, para. 4).  
 
 83
Aidid was a nationalist and believed he would not let his country become an 
experiment in state building by those ignorant of its political and cultural 
traditions (Marcus, 1995). Furthermore, these peace building negotiations 
were fronted by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had 
been a strong supporter of Siad Barre and who had personally ensured (some 
years earlier) that Aidid was deported from Egypt. 
 
Aidid was the leader of the Habr Gedir clan, the stronger of the two groups 
seeking control in Mogadishu. He earned that status through toppling the 
dictator Siad Barre and then completely rooting out Siad’s attempted 
comeback. The UN attempted to marginalise Aidid and create a new political 
system without him or the Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Peterson, 2000). 
This was widely resented by Aidid’s large following of Somalis.   
 
In 1992, 28,000 US troops opened fire on unarmed Somali protestors. In July 
1993 a clan meeting was held at the house of an Aidid official to discuss a 
peace proposal from the UN’s main official, Admiral Jonathan Howe. Many 
clan members opposed to Aidid were present when the gathering was 
attacked by a US mission that had been wrongly informed Aidid was inside. 
Religious leaders and clan elders were slaughtered in one blow and an 
enraged Somali crowd then killed four journalists who arrived to cover the 
carnage (PBS, 2013).  
 
US troops began to target Aidid. The US backed the UN to begin “inspections” 
of Aidid’s radio station with an aim of closing it down, while leaving the station 
run by his rival, Ali Mahdi. Aidid’s interior minister warned the US to do so 
would mean war. An independent UN inquiry later deemed this decision to be 
“ill-advised” and the “worst time” for this activity. However, UN Pakistani 
troops went to the radio station and were met by an angry mob of Somalis 
who attacked. The special “peace” mission of the UN evaporated and this 
American-approved “inspection” was the largest single-day massacre of UN 
peacekeeping troops since 1961 (Peterson, 2000). One of the biggest 
atrocities of this was the dismemberment of the bodies of UN Pakistani troops 
(Purvis, 1993).  
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The UN began preparing a counterattack and the hundreds of UNISOM staff – 
whose mission, ironically had been to rebuild Somalia – were down to less 
than 50. The US put a $25,000 bounty on the head of Aidid with the aim of 
arresting him to try him for war crimes (Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 
2007). In 1993, after failed previous attempts, President Bill Clinton ordered a 
force of United States Army Rangers and Special Forces to capture a number 
of Aidid’s officials in Mogadishu. The attempt failed and in one night two Black 
Hawk helicopters were shot down and trapped with two special forces units in 
the centre of Mogadishu. That night 18 Americans, one Malayan troop, and 
more than 1,000 Somalis, most of them women and children, were killed. It 
was the bloodiest battle involving US troops since Vietnam and is most widely 
known through the 2001 American war film of Black Hawk Down. The US 
Somalia expedition was the largest concentration of American troops on 
African soil in history and Somalia received more media coverage in American 
media in the space of one year than any other African country in history 
(Kareitha and Kariithi, 2008).  
 
Unfortunately, the situation on the ground deteriorated and in 1994 American 
and European units in the UN force withdrew due to the unacceptable level of 
casualties. The situation continued to deteriorate and in 1995, the remaining 
UN forces evacuated and Aidid declared himself as President of Somalia. 
President Aidid died of gunshot wounds in 1996. His son, Hussein Mohamed 
Farrah, who was a US citizen after living there for 16 years and a US marine 
who had served in Somalia, was selected by the Somali National Alliance 
(SNA) to become the new president of Somalia. He resigned his position in 
Cairo, Egypt following a peace process.   
 
At the end of the 1990s, the only remotely stable region was the breakaway 
republic of Somaliland (Bamber, 2001). Somaliland formed a hybrid system of 
governance under the Constitution of Somaliland, combining traditional and 
western institutions. Through a series of inter-clan conferences a clan system 
of governance was constructed. The constitution separates the government 
into an executive branch, legislative branch and a judicial branch, all of which 
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function independently from the others. A traditional Somali council of elders 
that included wise men from every clan, was formed by the Somali National 
Movement after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime. This council of elders worked 
with rebel leaders to set up a new government, and was incorporated into the 
governance structure, becoming the Parliament’s House of Elders. In 2002, 
Somaliland transitioned to a multi-party democracy (Hersi, 2009). The 
elections were limited to three parties to create ideology as opposed to clan, 
based elections.   
 
Recent Events: 2000-2010  
During 1997-2000 there was no President of Somalia as a result of civil 
conflict. Eventually an internationally recognised Transitional National 
Government (TNG) was formed in 2000-2004. The TNG faced steep 
opposition from the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), 
which was formed by rival leaders. The TNG suffered both internal threats 
and disruptive foreign intervention. This resulted in the replacement of the 
Prime Minister four times in three years and the administrative body reported 
bankruptcy in 2003 (Janaale Media, 2012). In 2004, an internationally 
supported National Reconciliation Conference resulted in the creation of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia with Abdullahi Yusuf 
Ahmed as President. This replaced the TNG and was tasked with moving 
Somalia out of transition by August 2009 (Hanson, and Keplan, 2008). 
 
The Islamic Courts strongly opposed the TFG and after conflict in 2006 they 
took control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu (BBC News, 2006). Somalia’s 
TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops ousted the Islamic Courts in December 
2006. The involvement of Ethiopian troops created further resistance towards 
the TFG. The Islamic Courts leadership moved to Eritrea and in this vacuum 
of leadership for the resistance, Al-Shabaab through a secretive leadership 
began slowly taking over its control. Many Somalis joined the fight against the 
Ethiopian forces and few were aware of or fully understood the objectives of 
Al-Shabaab. During 2007, the true leaders of Al-Shabaab emerged along with 
their ties with Al-Qaeda (Dagne, 2011). In 2008, the US Government 
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designated Al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (National 
Counterterrorism Center, 2013).  
 
Yusuf remained in power in Somalia until 2008 when he resigned after a 
fierce power struggle with his Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein who was 
supported by parliament after Yusuf had tried to sack him. Yusuf was a long 
ally to Ethiopia and a foe of Somalia’s extreme Islamists in the south. His 
requests for Ethiopia’s help in ousting the Islamists were not popular amongst 
many in Somalia (BBC News, 2008a). Furthermore, he always lacked support 
as he is from a northern based clan while Mogadishu the capital of Somalia is 
dominated by the southern Hawiye clan. After an interim period, Shairf Sheikh 
Ahmed was elected as President in 2009. Mid 2012, Ahmed’s term as 
President of Somalia officially ended, concurrent with the conclusions of the 
Transitional Federal Government’s mandate and the start of the Federal 
Government of Somalia. Ahmed was succeeded in office by the interim 
President General Muse Hassan Sheikh Sayid Abdulle. Shortly after, Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamud was elected as President of Somalia (BBC, 2012).     
 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was chosen as the first president of Puntland in 1998 
by a delegation of traditional leaders for a three year term. Yusuf is from the 
Darod clan based in the northern Puntland region. Yusuf’s term expired in 
2001 after an unsuccessful bid to extend his term. Elections were held 
however, forces loyal to the former president refused to recognise the result 
and attacked and captured Garowe the capital of Puntland in late 2001. 
Clashes continued until 2002 when Yusuf’s forces seized the last remaining 
stronghold and thus, had full control of Puntland. In 2004, Yusuf was elected 
transitional president of Somalia and as such he gave up the presidency in 
Puntland to Mohamed Abdi Hashi until January 2005 when Hashi lost a re-
election bid in parliament to General Mohamud Muse Hersi (African Elections 
Database, 2010).  
 
In March 2005, President Muse of Puntland commissioned an airport to be 
built in the coastal city of Bosaso, which is now complete. In April 2007, Muse 
held meetings with the Crown Prince of the United Arab Emirates where the 
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two leaders signed an agreement that established a dedicated livestock 
quarantine facility to enable the import of livestock from Somalia to UAE. In 
2008, Muse signed several agreements with Dubai’s Lootah group to support 
the construction of an airport, seaport and free zone in Bosaso (AMEinfo, 
2007). Muse’s objective was to improve prosperity, health and education 
services.  
 
In January 2009, Abdirahman Mohamud Farole ran for President of Puntland 
in the elections and won. Farole was a previous cabinet member until a 
dispute with Muse over a deal with an Australian oil company – Range 
Resources – led to his departure to Australia in 2006. Farole expressed 
doubts with regard to the agreements legality and described the process as 
far from transparent. Despite political tensions prior to the voting, the election 
itself was reportedly peaceful. In an effort to improve transparency, the new 
president issued a first-ever ‘100 Days in Office report’ (Omar, 2012).  
 
In December 2009, Puntland’s parliament introduced a new state flag. The top 
blue stripe and white centre star symbolising the Flag of Somalia. The centre 
white stripe representing peace and stability in the region. The bottom green 
stripe illustrating the natural wealth of the Puntland State of Somalia.  
 
Despite elections and transitional governments, Somalia remains in a state of 
crisis, with Al-Shabaab and other militias causing constant insecurity and 
outbreaks of violence. The number of Somali refugees has continued to rise 
with estimates indicating 1,033,559 Somalis hold refugee status in Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and further afield in Europe and the United States of 
America. Additionally, there is an estimated 1,360,000 internally displaced 
people (UNHCR, 2013a) in Somalia. Somalia also has a high number of 
destitute people, people whose livelihoods have been completely destroyed 
through conflicts and natural disasters.   
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3.6. Natural disasters 
In addition to the conflicts and violence Somalia suffers from recurrent 
droughts and floods. During 2011, 42.9 percent of Somalia’s population were 
victims of natural disasters, most of which were a result of droughts with four 
million Somali’s suffering from droughts and consecutive famines (Guha-
Sapir, Vos, Below and Ponserre, 2012). Somalia’s erratic rainfall causes 
almost annual droughts, which usually then result in flash floods killing many 
and displacing thousands.  
 
On the 26th December 2004 near the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia, the 
world’s most powerful earthquake in 40 years struck. The earthquake 
triggered a series of large Tsunami waves across the Indian Ocean. Somalia 
was the worst affected country in Africa. Approximately 650 kilometres of the 
Somali coastline primarily between Hafun (Bari region) and Garacad (Mudug 
region) in the state of Puntland were severely affected (UNEP, 2005). The 
Tsunami resulted in the death of some 298 people, thousands of homes were 
destroyed and an estimated 50,000 people were displaced (Preventionweb, 
2013; BBC News, 2005). Water and sanitation facilities were destroyed or 
contaminated, food stores swept away, roads and other infrastructure were 
damaged and thousands of fishing boats were lost, devastating lives and 
livelihoods and leaving people vulnerable, exposed and in need of emergency 
assistance. 
 
Somalia has ranked first in the Failed States Index for the last five years 
(2007-2012) (Foreign Policy, 2012). A testament not only to the depth of the 
country’s long-running political and humanitarian disaster, but also to the 
international community’s inability to respond effectively. Over two decades of 
devastating conflicts and natural disasters have left Somalia in a state of 
chronic humanitarian crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 89
Chapter 4  
Methodology 
 
The following chapter discusses the methodological approach and its 
limitations adopted for this research. This chapter also covers the 
researcher’s positionality and ethics.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Examining the manner in which humanitarian interventions reduce 
vulnerability, promote resilience and build adaptive capacity in disaster prone 
areas can prove problematic. An evaluation approach, which has increasingly 
become an inherent component of humanitarian interventions, can be utilised 
by researchers to understand and document the realities of adaptive capacity, 
resilience and vulnerability of beneficiaries. Studies designed ‘externally’ or, 
detached from the intervention will experience difficulties in accessing some 
data sources such as programme and project documentation, key informants, 
stakeholders and the affected population. 
 
An evaluation methodology was adopted to assess the extent to which ACT 
and NCA enhanced or impacted upon the adaptive capacity, resilience and 
vulnerability of the respective communities. Evaluations have become 
inherent to development and humanitarian operations largely for the purpose 
of accountability and lesson learning. Although, humanitarian organisations 
operating at a field level focus on evaluations less for accountability and more 
for lessons learnt. Evaluating humanitarian assistance like disaster research, 
is unique and context specific. Methodologically, evaluations have theoretical 
similarities, but differ in the design and execution according to the prevailing 
situations. Evaluations are applied research and as such, utilise findings and 
explanations of basic research to inform their design and implementation. This 
creates a number of implications primarily including philosophical and 
methodological challenges. Evaluations, similar to any other research, are not 
philosophically neutral. They are constructed upon particular assumptions 
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surrounding the nature of knowledge, reality and existence. Evaluators rely 
heavily upon existing social science research methods and methodologies for 
obtaining information. Hence, some commentators assert there is no single 
research strategy unique to evaluation research (Robson, 1993) and as such 
evaluations adopt methods provided in the research field. Evaluation research 
is distinguished from other forms of social research not through the methods 
evaluators employ but the purpose to which the methods are put (Babbie, 
1995). It is accepted practice, however, that evaluations rarely directly 
address the issue of ‘policy correctness’. This is a failing that will not be 
allowed in academic review of policy concern.  
 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of evaluation as a methodology for 
assessing lessons that can be learnt from humanitarian interventions in their 
attempts to address adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. This 
chapter commences with an exploration of the concept, evolution and types of 
evaluation.  
 
The discussion of evaluation methodology firstly explores the main types of 
evaluation – formative, summative and process. This is followed by an 
overview of evaluation models including, goal-based, goal-free and criteria-
based models. This study used the summative evaluation with the analysis 
based on the criteria model to establish the extent to which humanitarian 
interventions addressed adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. Figure 
5 summarises the methodological structure of the study. This chapter then 
proceeds to examine the philosophical underpinnings that guided this 
research. The quantitative and qualitative paradigms are discussed in relation 
to their relevance to the evaluations. Finally, the fieldwork methods and 
techniques including the associated limitations of each of the case studies are 
detailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 91
Figure 5 Methodological Structure of Evaluating Humanitarian Interventions 
 
(Source: Author).
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4.2 The Evolution of Evaluation 
Scriven (1991) describes evaluation as a new discipline but an ancient 
practice (Scriven, 1991). It is probably the most common form of reasoning 
used by people and all humans are nascent evaluators (Mathison, 2005). In 
terms of the evolution of the human race, evaluation is possibly the most 
important activity that has allowed us to evolve, develop, and survive in an 
ever-changing environment. Each time we attempt something new – a farming 
method, a manufacturing process, a medical treatment, a social change 
programme, a policy, or a new information system – it is important to consider 
its value (Davidson, 2004). Shadish and Luellen (2005) claim that Chapter 
One in the Book of Daniel in the Bible’s Old Testament describes a quasi-
experiment evaluation that sought to establish the effects of a Hebrew versus 
a Babylonian diet on health (Scriven, 1991).  
 
It was not until the late 20th Century however, that the concept of evaluation 
became popularised. According to Guba and Lincoln (1989), the first 
published educational research that could be associated with the ‘field’ of 
evaluation is Rice’s (1987) ‘The Futility of the Spelling Grind’ research study. 
Stufflebeam et al. (2000) believed the rise of scientific management during the 
1920s in order to improve efficiency and productivity witnessed a subsequent 
increase in use of evaluations in an effort to control the labour process. Tyler’s 
1942 study on curriculum improvement however, provided the most significant 
example of evaluation as an emerging distinct mode of inquiry (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989). There appears consensus amongst the evaluation literature 
that Tylers research was the starting point of programme evaluation as we 
perceive it today (Kenny, 2007).  
 
Evaluation as a mode of inquiry within social sciences has gradually gained 
acceptance as a legitimate ‘research design’ process (Sarantakos, 1998). It 
has largely been categorised as ‘applied research’, which focuses upon 
programme, policy issues and problem solving as opposed to basic research 
that aims to make a substantive, original contribution to knowledge (Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2004; and Kenny, 2007). The literature portrays the 
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emergence of evaluation as a mode of specific inquiry to be located in the 
1960s. The development of an array of social programmes and extensive 
financial investments as a consequence of the ‘great society’ strategy pursued 
in the USA aimed at dismantling poverty warranted increased accountability. 
Subsequently, many of these programmes received allocated funding for 
evaluations (Cracknell, 2000; Shadish and Luellen, 2005; Guba and Lincoln, 
1989, Patton, 1997 and Pawson and Tilley, 2001). 
 
On the development aid front, it was not until the late 1970s that evaluation 
became an integral component for the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) programmes. Development aid budgets 
and activities were increasing, which generated a need for more systematic 
audits and accountability. Financial audits evolved into performance audits 
that in turn evolved into impact and learning focused evaluations (World Bank, 
no date). On the professional front, methods and theories were as diverse as 
the professions themselves. In the majority of cases sociologists and 
psychologists conducted experimental evaluations, educators focused on 
testing during evaluations, anthropologists used qualitative methods while 
those from management used management information systems (Shadish 
and Luellen, 2005).  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s humanitarian organisations were largely exempt 
from serious evaluation or critical analysis (Crisp, 2000). However, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the ability to deliver aid in increasingly complex 
environments; the greater absorption of public and private funding by 
humanitarian organisations; and increasing ability of the international media to 
document such emergencies placed growing pressure on the humanitarian 
system to deliver results and demonstrate accountability. This pressure 
erupted in 1994 during the Rwandan crisis, which saw the largest 
humanitarian effort at that time fail to respond adequately or timely both 
before and during the genocide (Sphere Project, 2006). In order to examine 
the failings of the humanitarian response an evaluation team was established 
– the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR). With 52 
researchers and a cost of over a million dollars, a five-volume evaluation 
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report was produced. Whilst the Rwanda evaluation was somewhat unique in 
scale, its approach presented a new standard of good practice in evaluating 
humanitarian assistance (Crisp, 2000). Evaluations of humanitarian efforts 
have since become common practice and have attracted unprecedented 
levels of donor funding and agency commitment, as well as public and 
political interest.  
 
The Active Learning Network of Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) 
was established in the mid-1990s as a result of the growing number of 
humanitarian evaluations and a need to demonstrate accountability. ALNAP 
maintains the most comprehensive evaluations database with over 1,100 
evaluation reports, lessons studies, synthesis reports and good practice 
studies (ALNAP, 2013). This database however, does not illustrate the extent 
of growth in humanitarian evaluations as it is by no means exhaustive and 
relies on member and non-member organisations submitting their evaluation 
reports. 
 
Evaluation has experienced phenomenal growth in recent years and is 
amongst the fastest growing disciplines in the world (Cracknell, 2000). The 
growth of evaluation is manifest in the increasing number of evaluation 
societies, journals, conferences, workshops, training sessions and number of 
evaluations themselves (Guba and Lincoln, 1982; Cracknell, 2000; O'Keefe et 
al., 2002). The Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe all now have their own 
evaluation societies and evaluation societies are continuing to grow and 
emerge in various countries throughout the world such as the UK, Germany, 
France, Afghanistan, Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa 
(OECD/DAC, 2011). The growth in evaluations confirms their increasing 
importance to informing policy and programming. 
 
Evaluation as applied research has long been accepted by scholars including 
Weiss (1972), Clarke (1999), Shaw (1999), Cracknell (2000) and Patton 
(2002). The use of the terms ‘research’, ‘applied inquiry’, ‘systematic 
collection of information’ and ‘assessment’ denotes that evaluation is a type of 
applied research that centres upon practical challenges and issues faced by 
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societies and how these could be addressed (Patton, 2002; Clarke, 1999). 
Evaluation determines the merit, worth, or value of things. The evaluation 
process identifies relevant values or standards that apply to what is being 
evaluated; performs empirical investigation using techniques from the social 
sciences; and then integrates conclusions with the standards into an overall 
evaluation or set of evaluations (Scriven, 1991). 
 
Social science research, by contrast, does not aim for or achieve evaluative 
conclusions. It is restricted to empirical (rather than evaluative) research, and 
bases its conclusions only on factual results – that is, observed, measured, or 
calculated data. Social science research does not establish standards or 
values and then integrate them with factual results to reach evaluative 
conclusions (Scriven, 2004). Fournier (2005) asserts conclusions made in 
evaluations encompass both an empirical aspect (that something is the case) 
and a normative aspect (judgement about the value of something). It is this 
value feature that distinguishes evaluation from other types of enquiry such as 
basic research, clinical epidemiology or investigative journalism (ibid).  
 
4.3 Definition of Evaluation 
“Evaluation’ is a multi-faceted concept. It is used in a ‘myriad of contexts, 
settings and circumstances” (Clarke, 1999, p. 1). Table 2 provides a list of 
definitions of evaluation, although, this list is by no means exhaustive. The 
majority of definitions view evaluation as a deliberate and systematic process 
of collecting information about an ongoing or completed programme or 
project. Evaluations are used as a foundation for making judgements about 
project or programme outcomes, informing policies, and the design and 
implementation of future programmes. In the context of disasters and 
humanitarian interventions, evaluation is used to “improve future aid policy 
programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned [and] to 
provide a basis of accountability, including the provision of information to the 
public” (Poletti, 2004, p. 8).  
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Table 2 Definitions of Evaluation 
Source Definition 
ALNAP (2006, 
p. 14) 
 
“Systematic and impartial examination of humanitarian action 
intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and 
enhance accountability”.  
European 
Commission 
(2010, p. 5) 
Evaluation is the “judgement of interventions according to their 
results, impacts and needs they aim to satisfy”. The key notion in 
this definition is that it is a process that culminates in a judgement 
(or assessment) of an intervention. Moreover, the focus of 
evaluation is first and foremost on the needs, results and impacts 
of an intervention. 
Fournier 
(2005, p. 139) 
 
“Evaluation is an applied inquiry process for collecting and 
synthesising evidence that culminates in conclusions about state 
of affairs, value, merit, worth, significance, or quality of a 
programme, product, person, policy, proposal or plan”. 
OECD-DAC 
1991, p.5) 
 
“An evaluation is an assessment, as systematic and objective as 
possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or 
policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to 
determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, 
developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. 
An evaluation should provide information that is credible and 
useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the 
decision- making process of both recipients and donors”. 
Scriven (1991, 
p. 1) 
“Evaluation is the process of determining the merit, worth and 
value of things, and evaluations are the product of that process”. 
Patton (2002, 
p. 10) 
 
“Programme evaluation is the systematic collection of information 
about activities, characteristics, and outcomes of programmes to 
make judgements about programmes, improve programme 
effectiveness, and or/inform decisions about future programming”. 
Stufflebeam 
(2001, p. 11). 
“A study designed to assist some audience to assess an object’s 
merit and worth”. 
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Table 2 Definitions of Evaluation Continued  
UNDP (2002, 
p. 6) 
 
“Evaluation is a selective exercise that attempts to systematically 
and objectively assess progress towards and the achievement of an 
outcome. Evaluation is not a one-time event, but an exercise 
involving assessments of differing scope and depth carried out at 
several points in time in response to evolving needs for evaluative 
knowledge and learning during the effort to achieve an outcome”. 
Weiss (1972) 
as quoted in 
Clarke (1999, 
p. 1-2) 
 
“Evaluation is a type of policy research, designed to help people 
make wise choices about future programming. Evaluation does not 
aim to replace decision makers’ experiences and judgement, but 
rather offers systematic evidence that informs experience and 
judgement. Evaluation strives for impartiality and fairness. At best, it 
strives to represent the range of perspectives of those who have a 
stake in the programme”. 
WFP (2008a, 
p. 6) 
 An Evaluation “is an assessment that is as systematic and impartial 
as possible. It focuses on expected and actual accomplishments, 
examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors and 
causality to understand achievements or the lack thereof. It aims to 
determine the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and 
sustainability of WFPs activities, operations, strategies and policies, 
and their contribution to the development and humanitarian 
processes of countries that receive WFP assistance”. 
(Source: Author) 
 
4.3.1 Accountability and Lesson Learning 
Evaluations often originated due to a need for accountability as demonstrated 
by the 1960s US Government investments in social programmes and the 
Rwandan Genocide. The Development Assistance Committee defines 
accountability as an  
 
“Obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with 
agreed rules and/or plans. This may require a careful, even legally defensible, 
demonstration that the work is consistent with the contract terms” (DAC, 2002, 
p. 15).  
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In humanitarian evaluations, programme managers, staff, decision makers 
and politicians are accountable to communities, citizens, service users, tax 
payers, advocacy groups, relevant professions, international organisations 
and donors (OECD/DAC, 1991; Rogers, 2005). According to Rogers (2005), 
the common form of accountability focuses on meeting targets, outcomes or 
outputs. Discrepancies are reported between targets and performance to 
funders with the assumption the information will inform subsequent policy 
decisions.  
 
The very definition and meaning of evaluating humanitarian assistance 
creates what Cracknell (2000) refers to as the ‘accountability/lesson learning’ 
dichotomy. Cracknell and other authors have highlighted there is an essential 
tension between these two objectives. Accountability focuses on questions 
relating to whether humanitarian assistance works or is effective and 
accountability related concerns in evaluations underlie the interest of donors, 
governments and the media – all of whom have a justifiable interest in 
ensuring that aid money is spent effectively and responsibly. Lesson learning 
however, is focused on understanding why particular activities are more or 
less successful to improve the effectiveness of future humanitarian relief 
activities and as such it requires a different evaluation approach (ALNAP, 
2001).  
 
This tension is significant because evaluations designed to meet one 
objective will be of limited use in satisfying the other. In deciding upon a 
framework for evaluations in humanitarian crises, it is thus necessary to 
decide which objective is of primary interest, or to accept that different 
evaluations can and should have a different focus with respect to 
accountability and lesson learning. In either case, it is necessary to be clear 
from the outset when designing an evaluation which objective is of primary 
importance (Poletti, 2004). Patton (1997) stresses who an evaluation is for, 
and how an evaluation will be used should drive the entire evaluation process 
from the initial commissioning, through to the execution of the evaluation 
itself, the analysis and report writing stage, and to the dissemination of the 
report and subsequent follow-up. Agencies involved in the delivery of 
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humanitarian relief and indeed this research are focused on lesson learning, 
as it is vital to improve performance and increase the impact of humanitarian 
activities. 
 
“Experience reflected upon is the handmaiden of progress. Evaluation is an 
integral part of individual and institutional learning. By doing, evaluating and 
doing again we learn to do better” (Jean Quesnel, Chairman of the DAC 
Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, 1993, p. 3). 
 
Terms such as ‘lessons learned’ and ‘informed judgements’ are common 
themes among the definitions in Table 2, which denotes the role of evaluation 
in providing lessons for future programmes through feedback (OECD/DAC, 
1991). The Development Assistance Committee defines lessons learned as  
 
“Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or 
policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. 
Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, 
and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact” (DAC, 
2002, p. 26).  
 
A key aspect is absent from this definition – there is a focus on the attributes 
of the ‘lesson’ but not about the process by which it may, eventually, be used.  
In this sense, they are ‘lessons learned from experience’, as opposed to 
‘lessons applied’. Most evaluation professionals would probably acknowledge 
that their lessons are under-utilised. Spilsbury et al. (2007) highlights two key 
problems underlying this observation: 1) lessons are poorly formulated (low 
quality); and 2) processes to promote dissemination and uptake of lessons 
are weak. 
 
A high quality lesson should; succinctly specify the context from which it is 
derived, establish its relevance beyond that context (where it will be applied 
and by whom) and suggest some prescription or action. Although lessons are 
derived from a specific situation, they are intended to have wider relevance. 
Lessons however, are often regarded as one-off findings that lack supporting 
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information from other sources (Spilsbury, et al. 2007). Lessons that are 
supported by triangulated evidence command greater credibility among their 
potential users.  
 
“The more rigorous the supporting evidence, and the greater the triangulation 
of supporting sources, the more confidence one has in the significance and 
meaningfulness of a lesson learned” (Patton and Millet 1998, p. 14).  
 
Clearly, producing high-quality lessons is necessary but not sufficient to 
maximise their potential utility. Relying on passive dissemination approaches, 
for example, by simple dissemination of evaluation reports, is a common but 
not very effective method of promoting their uptake. As a result, many lessons 
are destined to be archived in under utilised databases or to languish, 
unheeded in evaluation reports. Greater emphasis on enhancing the 
credibility and building the ‘ownership’ of lessons is required. A variety of 
complementary communication and ‘outreach’ processes are needed to 
enhance the uptake of lessons by their intended users (Spilsbury et al. 2007).  
 
When conducting a lesson learning evaluation it is essential to understand 
how lessons learned will be used and the extent to which policies and 
programmes can be influenced. The evaluator and commissioning agency 
must have a mutual understanding of how lessons learned will be used to 
drive and focus the evaluation but also to ensure the evaluation results are 
used effectively. The researcher undertook lengthy discussions with each of 
the commissioning agencies for this study to ensure seeking and utilising 
lessons learned were a key objective of each agency; to understand how 
lessons learned would be used; and how lessons would be fed back to 
recipients or beneficiaries of the interventions at the local level.  
 
Lessons learned tend to be policy, programme or project oriented in the form 
of ‘recommendations’. Hence, the focus is often in building the capacity of 
donors and humanitarian agencies in designing policies and programmes 
whilst the capacity, resilience or vulnerability of beneficiaries is of peripheral 
importance, if not of little relevance (Kaiser, 2002 and Hallam, 1998). The 
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objectives of humanitarian evaluation have hitherto related predominantly to 
institutional priorities. According to Kaiser (2002) there has been no 
consideration that beneficiaries might have a role other than as recipients of 
improved assistance or that there might be value in the evaluation process for 
beneficiary populations. Involving beneficiaries in the evaluation of 
humanitarian assistance programmes implies that evaluation objectives are 
wider than a straightforward attempt to measure programme outputs. Any 
meaningful evaluation of assistance programmes requires analysis of both the 
socio-political economy inhabited by those affected by complex emergencies 
and the survival strategies they employ. Without beneficiary input, evaluation 
becomes counterproductive (ibid.). 
 
Evaluation purpose ranges from lessons learnt for the implementing agency to 
accountability, including fiscal accountability to the donor. These might be 
referred to as evaluations for internal purposes and evaluations for external 
purposes. In the uptake of evaluation especially evaluative capacity within 
organisations, the tendency has been to establish a purpose that is internal 
i.e. lessons learnt rather than external accountability.   
 
4.4 Evaluative Criteria 
Among the most widely used definitions of evaluation in the humanitarian 
sector is the OECD/DAC (1991) definition, which defines evaluation as an 
assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going or 
completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and 
results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, 
enabling the incorporation of lessons learnt into the decision-making process 
of recipients, implementing organisations and donors. In order to establish 
and gather credible and usable information, evaluation criteria are employed 
to focus and guide the researcher. Criteria are a central element of any 
evaluation, whether they are determined at the beginning of the evaluation or 
emerge during the evaluation process (Davidson, 2004).  
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2011), a criterion is a principle or 
 102
standard by which something may be judged or decided. Lacey (2003, p. 71) 
defines criteria as “something providing a conclusive way of knowing whether 
something exists or whether a word is used correctly”.  
 
The concept of criteria evolves from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 
1951), which drew wide philosophical interest although, what Wittgenstein 
precisely meant by criteria was, and remains disputed (Wellman, 1962 and 
Lacey, 2003). In evaluations, criteria are used in a rather looser way to 
include indicators of success or merit (Scriven, 1991). Davidson (2004) states 
one of the most important activities in establishing a sound evaluation is 
identifying the evaluative criteria. Using goals or targets to measure 
performance provides some information but falls short of enabling an 
evaluator to draw valid conclusions about how well a project or programme is 
operating (ibid.) 
 
During 1991, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD set 
out broad principles for the evaluation process for DAC members. These 
principles were refined into five criteria that have been widely utilised in the 
evaluation of development initiatives – efficiency, effectiveness, impact, 
sustainability and relevance (OECD-DAC, 2000). These criteria were later 
adapted for evaluation of complex emergencies (OECD-DAC, 1999) to 
become a set of seven criteria, which are illustrated within Table 2. These 
criteria have become central to the evaluation of humanitarian action (ALNAP, 
2006) and as such, are the criteria adopted for this research. Impact and 
sustainability are often grouped together however, for the purpose of the 
evaluations within this research they were believed to each add value and are 
therefore, illustrated as separate criteria within Table 3. 
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Table 3 Evaluation Criteria 
Criterion Definition Main Use8 
Relevance or 
Appropriateness
Relevance is concerned with 
assessing whether the project is in 
line with local needs and priorities 
(as well as donor policy). 
Appropriateness is the tailoring of 
humanitarian activities to local 
needs, increasing ownership, 
accountability and cost-
effectiveness accordingly.  
All evaluation types except 
those with a mainly 
institutional focus. 
Connectedness 
 
Connectedness refers to the need 
to ensure that activities of a short-
term emergency nature are carried 
out in a context that takes longer-
term and interconnected problems 
into account.  
Evaluations assessing 
institutional structures and 
partnerships. 
Coherence 
 
The need to assess security, 
developmental, trade and military 
policies as well as humanitarian 
policies, to ensure that there is 
consistency and, in particular, that 
all policies take into account 
humanitarian and human-rights 
considerations.  
Joint evaluations, large-
scale evaluations and 
those with a focus on 
policy. 
Coverage 
 
The need to reach major population 
groups facing life-threatening 
suffering wherever they are.  
All evaluation types except 
those with a mainly 
institutional focus. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8 All of the criteria will be useful in most evaluations to some extent however, this 
column selects evaluation types where each criterion will be particularly useful 
(ALNAP, 2006). 
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Table 3 Evaluation Criteria Continued 
Efficiency 
 
Efficiency measures the outputs – 
qualitative and quantitative – 
achieved as a result of inputs. This 
generally requires comparing 
alternative approaches to achieving 
an output, to see whether the most 
efficient approach has been used.  
All evaluation types where 
adequate financial 
information is available. 
Effectiveness 
 
Effectiveness measures the extent to 
which an activity achieves its 
purpose, or whether this can be 
expected to happen on the basis of 
the outputs. Implicit within the 
criterion of effectiveness is 
timeliness.  
Single-sector or single-
agency evaluations. 
Impact 
 
Impact looks at the wider effects of 
the project – social, economic, 
technical, and environmental – on 
individuals, gender- and age-groups, 
communities and institutions. Impacts 
can be intended and unintended, 
positive and negative, macro (sector) 
and micro (household).  
Multi-sector, multi- agency 
evaluations; joint 
evaluations; sector-wide 
evaluations. 
Sustainability 
 
The extent to which the objectives of 
an activity will continue (to be 
reached) after the project assistance 
is over’. 
All evaluation types. 
(Source: Adapted from ALNAP, 2006). 
 
Sustainability is not included within the ALNAP list of evaluation criteria. 
However, based on the researchers experience of conducting evaluations of 
humanitarian assistance, sustainability is a valuable criteria and one that most 
donors or agencies contracting evaluations request to be included. Hence, 
sustainability has been added to the list of evaluation criteria for this research.  
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To ensure credibility, evaluators and evaluations must uphold certain 
principles. These key principles are detailed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Evaluation Principles 
Principle Explanation 
Independence 
and 
impartiality 
Independence, objectivity and impartiality of evaluators and 
the evaluation process provides the credibility and 
legitimacy to the evaluation: The evaluation process should 
be independent and impartial with regard to the activities 
evaluated and free from any pressure or influence that 
evaluators may receive. Impartiality enhances the 
credibility of evaluation and avoids bias, and independence 
provides legitimacy and helps to reduce the potential for 
conflicts of interest. The evaluation process should be 
independent from programme/project delivery and the 
management of the activities being evaluated. The 
requirement for independence and impartiality must 
transcend all stages of the evaluation process including 
planning, the selection of the evaluation team, conducting 
the evaluation, formulation of findings and 
recommendations, and review and finalisation of the report.
Integrity and 
Honesty 
Evaluators must show honesty, integrity, objectivity and 
fairness in the entire evaluation process. Evaluators should 
not misrepresent their findings or views of those they 
interview. Evaluators should not receive any instructions, 
pressure, or influences from any person, which may distort 
the objective findings, analysis or conclusions of the 
evaluation. 
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Table 4 Evaluation Principles Continued 
Respect for 
People 
Evaluators respect the rights, security, privacy, dignity and 
self-worth of respondents, programme participants and other 
stakeholders. Evaluators must abide by current professional 
ethics and standards regarding risks that might be 
engendered to those participating in the evaluation; 
regarding informed consent for participating in the 
evaluation; and regarding informing participants about the 
scope and limits of confidentiality. 
Accountability Evaluators are accountable for the results of the evaluation 
and for the advice they provide. 
Professional 
Objectivity 
Evaluators should maintain professional objectivity when 
conducting the evaluation. Objectivity is required at all the 
processes of the evaluation. Evaluators should endeavor to 
attain the maximum level of objectivity when carrying out 
evaluations. Conclusions of the evaluations should strictly 
be based on the factual data and evidence that is collected 
in a balanced manner. Evaluators should employ an 
evaluation methodology that allows the collection of 
data/information, in such a manner that would lead to the 
most objective analysis and conclusions. In this regard, 
evaluators should take due account of the need for balance 
in the regional, gender and other interest groups whose 
views are reflected in the evaluation exercise. 
Neutrality Evaluators must not further a particular political or religious 
standpoint nor act as instruments of government foreign 
policy. Evaluators must portray an objective image of 
disaster situations.  
(Source: Adapted from IFRC, 2011; OECD-DAC, 1991; and UNDOC, no 
date). 
 
The use of the terms ‘impartiality’, ‘fairness’ and ‘credibility’ denotes how 
rigorous the methodology should be and as such these values and the key 
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principles in Table 4 were upheld throughout this research.  
 
4.4.1 Formative evaluation 
Often referred to as a mid-term, real-time, ongoing or intermediate evaluation 
(Cracknell, 2000), formative evaluation focuses on the process of new 
programmes. Scriven (1991:168-169) views formative evaluation as typically 
conducted during the development or improvement of a programme or 
product. According to ECHO (1999), it is an analysis of the performance of a 
programme or project during implementation. The focus is on the relevance of 
its operational objectives relative to its overall objectives, and on matters 
relating to implementation and management. It describes what the 
intervention has achieved and what its initial effects have been, using 
information available. Intermediate evaluation can play a significant role in 
feeding back to stakeholders, particularly local institutions and communities 
including for example, aspects that may warrant urgent attention rather than 
waiting until the end of a project or for a summative evaluation. Europa (2009) 
explains as a change oriented evaluation approach, formative evaluation is 
especially attuned to assessing in an ongoing way, any discrepancies 
between the expected direction and outputs of the programme and what is 
occurring in reality; analysing strengths and weaknesses; uncovering 
obstacles, barriers or unexpected opportunities; and identifying midcourse 
corrections that will enhance the likelihood of the programme’s success. 
 
In the context of humanitarian interventions, formative evaluations seek to 
provide immediate feedback to the delivery agency regarding the status of 
project activities so where necessary project revisions can be implemented. It 
provides an important opportunity to assess the project’s progress in meeting 
its objectives while at the same time identifying opportunities to improve. The 
inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Darfur 
crisis, for example, recommended actions that could be taken to improve the 
operational response through lessons learnt during the initial phases of the 
response (Broughton, Maguire, and David-Toweh, 2006). 
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Patton (2002) views the purpose of formative evaluation as that of forming or 
shaping a specific policy, programme, group of staff or product without an 
attempt to generalise findings beyond the setting in which the evaluation 
occurs. Formative evaluations are analytic (Scriven, 1991) in nature and are 
designed to produce qualitative and quantitative data and insights during the 
early phase of an intervention. This includes an assessment of the feasibility 
of programme implementation; the appropriateness of content, methods, 
materials, media, and instruments; and the immediate behavioural impact for 
a defined population. Patton (2002) goes on to assert that formative 
evaluations tend to rely heavily on qualitative rather than quantitative methods 
focusing on processes, case studies and implementation. 
 
Formative evaluations are normally conducted by internal or external 
evaluators or preferably a combination of both (Scriven, 1991). Local 
stakeholders and beneficiaries are generally involved in most humanitarian 
evaluations albeit they are rarely used to select evaluative criteria or execute 
evaluations. 
 
4.4.2 Summative evaluation 
Programme evaluation traces its modern beginnings to the educational testing 
work of Thorndike and colleagues in the early 1900s and later became 
referred to as summative evaluation in 1967 by Michael Scriven (Stufflebeam, 
1974 and Henry, 2005). Programme evaluation originally focused on 
measuring the achievement of goals and objectives. Hence, programme 
evaluation was utilsied to establish whether a programme is effective. It is the 
systematic collection of information about the activities, processes, 
characteristics, and outcomes of programmes to make judgments about the 
programme, improve programme effectiveness and/or inform decisions about 
future programming (Patton, 2002). Programme or summative evaluation 
contrasts with formative evaluation, which focuses on methods of improving 
and enhancing programmes rather than rendering definitive judgements about 
effectiveness (ibid.). Also referred to as ex-post or maturity evaluations, they 
are conducted after the completion of a programme or between phases for 
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on-going programmes (Cracknell, 2000). Furthermore, summative evaluations 
are conducted for the benefit of some external audience such as a funding 
agency, head office or future users (Scriven, 1991).  
 
Both case studies within this research, Act and NCA, fall into the summative 
evaluation category, as they were end of phases for ongoing programmes. 
The beneficiaries of the evaluations in the case of this research are mainly the 
funders and implementing agencies. Summative evaluation is largely 
concerned with a programme's overall effectiveness and involves the 
assessment of anticipated (or unanticipated) results or outcomes of a 
programme. For credibility and impartiality reasons, summative evaluations 
are normally conducted by a mixture of both internal and external evaluators 
(Scriven, 1991).  
 
Scriven (1991) warns that summative evaluation should not be confused with 
outcome evaluation. Summative evaluation focuses on both the process and 
the outcomes while outcome evaluation focuses on the outcomes. However, 
as outcomes are examined as part of summative evaluations, this research 
treats outcome evaluation as a type of summative evaluation.  
 
4.4.2.1 Process Evaluation 
A focus on process involves examining how something happens rather than 
or in addition to assessing outputs and outcomes. Evaluations vary in their 
emphasis on process in part as programmes vary in their attention to process. 
Qualitative inquiry is highly appropriate for studying process because:  Depicting process requires detailed descriptions of how people engage 
with each other;  The experience of process typically varies for different people so their 
experiences need to be captured in their own words;  Process is fluid and dynamic so it can not be fairly summarised on a 
single rating scale at one point in time; and  Participants’ perceptions are a key process consideration. 
(Patton, 2002). 
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Process evaluations aim at elucidating and understanding the internal 
dynamics of how a programme, organisation or relationship operates. A 
process evaluation requires sensitivity to both qualitative and quantitative 
changes in programmes throughout their development, which typically means 
monitoring and describing the details of the programme’s implementation. 
Process evaluations examine formal activities and anticipated outcomes 
however, they also investigate informal patterns and unanticipated 
interactions (ibid). Understanding processes and their impacts were an 
important component to this research and therefore a combination of 
summative and process evaluation were employed.  
 
Evaluating impacts can be a complicated exercise; what to count as an impact 
can be purely objective or subjective. Hence, a clear understanding of what 
constitutes an outcome or impact must firstly be considered, as one of the key 
design issues.  Box 3 summarises the steps of an impact or outcome 
evaluation.  
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 Box 3 Steps of an Impact Evaluation 
 
(Source: Adapted from Cracknell (2000, p.240). 
 
Mark (2005) views outcomes or impacts as changes, results, and impacts that 
are short or long-term; proximal or distal; primary or secondary; intended or 
unintended; positive or negative; and singular, multiple or hierarchical that can 
be measured at individual, organisational, community and policy or 
governmental levels:  Individual or household level: outcomes can include changes in 
attitudes, knowledge, skills, daily routines and livelihood strategies while 
at the organisational level changes can affect policies, practices and 
capacity.   Community level: outcomes can include changes in the way 
communities self-organise for example, in food for work programmes 
and school feeding programmes to improve school attendance.   Implementing agency, donor or government level: laws, regulations, 
policies or funding streams can be altered to ensure sustainability and 
Identification: Noting whatever changes (impacts) have taken place that 
can be attributed to the intervention. Impacts include short or long-term; 
proximal or distal; primary or secondary; intended or unintended; positive 
or negative; and singular, multiple or hierarchical which can be measured 
at individual, organisational, community levels and policy or governmental 
levels. Impacts can also be categorised as: technical, economic, socio-
cultural, institutional and environmental impacts. 
Measurement: Trying to quantify or assess the significance of the 
changes (impacts). Participatory research methods will generally be more 
appropriate for this purpose. 
Attribution: Trying to establish causes of the changes, especially the 
extent to which they can be attributed to the intervention. 
Assessment: Drawing together all the threads, and forming judgement on 
the impacts in relation to aid input: making recommendations for future aid 
activities of a similar kind. 
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support for policies and programmes.  
 
Since outcome or impact evaluation focuses on effects, results or 
consequences, the key methodology focuses on the determination of 
causation. In the context of this research, establishing causation simply 
entails the evaluator determining the relationship between a policy, process, 
action or resource that is believed to somehow generate an outcome. 
 
4.5 Evaluation Models 
The use of models, also referred to as approaches (Stufflebeam, 2001), has 
long been recognised in the evaluation field. A model is a simplified or 
generalised description or representation of reality. The term ‘model’ is loosely 
used to refer to a conception or approach or sometimes a method of doing 
evaluation (Scriven, 1991). Evaluation models provide a framework and 
structure; offer guidance about the appropriate steps to follow in design; 
provide direction in dealing with stakeholders; and identify the important 
issues to consider in undertaking a study. Models provide frameworks, in 
which evaluators and evaluation users identify and distinguish amongst 
alternative approaches (Patton, 2002). Numerous academics and researchers 
have categorised a wide variety of evaluation models (Guba and Lincoln, 
1981; Hansen, 2005; Patton, 2002; Shaw, 1999; Stufflebeam, 2001) and the 
following section explores three models that are common in the evaluation 
literature: (1) goal-based; (2) goal-free; and (3) criteria-based. 
 
4.5.1 Goal-based evaluation 
Both case studies within this research comprised elements of measuring the 
extent to which programme and project goals were achieved. A goal may be 
thought of as a deliberate statement of an intended outcome of a particular 
programme and operationalised into measurable objectives (Tucker, 2005). 
Hence, goal-based evaluations measure the extent to which a programme or 
intervention has achieved clear and specific objectives (Patton, 2002). 
 
Tyler (1949) developed the idea of goal-based evaluation through his work 
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Basic Principles in Curriculum and Instruction. He explained the need to focus 
on the degree to which objectives are realised (Stufflebeam, Madaus and 
Kallaghan, 2000). The basic strategy of this approach is to measure if 
predefined goals are fulfilled or not; to what extent; and how. The approach is 
deductive and often related to harder measurable goals. This supports the 
traditional understanding of goal-based evaluations that generally 
concentrates on technical and economic aspects rather than human and 
social aspects. 
 
Goals can also be of social or human character. Both case studies within this 
research largely pertain to social and human goals. Patton (2002) argues that 
what is measured depends on the character of the goals. Either a quantitative 
or a qualitative approach could be adopted as there is no imperative 
relationship between a goal-based approach, and a quantitative process. The 
fulfillment of these types of goals is preferably expressed in qualitative terms. 
The qualitative process enables a description of how the goals are fulfilled. 
Thus, a qualitative approach aims at establishing detailed descriptions. The 
goal-based evaluation, however, was not selected for this research as it lacks 
indicators of success or merits interpretation in adaptive capacity, resilience or 
vulnerability terms, which this research could found itself upon. 
 
4.5.2 Goal-free evaluation 
First proposed by Michael Scriven in the 1970s, the goal-free model implies 
undertaking fieldwork and gathering data on a broad array of actual effects or 
outcomes. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of 
searching for ‘actual effects’ of what is to be evaluated (Patton, 2002). The 
basic strategy of this approach is inductive and holistic aimed at countering 
the logic-deductive limitation inherent in the goal-based model. In resilience 
oriented evaluations, as in the case of ACT and NCA, the actual effects may 
include the capacity of local institutions and communities enhanced by the 
project, and measures put in place to enable communities to implement the 
learning experiences. These are then compared with the observed and the 
actual needs of programme participants. The goal-free model adopts an 
 114
interpretative approach, which is relevant to the case studies within this 
research. Involving a wide range of stakeholder groups is an essential 
element and as such this approach is likely to capture unintended effects to 
inform capacity, resilience and vulnerability programming. The goal-free 
model was not a logical choice. The major weakness is that the evaluator 
deliberately attempts to avoid all rhetoric related to programme goals; no 
discussion about goals is held with staff; no programme documentation is 
reviewed; only the programme’s outcomes and measurable effects are 
studied. This can also prove a practical obstacle where time or resources for 
the evaluation are short. The assumption in this study was that the evaluation 
process can also contribute to the humanitarian interventions through 
involving the implementers and the targeted communities to learn from both 
the process and the outcomes of the evaluation. Both case studies involved 
staff, stakeholders and community members in the evaluation processes. 
 
4.5.3 Criteria-based evaluation 
Criteria have become a central element to any evaluation and both case 
studies within this research were subject to criteria-based evaluations. Most 
humanitarian evaluations are assessed using the OECD/DAC criteria as 
discussed in Table 2 to determine the relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, 
effectiveness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, impact and sustainability 
of the intervention.  
 
Criteria-based approaches include checklists, principles or quality ideals and 
these are grounded in, and derived from, one or more specific perspectives or 
theories. Patton (2002) identifies five contrasting sets of criteria for judging the 
quality of evaluation studies:  
1. Traditional scientific;  
2. Social constructivist;  
3. Artistic and evocative;  
4. Critical change; and  
5. Standards and principles criteria.  
These are explained further within Table 5.  
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Table 5 Alternative Criteria for Judging the Quality of Evaluation Studies 
Traditional 
scientific 
(positivist) 
Social 
constructivist 
(relativist) 
Artistic 
and 
evocative  
Critical 
change 
criteria (neo- 
Marxist, 
some 
feminist) 
Evaluation 
standards 
and 
principles 
Objectivity 
(attempts to 
minimise bias) 
Subjectivity 
acknowledged 
and embraced 
Opens the 
world to us 
in some 
way 
Critical 
perspectives - 
increases 
consciousness 
of injustice 
Utility – if not 
useful to some 
audience, then 
no point in 
doing it 
Validity of the 
data 
Trustworthiness 
and authenticity 
– fairness and 
coverage of 
others’ 
perspectives 
Creativity; 
Aesthetic 
quality; 
Interpretive 
vitality 
Identifies 
nature and 
sources of 
inequalities 
and injustice 
Feasibility – if 
not practically 
or politically 
do- able then 
no point 
Systematic rigour 
of fieldwork 
practices 
Triangulation 
(for capturing 
multiple 
perspectives) 
Flows from 
self - 
embedded 
in lived 
experience 
Represents 
the 
perspective of 
the less 
powerful 
Propriety – fair 
and ethical 
Triangulation (for 
consistency of 
findings) 
Reflexivity and 
praxis - 
understanding 
one’s 
background 
and how to act 
in the world 
Stimulating; 
Provocative
Portrays the 
ways those 
with power 
exercise and 
benefit from 
this power 
Accuracy 
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Table 5 Alternative Criteria for Judging the Quality of Evaluation Studies 
Continued 
Reliability of 
coding and 
pattern analysis 
(multiple coders) 
Particularity – 
doing justice to 
unique cases 
Connects 
and moves 
the 
audience 
Engages 
those with less 
power 
respectfully 
and 
collaboratively 
Systematic 
inquiry 
Correspondence 
of findings to 
reality 
Contributions 
to dialogue – 
encouraging 
multiple 
perspectives. 
Voice is 
distinct and 
expressive 
Builds 
capacity of 
those involved 
to take action 
Integrity/honesty 
and respect for 
people 
Strength of 
evidence 
supporting 
causal 
hypotheses 
 Feels ‘true’, 
‘authentic’ 
and real’ 
Identifies 
potential 
change - 
making 
strategies 
Responsibility to 
general public 
welfare 
Generalisability  Case 
studies 
become 
literary 
works, 
blurring of 
boundaries 
Clear historical 
and values 
context 
 
Contributions to 
theory. 
 Opens the 
world to us 
in some 
way 
Consequential 
or catalytic 
validity 
 
(Adapted from Jones and Sumner, 2007 originally in Patton, 2002) 
 
The evaluator adopted a range of the traditional scientific, social constructivist 
and critical change criteria. The evaluator strives for causal explanations and 
generalisability that can be used in combination with qualitative approaches 
such as the grounded theory adopted for both case studies within this 
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research. Proponents of the social and constructivist criteria view the world as 
socially, politically and psychologically constructed and are interested in 
understanding specific cases within a specific context, rather than in 
hypothesising generalisations and causes across time and space. The 
researcher acknowledges the subjectivity of the research and strives for 
trustworthiness and authenticity. The researcher applies reflexivity and 
triangulation to capture multiple perspectives. The researcher represents the 
perspective of the less powerful and engages those with less power 
respectfully and collaboratively. The researcher also builds capacity of those 
involved and identifies potential change making strategies.  
 
4.6 Philosophical challenges 
Humanitarian evaluations can be conducted at any stage of a project for the 
purposes of accountability and lesson learning. As applied research, 
evaluation aims to produce information to account for the resources used and 
also contribute to knowledge to reduce failure to future programmes (Clarke, 
1999). The evaluation of humanitarian action does not possess a 
methodology of its own. It relies on social science methodology. This steers 
itself towards philosophical questions that are dominant in social science 
research for example, what is an evaluation, is it a science or art; and what 
constitutes as knowledge in evaluations. These questions are important if 
lessons learnt from humanitarian evaluations are to contribute knowledge 
towards reducing vulnerability and building adaptive capacity and disaster 
resilience. 
 
The methodology for humanitarian evaluations has emerged from the 
methods for development evaluations, which has grown since the 1970s. The 
design and implementation of evaluations are based on certain assumptions 
regarding the nature of knowledge, reality and existence. Clarke (1999) 
identifies several key elements to knowledge construction. Firstly, there are 
issues surrounding methods, such as, which techniques and analytical 
procedures are the most appropriate to use for collecting data, “different 
methods may produce contradictory results when applied to the same 
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evaluation problem” (ibid., p. 35).  
 
Additionally, there are considerations of general methodology that relate to 
the overall logic of inquiry and cover the general principles through which 
research tools and techniques are applied. Finally, there are issues regarding 
ontology that are concerned with the nature of reality and there are questions 
of epistemology that are connected to knowing and the nature and limits of 
knowledge. The first two issues concentrate on the practicalities of knowledge 
construction while the latter two are concerned with the philosophical 
assumptions underlying research practice. 
 
Evaluations are presented as a practical scientific undertaking and therefore, 
need a theoretical foundation (Clark, 1999). Consideration needs to be given 
to wider philosophical issues not merely in the interests of making better 
methods choices but also in order to develop evaluation theory. There are two 
major paradigms to theory development, positivism and subjectivism. The 
positivist paradigm takes an epistemological position known as traditional, 
conventional, scientific, experimental, (Bryman, 2001), empiricist and 
hypothetico-deductive. The subjectivist approach adopts an epistemological 
position referred to as naturalistic, humanistic, constructivist, interpretivist, 
post-positivist, holistic-deductive and alternative (Clarke, 1999). The positivist 
paradigm tends to adopt the quantitative methodology while the subjectivist 
tends to adopt the qualitative methodology. This research did not adopt a 
purist view of either positivism or subjectivism. Pragmatism or methodological 
appropriateness (Patton, 2002) was adopted to increase practical 
methodological options available. 
 
4.6.1 The positivist paradigm 
First proclaimed by Auguste Comte in the 19th Century, the positivist 
approach has developed various mutations and is associated with a number 
of disparate philosophical schools of thought (Hughes and Sharrock, 1990). 
The intellectual debate on the authority of positivism, despite its long journey, 
remains alive today. Hughes and Sharrock (1990) refer to positivism as 
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orthodoxy as its legitimacy was unquestioned for some time. Endorsed by 
John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx, albeit in 
various versions, there was a belief that society could follow the same logic of 
enquiry as that employed by the natural sciences (Hughes and Sharrock, 
1990). Hence, the social world can be studied according to the same 
principles, procedures, ethos and laws as the natural sciences.  
 
As social processes are viewed as subject to casual laws, applying objectivity, 
rationality and rigorous scientific methods of enquiry to establish truth, it is 
assumed the researcher can identify regularities and causal relationships of 
social phenomena. The research process starts with a hypothesis or tentative 
explanation based on the assumption that the investigator is objective and 
remains detached from phenomenon under study, (Clarke, 1999). Testing the 
hypothesis to either accept or disprove it involves collecting facts, while the 
hypothesis remains fixed throughout the research process. To achieve this, 
survey methods and experimental designs are employed that limit the 
interaction that occurs between the researcher and the researched (Clarke, 
1999). Research techniques include highly structured questionnaires or 
interview schedules that contain predetermined, standardised categories into 
which individuals responses are fitted. Systematic sampling techniques are 
employed to control bias and ensure internal validity (Bryman, 2001). Box 4 
details the scientific method in relation to evaluation. 
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Box 4 Evaluation and the Scientific Method 
 The evaluator is separate from the practitioners and from the practice 
supposedly in order to ensure neutrality and objectivity.   Practice is conceptualised as informed by defined inputs and measurable 
outcomes.   Decisions are made about intended outputs depending on their 
susceptibility to measurement, thus simplifying what may otherwise be 
complex, diffuse and multi-faceted goals and processes.  Different interventions are applied to control and experimental groups so 
that differences in outcomes can be measured and compared, and these 
differences are related in causal ways to differences in inputs.   Interventions in the control and experimental groups are controlled for the 
period of the intervention so that measurements can be made, thus not 
allowing for practice as a developing and changing process.   Causal relationships are sought between inputs and outputs.  
(Source: Everrit and Hardiker (1996, p. 46-47). 
 
4.6.1.1 Experimental Designs and Evaluations  
Experimental research designs provide a sound method of arriving at causal 
explanations in evaluations (Rossi and Freeman, 1993) and are “strong in 
terms of internal validity” (Bryman, 2001, p. 39).  
 
That randomised experimental designs are of proven scientific merit in 
evaluations is an acceptable view. Thus, logic and rules of scientific method 
are an indispensable component for establishing the effectiveness of 
interventions and amounts to identifying relative causality. 
 
In humanitarian evaluations following and during civil conflicts such as 
Somalia, pre-test, post-test, control group designs can prove problematic 
considering the nature of interventions. Similarly, it is rather difficult to conduct 
a pre-test, post-test, control group design in rapid-onset disasters where there 
is little or no warning. The South East Asian Tsunami in 2004 was a natural 
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disaster where there was little, if any warning at all. Even, in slow- onset 
disasters, the treatment in most cases is based on appropriate eligibility 
criteria, making it impossible to construct a conventional group. Both case 
studies within this research for example, had clear eligibility criteria as 
populations without access to clean, safe water and sanitation. Creating a 
control group would have been problematic but more importantly unethical, as 
it would involve withholding relief aid to those who met the criteria, which 
directly conflicts with the purpose of relief aid – to save lives. 
 
Clarke (1999) identifies the following potential limitations of randomised 
experimental designs:   Ethical considerations such as withholding beneficial resources from 
clients in the name of research;   Comparability, non-random processes can threaten group equivalence;   The potential for creating inequities between groups; and  
 Generating conflict and resentment between experimental and control 
groups.  
 
Humanitarian agencies would likely object on ethical grounds to 
randomisation as a method of assigning individuals to treatment and non-
treatment groups (Clarke, 1999). How would a humanitarian agency provide 
clean water to one group in Somalia, while denying another group access to 
the same service for the purpose of carrying out an experiment to meet 
evaluation criteria? Furthermore, this creation of inequities between groups 
would likely generate conflict as a result of resentment among those not 
receiving aid. In ‘complex emergencies’ however, the observed effects often 
occur by chance due to problems of attribution (O’Keefe, Kirkby and 
Cheetham, 2002 and Buchanan-Smith and Collinson, 2002). Thus, factors 
operating simultaneously to the programme may cause effects that are not 
related to it. 
 
Evaluation is about generating evidence of the effectiveness of humanitarian 
action and the positivist approach provides one of several methods of 
accomplishing this. Consistent with Everrit and Hardiker (1996), this research 
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recognised the merit in employing the positivist paradigm in evaluation 
research. The objective of this research however, was not to establish 
whether there is a cause-effect relationship but to assess the effects of the 
programme on adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability in the study 
locations. The limitations of the positivist paradigm form the rationale for the 
subjectivist paradigm. 
 
4.6.2 The subjectivist paradigm 
Although the case studies had aspects of each of the research paradigms, 
ACT and NCA predominantly fitted the qualitative approach. The quantitative 
design was not a logical choice as the aim and nature of this research was not 
to explain casual relationships but rather to understand complex relationships 
and meanings between variables. Clarke (1999) asserts that conventional 
approaches offer little insight into social processes that account for the 
changes observed. Instead, they encourage evaluators to identify 
predetermined objective indicators of success, utilise standardised measuring 
techniques and adopt formal methods of data analysis. Evaluators of 
humanitarian action do not all reduce human behaviour to mimic that of 
natural sciences. The study of interpreting and understanding, known as 
hermeneutics, has become one of the philosophies underpinning 
humanitarian evaluations. Idealism, phenomenology, postmodernism and 
critical theory are examples of mutations of hermeneutical philosophy that 
focus on meaning and reject naturalistic approaches to human behaviour 
(Graham, 1997). 
 
A constructivist design was more appropriate for this research as this enabled 
project participants including primary and secondary stakeholders and the 
evaluator to construct their experiences from their (multiple) social realities. It 
was not possible, nor desirable, to separate the evaluator (observer) from the 
project stakeholders and beneficiaries (observed). This is contrary to the 
positivist view whereby the observer can be independent from the observed. 
Rather knowledge was viewed as a construction in the minds of individuals. 
The constructions do not exist outside of the persons who construct them and 
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are not part of some objective world that exists separate from their 
constructors (Clarke, 1999). Evaluators following a constructivist stance need 
to understand and experience the context in which the programme operates. 
This will enable them to discover the experience of the programme by policy 
makers, staff and beneficiaries’.  
 
Each of the communities visited for this research were approached by the 
researcher with an open mind, willingness to learn and open heart. No claims 
were made to know what answers could possibly arise and this helped reveal 
the intrinsic aspects of the connectedness of the intervention with the past 
and the future whilst not imposing limits. The researcher welcomed the 
complexity or multiple realities as providing a holistic and fertile ground that 
allowed beneficiaries to be involved in the process, as co-creators, of 
knowledge creation. This participatory methodology is addressed later in this 
chapter. 
 
4.7 Limitations of qualitative research 
Qualitative research, as with any methodology, has limitations. Bryman (2001) 
identifies four major criticisms against the qualitative methodology, all of which 
can be encountered by evaluation research:  Too subjective – qualitative researchers are said to be too 
impressionistic and subjective. Evaluation findings rely too much on the 
evaluator’s often unsystematic views about what is important, which 
also depend on the personal relationship created between the 
evaluator and the organisation evaluated.  Difficult to replicate – Reliance upon the evaluator’s ingenuity, absence 
of standard procedures to follow, dependence on subjective 
observation and judgement and biases are some of the aspects that 
make qualitative research difficult to replicate.   Problems of generalisation – respondents in a qualitative study are not 
meant to be representative of a population like in a quantitative study. 
Through detailed case studies it can be impossible to know how the 
findings can be generalised to other settings. 
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 Lack of transparency – It is sometimes difficult to ascertain how the
research was conducted. For instance, it is sometimes unclear how
participants were selected; how data was collected and catalogued;
and how the analysis was conducted to arrive at the conclusions.
(Adapted from Bryman, 2001 and Whipp, 1998) 
The researcher views these limitations as not inherent weaknesses of 
qualitative research. Rather the weaknesses were a manifestation of how the 
research has been engaged with and documented. It is important here to note 
that more secure evidence for the overall findings of this thesis derive from 
the process of exploring two different case study regions within Somalia. 
4.8 Participatory evaluation 
Participatory evaluation is a relatively recent (Brisolura, 1998) albeit growing 
element of participatory approaches through which “researchers, facilitators, 
or professional evaluators collaborate in some way with individuals, groups, or 
communities who have a decided stake in the programme, development 
project, or other entity being evaluated” (Cousins and Whitmore, 1998, p. 5).  
Participatory evaluation draws on “many established traditions that have put 
participation, action research and adult education at the forefront of attempts 
to emancipate disempowered people” (Pretty et al., 1995, p. 55). 
Participatory evaluation is rooted to Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) ‘fourth 
generation evaluation’, which they assert is ‘characterised by negotiation 
between various stakeholders, participation in every stage of the evaluation 
process and focus on action’ (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998:14). Cousins and 
Whitmore (1998) proposed two types of participatory evaluation – practical 
and transformative evaluation. The core premise of the former is that 
stakeholder participation in evaluation will enhance evaluation relevance, 
ownership, and thus utilisation. Alternatively, the latter invokes participatory 
principles and actions to democratise social change (Cousins and Whitmore, 
1998). Barakat, Chard and Jones (2005) contrast traditional and participatory 
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evaluation. They contend that conventional (‘top-down’) evaluation theory and 
practice in which aid evaluation, particularly post-war contexts, is exclusively 
focused upon project accountability and performance. Thus, it largely fails to 
question the culturally and ideologically determined assumptions of value that 
underpin post-war reconstruction interventions. Rather, measurable 
indicators, such as the absence of violent conflict, multiparty elections and the 
growth of GDP are taken as the sole indicators of success. Hence, criteria of 
value appear to be based upon assumptions that are determined by the 
dominant international culture such as, the existence of structures for liberal 
democracy and a market economy as opposed to talking to the national 
stakeholders – the people – and engaging in dialogue. 
 
Barakat, Chard and Jones’ (2005) participatory evaluations of the post-war 
and reconstruction efforts in Burundi and Mozambique identified and enabled 
the understanding of the visible effects of war and reconstruction and the 
invisible, emotional and attitudinal changes that are determining factors in 
developing a harmonious nation. The ‘invisible’ yet crucial, determining factors 
were only identifiable through the participatory techniques adopted by the 
evaluators. Table 6 below outlines the main differences between conventional 
and participatory evaluations. 
 
Table 6 Differences Between Conventional and Participatory Evaluation 
 Conventional Evaluation Participatory Evaluation 
Who plans and 
manages the 
process? 
Senior managers, or 
outside experts 
Local people, project staff, managers 
and other stakeholders, often helped 
by a facilitator 
Role of ‘primary 
stakeholders’ 
(the intended 
beneficiaries) 
Provide information only Design and adapt the methodology, 
collect and analyse data, share 
findings and link them to action. 
How success is 
measured 
Externally defined, mainly 
through quantitative 
indicators 
Internally defined indicators, including 
more qualitative judgements 
Approach Predetermined Adaptive 
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(Source: Institute of Development Studies, 1998). 
 
Table 6 demonstrates that conventional evaluations are completely 
predetermined and only involve beneficiaries in the process to inform the 
predetermined, external measures of success. This approach does not 
consider how beneficiaries themselves would measure success. In 
comparison, the results and lessons learnt from a participatory evaluation are 
more likely to be implemented with action taken at the field level. Participatory 
evaluations through their adaptive nature allow for innovation and the scope 
to explore holistically the success of interventions outside of externally defined 
parameters and through a local lens.  
 
Participation and as such, participatory evaluation however, is subjective – it 
means different things to different people. Table 7 summarises some of the 
key advantages and challenges of participatory evaluation. 
 
Table 7 below highlights some of the key challenges of participatory 
evaluation. Through an awareness and understanding of these challenges 
many of them can be overcome. Gaining confidence and the trust of those 
involved in the evaluation process is critical to ensure accurate results. This is 
a key skill for any evaluator and comes through excellent interpersonal skills, 
an understanding of the local population and experience – all of which the 
researcher developed over a number of years. 
 
It is important to understand the various political factors, powers and 
hierarchies in operation in order to know ‘whose’ voice has been heard. 
Through this, the evaluator can select a range of participants and 
stakeholders and identify where groups should be separated so that all voices 
can be heard. This is of particular importance for more vulnerable groups 
such as women and IDPs.  
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Table 7 Advantages and Challenges of Participatory Evaluation 
Advantages Challenges 
Effective for accessing ‘hard to reach’ 
groups. 
Produces certain types of information 
Potentially wide coverage of population Information may be brief and superficial. 
The technical knowledge and 
background of the professional evaluator 
may not fit with the culture in question. 
Participants choose level of involvement Relationship with researcher may be very 
brief 
Group work is inclusive, and promotes 
information sharing and education 
Presence of others affects personal 
accounts 
Research is emergent and reflects 
people’s own priorities and interests 
Information may not address goals of 
research 
Can tailor tools to participants Selective involvement of participants in 
verification and analysis. Participants can 
directly manipulate the data or 
information provided. 
Views participants as experts in problem 
definition and solutions 
Unequal power and representation 
amongst participants, and between 
participants and researcher. How does 
one listen to the voices that have not yet 
been heard? How much should (or can) 
an outside evaluator meddle in the affairs 
of others, especially when these people 
need to live with the consequences long 
after the evaluator has left the scene?  
Collective solutions emerge organically 
and involvement of key stakeholders 
across the social and political arena can 
reduce tensions.  
Social and political factors can effect 
change to the detriment of the 
participants 
(Source: Adapted from Cousins and Whitmore, 1998, pp. 18; and Pain and 
Francis, 2003, pp. 50). 
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4.8.1 Participatory Research Tools 
There is a plethora of research tools available to participatory research 
including, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, mapping, 
timelines, oral histories and biographies, seasonal calendars, role plays, Venn 
diagrams, observations, matrix and pairwise ranking, flowcharts, transects, 
and pie charts and secondary sources (Fuller, O'Brien and Hope, 2003; 
Chambers, 2002). The participatory tools employed for this research to aid the 
researcher in analysing the experience of the interventions are illustrated in 
Table 8. 
 
Firstly, the researcher examined the range of participatory research tools to 
find those that would provide the most thorough and accurate information for 
the research aims of this thesis in the context of local Somali populations. 
Secondly, the researcher examined those challenges highlighted within Table 
7 against the various participatory research tools, identifying the tools most 
likely to overcome these challenges. Finally, the researcher reviewed each 
participatory research tool along with its strengths and limitations and 
identified how the findings of each could be triangulated against other 
participatory research tools. Through this process, the researcher was able to 
develop the list of participatory tools for this research as shown in Table 8.  
 
Any research tool will have limitations and weaknesses. Table 8 highlights the 
limitations of the methods selected for this research. The limitations however, 
are specific to each research tool and applying the mix of research tools 
shown in Table 8 will allow for the triangulation of findings therefore, 
minimising many of the limitations. Oral histories for example, may be biased 
and rely only on memories, which cannot be cross-checked. Cross-checking 
these histories however, against focus group discussions and semi-structure 
interviews will help identify any bias or inaccurate accounts. Similarly, transect 
walks and mapping provide a snap shot in time but with the detail of oral 
histories and timelines an in-depth picture can be constructed.  
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It would be impossible to completely eradicate all limitations from participatory 
research tools. However, the researcher has a conscious understanding of 
the limitations of the participatory research tools and has used this awareness 
throughout the research along with a careful mix of participatory research 
tools to try and minimise the limitations of the research.   
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Table 8 Participatory Research Tools 
Tool Use Strengths Limitations 
Oral 
histories and 
timelines 
The participant relays their history, 
particularly through remembering key 
events and lived experiences.  
Provide detailed information of 
experiences and events. Helps to put 
events in order particularly, in societies 
where times and dates are rarely used 
by participants. 
Relies on memories and can be biased 
to the participants views therefore, this 
method should be triangulated. This 
method can raise sensitive past issues. 
Transect 
walks 
A transect walk is a walk taken by the 
evaluator through the area of interest, 
observing, asking, listening, looking 
and identifying different zones.  
 
Transect walks are simple and can 
generate cause-effect relationship data. 
Transects enable the quick 
identification of social structures, land 
use, and community assets. They are 
also an effective method of triangulating 
data already available. 
Only accounts for the currently 
‘observable’ situation and features – a 
snap shot. Hence, this method should 
not be used in isolation.  
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Table 8 Participatory Research Tools Continued 
 
Focus group 
discussions 
A group of individuals are selected to 
discuss and comment on, from 
personal experience, predetermined 
topics. Typically groups are 6-12 
people. The evaluator facilitates and 
encourages participants to respond in 
their own terms, while simultaneously 
ensuring the focus of the group is 
maintained. These were also used to 
triangulate results from background 
documentation and interviews. 
Generate qualitative data efficiently. 
Allows participants freedom to raise 
issues that are important to them, 
rather than merely respond to 
predetermined questions. Enables the 
evaluator to directly observe the social 
processes and dynamics of group 
interaction. The group provides an 
element of quality control into the data 
collection process. 
Individuals may suppress or modify their 
true feelings when in the presence of 
others. The confidentiality of individual 
interviews is missing. Individuals may feel 
inhibited when in a group where 
participants know one another. They can 
be dominated by the most powerful 
members.  
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Table 8 Participatory Research Tools Continued 
 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
A ‘conversation with a purpose’ 
(Dexter, 1970; 136). Standardised 
questions covering socio-biographical 
details are followed by open-ended 
questions designed to elicit more 
qualitative information. The 
interviewer is expected to probe for 
more information by using active 
listening and encouraging 
respondents to digress and expand 
upon their answers. These were also 
used to triangulate results from 
background documentation and focus 
group discussions. 
Provides focused, in-depth answers. 
The semi-structured nature encourages 
the interviewee to provide more 
information and allows issues to be 
raised of importance to the interviewee. 
Answers can be directly compared 
between interviewees 
The age, sex, race, character, attitude and 
experience of the interviewer can influence 
the quality and validity of response data. 
The evaluator must have the trust and 
confidence of the interviewee, which can 
cause problems when time is limited. 
Answers provided can be biased or 
manipulated by the interviewee.  
Mapping The evaluator generates maps as a 
visual resource and to clarify spatial 
arrangements. 
Aids memory stimulation later or when 
no longer in the field. Mapping can 
provide new insights through drawing 
attention to features normally taken for 
granted by those involved. 
Large or complex landscapes can prove 
difficult to map. Maps provide an overview 
of the current situation but not cause-effect 
relationship data. 
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Table 8 Participatory Research Tools Continued 
 
Observations Spontaneous observations that occur 
throughout the evaluation process 
combined with systematic observation 
whereby observation and recording 
are conducted according to explicit 
procedures that permit replication and 
rules are followed that permit the use 
of the logic of scientific inference.  
Observational fieldwork is essential if 
the evaluator is to provide a suitably 
descriptive account of the core features 
of any programme. Systematic 
observation can provide new insights 
through drawing attention to actions 
and behaviours normally taken for 
granted by those involved.  
Gathering detailed observations can take a 
long time. The direct involvement of the 
observer in the situation under 
investigation can be a potential source of 
bias. There is the possibility that 
individuals will modify their behaviour if 
aware that they are under observation.  
 
(Source: Dexter, 1970; Clarke, 1999: 72; Reiss, 1971: 4; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Sudman and Bradburn, 1974; Chambers, 2002) 
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4.9 Data Collection 
Information and data collection was guided by three principles: using multiple 
sources to allow the triangulation of results; creating a case study database; 
and maintaining a chain of evidence (de Weerd-Nederhof, 2001). The 
evaluations were conducted in five stages: 
1. Review of project documentation and secondary data
2. Headquarter level interviews and discussions
3. Regional level briefings, interviews and discussions
4. Field visits to the selected towns and villages
5. Debriefings at regional and headquarter level.
Secondary data and project documentation was mostly provided by the 
organisations under evaluation however, the evaluator also undertook 
independent research to verify information provided. Headquarters of the 
organisations evaluated for this research were interviewed as were the donor 
bodies to discuss how the evaluation results would be utilised; to what extent 
the results could influence future projects; and any clarification or issues 
arising from the secondary data provided. These interviews provided insight 
into how the projects and programmes were viewed from a headquarter 
perspective and what people operating at this level believed to be occurring 
on the ground both in terms of the general situation and project specifics.  
The organisations evaluated for this research had allocated sufficient 
resources for the evaluation process to ensure the evaluator could spend 
sufficient time in the various locations. The evaluations largely adopted 
participatory, qualitative approaches. The following section summarises the 
methods used for collecting information for each of the evaluations. 
4.9.1 Action by Churches Together, Bari and Nugaal, Somalia 
Action by Churches Together (ACT) used a member organisation – 
Norwegian Church Aid – with experience of operating in Somalia to deliver 
their humanitarian assistance. The researcher conducted a briefing with field 
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staff at their regional headquarters in Garowe, Somalia. This briefing ensured 
the entire field team understood the importance and purpose of the 
evaluation. Key issues such as confidentiality and impartiality were also 
discussed. The core evaluation team consisted of the researcher; the head of 
Norwegian Church Aids operations in Somalia who is well known to the field 
staff and has a strong working relationship with the researcher through 
previously working together on evaluations; NCAs technical manager, who 
has long experience with each of the communities, is able to provide detailed 
technical knowledge of each project and undertake inspections of projects 
during the evaluation visits; an independent, highly experienced interpreter 
who is from a neutral clan and has previously worked with the researcher. The 
researcher conducted a one day workshop with the core evaluation team. 
This covered aims, objectives, definitions and key terms/phrases, potential 
challenges and methods including interviewing techniques, focus group 
discussions and methods of recording information.  
 
The evaluation team was accompanied by eight security personnel. The 
number of security personnel were strategically hired to ensure two members 
were recruited from each of the local leaders and therefore, reduced the risk 
of threat to the evaluation team. 
 
The researcher was requested to meet with the President of Puntland shortly 
after arriving in Garowe. This is generally standard protocol to inform the 
President of the nature of the visit and how the results will be utilised. 
Ensuring awareness and support from the President and his party also 
reduces risk of threat to the evaluation team. 
 
Table 9 demonstrates the locations visited and the number of participants at 
each field site. The evaluator proposed visiting 11 of the 15 sites in which 
ACT through NCA had developed projects. Sites were selected based on the 
background documentation and project reports taking into account factors 
such as the geographical location, socio-economic environment, size of town 
or village, technical details of the project and when the project was 
implemented to ensure a representative sample of projects were visited.  
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Table 9 NCA Site Visits and Number of Participants 
Town/ Village 
Elders 
Committee 
Community 
Focus Group 
Water and 
Environmental 
Sanitation Committee 
Women’s 
Group 
Education 
Committee 
Beneficiaries Total 
Aris 5 12 11 10 5 5 48
Badweyn 3 12 5 6 0 5 31
Baq Baq 5 8 11 8 3 5 40
Bender Beyla 10 14 11 12 5 5 57
Budan Buto 3 9 5 8 0 5 30
Dhuudo 5 12 11 10 5 5 48
Dhuur 6 12 11 12 5 5 51
El Dhidir 5 12 11 11 3 5 47
Falah Falah 5 11 11 9 5 5 46
Qundheed 5 10 11 12 0 5 43
Suuj 6 11 11 9 0 5 42
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Table 10 Field Sites  
Town/ 
Village 
Mechanised 
Diesel 
Generator Solar Powered Berkad Latrines
WES Committee 
trained by 
FOPAG 
WES 
Committee 
trained by NCA
Members 
of WES 
Committee Region 
Bender Beyla x     0 x   11 Bari 
El Dhidir x     15 x   11 Bari 
Aris   x   10 x   11 Bari 
Dhuur   
x (partial 
damage)   15 x   11 Bari 
Dhuudo   x   26 x   11 Bari 
Baq Baq   x (blocked)   20 x   11 Nugaal 
Qundheed x     0   x 11 Bari 
Falah Falah x (stolen)     0   x 11 Bari 
Suuj x (stolen)     10   x 11 Bari 
Haji Khayr     x 0   x 5 Bari 
Budan Buto     x 0   x 5 Nugaal 
Badweyn     x 0   x 5
Bari 
(Inland) 
Gubato     x 0   x 5 Bari 
Diilin     x 0   x 5 Bari 
Hamhamaa     x 0   x 5 Bari 
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NCA then advised against visiting one location due to recent violent 
outbreaks. This violence was investigated by the evaluator who concluded the 
reports were accurate and therefore, another location was selected. Field 
visits were restricted to 11 because, given the security risks, it was considered 
more important to get an in-depth understanding of several communities 
rather than make superficial visits to every project. Table 10 illustrates the 
field sites visited with project details. The project sites not visited are in grey. 
The researcher visited all mechanized and solar powered water projects. The 
researcher selected two Berkad sites to visit. The researcher was informed all 
Berkad projects were similar and operational therefore, the researcher opted 
to only visit two allowing for more in-depth information gathering at these two 
sites rather than trying to gather a greater number of more superficial 
information at project sites. Furthermore, superficial information on all the 
projects already existed in the form of project reports and secondary data. 
The researcher selected the first Berkad as it was in the Nugaal region and 
only two of NCAs projects were in Nugaal so this would allow for a 
geographical comparison. The researcher selected the second Berkad as its 
inland location enabled the field team to have a tea break at two other Berkad 
locations. This enabled the researcher to briefly observe that the Berkads 
were functional and had good quantities of water.  
Introductory meetings were held firstly with each Elders Committee. These 
meetings are extremely important as approval from the Elders Committee 
allows the evaluation to proceed and ensures all community members will be 
willing to meet with the evaluation team if requested. Elders Committees 
comprise some of the oldest and most respected members of the community 
and as such these meetings would also be used to extract oral histories and 
timelines both of the Elders personal experiences and that of the village or 
town. The Elders would also use this opportunity to outline their priorities for 
the community and future aspirations. 
Community meeting focus groups were held with key community members 
including teachers, businessmen or women and members of the community 
selected by the community to voice any concerns. These focus groups were 
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used to gather detailed information surrounding the project implementation. 
Focus groups were additionally held with the Water and Environmental 
Sanitation (WES) Committees, women’s groups and Education Committees. 
WES committees were established during the projects to assist with 
implementation and sustainability. A number of towns have well established, 
active women’s groups that meet regularly, other smaller villages have only 
informal women’s groups that only meet during major events. The majority of 
towns and villages had Education Committees despite some not having 
functioning schools. Several participants were selected for follow-up semi-
structured interviews. These participants were selected based on either the 
quality or lack of information provided during focus group sessions i.e. 
participants who raised interesting issues that warranted further in-depth 
discussion or participants who remained quiet during sessions possibly due to 
the presence of other more dominant participants.  
Observations and transect walks were conducted at each site and during the 
walks beneficiaries would be selected for interview. These interviews were all 
semi-structured. 
The evaluation team spent three days in each community. The first day was 
spent in discussions with the Elders Committee and undertaking focus group 
sessions. The second and third day was spent conducting further focus group 
sessions, semi-structured interviews and transect walks. A particular effort 
was made to interview poorer members of the community, women and 
youths. It is possible to identify poorer members of the community through 
their dress, lack of footwear and quality of water containers. 
Upon completion of the field visits, interviews were conducted with field staff. 
These interviews were also used to triangulate findings and clarify or address 
any issues arising from the field visits.    
Following the completion of data collection, collation and analysis, the 
evaluators jointly reviewed the information obtained and identified key issues 
and outcomes. These were discussed at a one-day feedback session with 
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field staff and a one-day feedback workshop that was attended by 
representatives from regional and headquarter level personnel. This enabled 
further feedback to be collected on initial findings and these were used to 
support the formulation of recommendations and were incorporated into the 
final evaluation report.   
 
4.9.1.1 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the research conducted during this 
evaluation. Firstly, only 11 out of 15 project sites were visited, which may not 
be fully representative of the project experiences. However, participants were 
viewed as resourceful, experienced and rich in knowledge of their 
environment. The level of detail gathered from these communities therefore, 
was considered sufficient to gain an understanding of NCAs projects in the 
region and their contribution to adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. 
Hence, understanding the processes that generated the outcomes was 
fundamental rather than generalising findings. This research is consistent with 
the social research literature whereby a small sample size with in-depth data 
is likely to generate rich information from which some conclusions can be 
drawn (Patton, 2002 and Bryman, 2001).  
 
People selected for interview or to participate in focus group sessions may not 
have been representative or people with opposing views may have been 
missed. To avoid this, a range of methods were used for data collection and 
every method of data collection at each field site was used to triangulate 
information collected through other methods.  
 
The presence of project staff during focus group discussions and the 
presence of an interpreter during interviews could have affected participants’ 
freedom of expression. The interpreter was selected specifically for their skills 
in ensuring both male and female interviewees feel at ease, relaxed and are 
forthcoming with information. Furthermore, Somali men and women are 
generally very vocal and the risk of them being silenced or reluctant to speak 
freely due to the presence of project staff is minimal.  
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The use of an interpreter poses another challenge as many phrases or words 
cannot be translated directly from Somali to English and vice versa. The 
interpreter selected for the evaluation has lived in England for over ten years 
and has a wealth of experience in translating between Somali and English 
therefore, the researcher is assured that accurate information was transferred 
between participants, the interpreter and researcher.  
Finally, although not necessarily a limitation, it is worth noting the researchers 
positionality. A white, British female with a western education could have 
certain prejudices and albeit unconsciously, could have influenced data 
collection and analysis. The other two main members of the evaluation team 
however – An Eritrean and a Kenyan – would have reported any such biases 
or prejudices.   
4.9.2 Norwegian Church Aid, Gedo, Somalia 
Similarly to the ACT evaluation, the evaluation of Norwegian Church Aid 
(NCA) was conducted in five stages – review of project documentation and 
secondary data; headquarter level interviews and discussions; regional level 
briefings, interviews and discussions; field visits to the selected towns and 
villages; and debriefings at regional and headquarter level. 
The core evaluation team consisted of the researcher; an independent 
evaluator with over 30 years experience, who the researcher has previously 
worked with on several evaluations; an independent evaluator with over 20 
years experience; and an independent, highly experienced interpreter who is 
from a neutral clan and has previously worked with the researcher. The 
evaluation team was accompanied by several field staff that had long 
experience of the projects and communities. The field staff provided 
community introductions and offered insight on individual projects throughout 
the field visits. The three evaluators and interpreter had a one day workshop 
covering the evaluation aims, objectives, definitions and key terms/phrases, 
potential challenges and methods including interviewing techniques, focus 
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group discussions and methods of recording information. The three evaluators 
conducted a briefing with field staff at their regional headquarters in Gedo, 
Somalia. This briefing ensured the entire field team understood the 
importance and purpose of the evaluation. Key issues such as confidentiality 
and impartiality were also discussed. 
 
The evaluation team was accompanied by ten security personnel. The 
number of security personnel were strategically hired to ensure members 
were recruited from each of the local leaders therefore, reducing the risks to 
the evaluation team.  
 
Table 11 below demonstrates the locations visited and the number of 
participants at each field site. The evaluator’s selected eight project sites to 
visit in collaboration with NCAs programme Director. Sites were selected 
based on the background documentation and project reports taking into 
account factors such as the geographical location, socio-economic 
environment, size of town or village, technical details of the project and when 
the project was implemented to ensure a representative sample of projects 
were visited. The security threat at the time of the evaluation was also a 
consideration in site selection.  
 
Table 12 below illustrates the field sites visited with project details. The 
project sites not visited are in grey. There are three food security projects 
located in Dolo and three in Geedweyne. The researcher visited two food 
security projects at each location. In Dolo, one of the farmers was away on 
business and therefore the evaluator made observations on this farm but 
conducted the research at the other two field sites. Similarly in Geedweyne 
one of the farmers was getting married so observations were made at that 
farm and the other two farms were used as research sites. The observations 
taken gave the researcher further confidence in the quality of information 
collected at the other project sites. The researcher visited both mechanized 
water projects and two emergency schools. The researcher selected Pur 
Puris as a field site as this contained one school and two shallow wells 
therefore offering the opportunity to collect information on multiple projects. 
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Research was not possible in Ceel Cadde at the time due to insecurity. The 
researcher then selected Garbahary as a field site as this location had 
received an education project but no other projects. There were plans for NCA 
to begin constructing a mechanized water system in Garbahary and, 
therefore, it offered an appropriate research site to examine the situation in an 
area prior to implementation.
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Table 11 NCA Site Visits and Number of Participants  
Site Visited 
Elders 
Committee 
Community 
Focus Groups 
WES Committee 
Women’s 
Group 
Beneficiaries Total 
Dolo 4 9 5 10 5 33 
Geedweyne 5 8 5 10 5 33 
Labahlow 5 10 6 12 5 38 
Pur Puris 5 8 5 9 5 32 
El Adde 4 12 12 12 5 45 
El Godgod 5 8 5 12 5 35 
Garbaharey 7 12 5 14 5 43 
Qalwo 4 8 0 4 5 21 
 
(Source: Author) 
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Table 12 Field Sites 
Town/ Village Mechanised Water System Shallow Wells Latrines Education Project Food Security 
Dolo     2 x x2 
Geedweyn     2 x x2 
Labahlow   x3 2 x (emergency)   
Pur Puris   x2 2 x   
El Adde x   10 x   
El Godgod x   10 x   
Garbahary     4 x   
Qalwo   x1 2 x (emergency)   
Ceel Cadde   x1 2 x   
Bura   x1 2 x   
 
(Source: Author)
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The process and methods of collecting field data were similar to the other 
evaluation described above. Firstly, introductory meetings were held with 
each Elders Committee. Again, these meetings were used to extract oral 
histories and timelines both of the Elders personal experiences and that of the 
village or town. Secondly focus groups were held with key community 
members including teachers, businessmen or women, farmers and members 
of the community selected by the community to voice any concerns; the WES 
committees; and women’s groups. These focus groups were used to gather 
further detailed information surrounding the project (see section 4.10 
Analytical framework for further details).  
 
The majority of the villages visited have informal women’s groups that meet 
on an ad hoc basis. However, these women’s groups provide valuable insight 
into Somali society and the projects and therefore, were a crucial component 
of the evaluation. The evaluators would generally take it in turn to lead the 
focus group sessions and where time was restricted they would separate and 
each hold different focus group sessions. Although, the researcher (as the 
only female member of the evaluation team), was the only evaluator present 
during the women’s group sessions to encourage an informal atmosphere that 
would allow participants to freely provide information. 
 
Several participants were selected for follow-up semi-structured interviews. 
These participants were selected based on either the quality or lack of 
information provided during focus group sessions i.e. participants who raised 
interesting issues that warranted further in depth discussion or participants 
who remained quiet during sessions possibly due to the presence of other 
more dominant participants.  
 
Observations and transect walks were conducted at each site and during the 
walks beneficiaries would be selected for interview. These interviews were all 
semi-structured. A particular effort was made to interview poorer members of 
the community, women and youths. It is possible to identify poorer members 
of the community through their dress, lack of footwear and quality of water 
containers. 
 147
 
The evaluation team spent two-three days in each community. The first day 
was spent in discussions with the Elders Committee and undertaking focus 
group sessions. The second and third day was spent conducting further focus 
group sessions, semi-structured interviews and transect walks.  
 
Upon completion of the field visits, interviews were conducted with field staff 
including the staff of NCAs local implementing partner. These interviews were 
also used to triangulate findings and clarify or address any issues arising from 
the field visits.    
 
Following the completion of data collection, collation and analysis, the 
evaluators jointly reviewed the information obtained and identified key issues 
and outcomes. These were discussed at a one-day debriefing session with 
field staff in Gedo and a one-day debriefing workshop in Nairobi that was 
attended by representatives from regional and headquarter level personnel. 
This enabled further feedback to be collected on initial findings and these 
were used to support the formulation of recommendations and were 
incorporated into the final evaluation report. Draft reports were issued to all 
field staff for their comments and feedback and these were also incorporated 
into the final report.  
 
4.9.3.1 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the research conducted during the 
evaluations several of which are similar to the limitations of the evaluation 
discussed earlier including, the number of project sites visited; the selection of 
participants; the presence of project staff and interpreter during focus group 
discussions and interviews; the use of an interpreter; and the positionality of 
the researcher. These limitations have already been addressed above within 
section 4.9.1.1 Limitations. 
 
Tensions in the Gedo region during the evaluation period were high due to the 
presence of Ethiopian soldiers on the Somali side of the border. Hence, one 
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of the field visits was reduced from three to two days however, this is not 
believed to have affected the results as the evaluators were still able to 
conduct the necessary focus group sessions and interviews.  
 
It was generally felt the participatory approach adopted for each evaluation 
was very effective for this research. Efforts and enthusiasm of the evaluation 
teams and field staff and their capacity to grasp both the purpose of the 
evaluation and the data collection techniques used were impressive. 
Formulating the recommendations and conclusions was undertaken 
transparently with each core evaluation team, which promoted confidence in 
the results that were relevant, appropriate and actionable.  
 
4.10 Analytical framework 
Figure 6 provides an overview of the researchers data collection and 
analytical framework. The diagram is essentially into the three phases of 
research. The first field level work was part of the original evaluation fieldwork. 
The second phase at field level was pulling together a daily workshop to come 
to evaluative judgements under the researchers leadership. The third phase is 
a desk review undertaken by the researcher herself. These three phases and 
methodologies are examined in more detail below.  
 
Phase I demonstrates the methods used at each field site. Oral histories were 
collected from two members of each Elder’s Committee. Members of the 
Elders’ Committee were used as these are some of the oldest members of the 
community and provide both a personal history and then a history of the 
community, village or town, which offers great insight and depth into the 
community. Focus group sessions were held with each Water and 
Environmental Sanitation (WES) Committee; a community focus group and 
the women’s committee. Most villages and towns in Somalia have established 
women’s groups, which were used to form the women’s focus group. The 
community group comprised largely of men and included a range of 
representatives from each wider family group. These groups included 
representatives from some of the poorest households in each location. Semi-
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structured interviews were held with one male and one female member of the 
WES committee to gain greater insight into the personal accounts of the 
project and also to help triangulate the findings of the focus group sessions. 
Three semi-structured interviews were held with beneficiaries at each project 
site. Transect walks, mapping and observations were conducted at each site 
and further information on each method can be found in Table 8 Participatory 
Research Tools 
An interpreter was used for the oral histories, semi-structured interviews and 
focus group sessions. There are a number of limitations of using an 
interpreter (Jandt, 2003) including the potential loss of conceptual 
equivalence. This is where the interpretation is not conceptually or technically 
representative of what the participant has said. Edwards (1998) explains that 
an incorrect interpretation of one word can lead to different themes emerging 
and subsequently a different analysis. The researcher does not speak Somali 
and the participants do not speak English thus, there is no independent 
validation of the interpretation. These limitations were minimised through a 
number of measures. Firstly, the interpreter was highly qualified with 
extensive experience of conducting field evaluations. Secondly, the interpreter 
had excellent references, was from a neutral clan and had nothing to gain 
from the evaluation or research findings. Finally, the researcher would 
observe participant body language and tone of voice to ensure it married with 
the interpretation given.  
Phase II demonstrates the use of evaluative criteria. The evaluations for this 
research were analysed using a framework of the OECD-DAC evaluation 
criteria, which have previously been discussed (see Table 3). Table 13 
presents this framework adapted from O’Keefe et al. (2002) and ALNAP 
(2006, which has been used to assess these case studies. The criteria are 
grouped into five major categories – relevance/appropriateness; 
effectiveness; efficiency; impact; and sustainability. Other over-lapping criteria 
including, coherence, timeliness, coverage, coordination and connectedness 
were considered sub-issues of these five major criteria. Table 14 summarises 
the themes for each case study whose results are detailed in Chapter 5 and 
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Chapter 6. Each evening the evaluation team would hold a workshop to 
discuss all of the findings from that day and explore them through the 
evaluative criteria. There are a number of limitations to this process of 
teamwork. Firstly as the OECD-DAC (1999) discussed there is the potential to 
disagree over findings. Prior to commencing the fieldwork the team agreed to 
conduct evening workshops every night in the field. Therefore, if there were 
any disagreements or uncertainties regarding findings, the team would have 
the following day to clarify the findings. Secondly as Barry et al. (1999) 
highlighted there is potential for team members to simply agree with other 
members to please the team. Finally, any personality clashes amongst team 
members can significantly hinder the analysis process. All team members 
were selected for their reputations and experience as quality professionals 
with excellent research and evaluation skills. It is believed all team members 
would put integrity and professionalism ahead of simply wanting to please 
other team members or equally causing disruptions to the teams. 
Furthermore, all team members agreed ahead of the research that the most 
important aspect is ensuring the voice of the beneficiaries is heard.  
 
Phase III was conducted solely by the researcher once all fieldwork was 
completed. The researcher analysed and examined all the findings and began 
grouping exploring them through a number of key themes. This provided an 
additional level of insight and depth into the findings to ensure the researcher 
gathered a holistic understanding of the situation on the ground. This phase of 
analysis is open to subjectivism and misinterpretation by the researcher. 
These limitations were minimised through the use of mixed methods and 
multiple data sources in phase I and then the teamwork analysis conducted in 
Phase II. Hence, the researcher has made every effort to triangulate data 
sources and findings and minimise all of the research limitations.    
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Figure 6 Data Collection and Analytical Framework  
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 Table 13 Evaluation Criteria Framework 
Criteria 
Assessed 
What to Measure 
Whose 
Perspective 
Methodological Challenge Key Questions 
Relevance or 
Appropriateness 
(coherence) 
Relevance and 
appropriateness in relation to 
local needs, priorities and 
donor policies. 
Appropriateness of increasing 
ownership. 
The society 
including 
women, men, 
girls and 
boys. 
Lack of consensus regarding 
needs and priorities. 
Understanding the perspective 
of different stakeholders  
Are project aims and methods in 
keeping with local needs and 
priorities? Are projects and methods 
of implementation culturally 
appropriate? 
Efficiency 
(timeliness and 
coverage) 
The delivery of aid and 
implementation of projects. 
Donor and 
implementing 
agency. 
What standards to use a 
reference point.  
Were aims achieved within allocated 
timeframes and deadlines? What 
were the alternative options for 
delivery (could it have been quicker, 
cheaper)? 
Effectiveness 
(coordination) 
 
The achievement of project 
aims. 
Target 
groups and 
beneficiaries 
Multiple aims; clarifying the 
extent to which something was 
effective; examining whether 
effects were equal across 
beneficiaries and groups. 
To what extent have agreed aims 
and objectives been achieved or 
not? What are the reasons for 
achieving or not achieving agreed 
aims?  
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Table 13 Evaluation Criteria Framework Continued 
 
(Source: Adapted from O’Keefe, 2002 and ALNAP, 2006)
Impact 
 
Intended and unintended 
positive and negative impacts. 
Wider effects of the project – 
social, economic, technical and 
environmental. 
The society 
including 
individuals, gender 
and age groups, 
communities and 
institutions 
Linking cause and 
effect. 
What are the positive and negative 
effects on individuals, groups and 
the wider society? What caused 
these effects (both intended and 
unintended)? 
Sustainability 
(connectedness)
 
The longevity of the project and 
its associated benefits. 
The society. Hypothetical answers. What is the agency exit strategy? 
Do beneficiaries have the skills, 
resources and will to maintain the 
project? 
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Table 14 Key Themes 
Research Theme Assessment Criteria 
Source 
ACT NCA 
Context of research Literature review Literature Literature 
The concepts of 
adaptive capacity, 
resilience and 
vulnerability 
Literature review Literature Literature 
Community 
participation and 
ownership 
Relevance/ 
appropriateness, 
effectiveness, impact, 
sustainability 
Project documentation; interviews; 
focus group sessions with stakeholders 
including target groups, beneficiaries 
and implementing partners.  
Project documentation; interviews; focus 
group sessions with stakeholders 
including target groups, beneficiaries and 
implementing partners. 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
Relevance/ 
appropriateness, 
effectiveness, impact, 
sustainability 
Project documentation; interviews; 
focus group sessions with stakeholders 
including target groups, beneficiaries 
and implementing partners. 
Project documentation; interviews; focus 
group sessions with stakeholders 
including target groups, beneficiaries and 
implementing partners. 
Somalia: Judgement 
on the uniqueness of 
the case 
Comparative literature 
review, against authors’ 
evaluation experience.  
Field judgement Field judgement 
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Table 14 Key Themes Continued 
 
Livelihood 
security 
Relevance/ 
appropriateness, 
efficiency, effectiveness, 
impact, sustainability 
Project and secondary literature; interviews; 
focus group sessions with stakeholders 
including target groups and beneficiaries. 
Government policies and other 
implementing agencies. 
Project and secondary literature; interviews; 
focus group sessions with stakeholders 
including target groups and beneficiaries. 
Government policies and other implementing 
agencies. 
Entry and 
exit 
strategies 
Relevance/ 
appropriateness, 
sustainability 
Project documentation; interviews; and 
focus groups with project staff, beneficiaries 
and implementing partners.  
Project documentation; interviews; and focus 
groups with project staff, beneficiaries and 
implementing partners. 
 
(Source: Author).
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4.11 Ethical Considerations and Positionality 
Involving human participants in exploring the extent to which development 
and humanitarian interventions promote adaptive capacity and resilience and 
reduce vulnerability raises numerous ethical issues for example, the right to 
privacy, confidentiality, personal autonomy, respect and dignity.  
The researcher believed the most important aspect of the research to be ‘do 
no harm’ (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989). Under no circumstances should the 
research or methods do harm whether physically, mentally or otherwise, or 
worsen the situation of any participant (Patton, 2002). Social inquiry is 
predicated on the belief that greater access to well-grounded information will 
improve rather than threaten the interests of society. Nonetheless, as the 
Social Research Association (2003) explains, in planning all phases of an 
inquiry, from design to presentation of findings, social researchers should 
consider the likely consequences for society at large, groups and categories 
of persons within it, respondents or other subjects, and possible future 
research. No generic formula exists for assessing the likely benefit or risk of 
various types of social inquiry. Social researchers however, must be sensitive 
to the possible consequences of their work and should as far as possible 
guard against predictably harmful effects.  
Two approaches dominate ethics research – consequentialist and 
deontological ethics (Peach, 1995). Peach (1995) outlines the differences 
between these two approaches. Consequentialist, also referred to as a 
utilitarian or teleological approach, focuses on the results or outcomes of 
actions. Researchers adopting this approach believe in the utility principle – 
we should strive to create the greatest possible balance of good over evil in 
the world. Maximising benefits and minimising harm, and the promotion of 
human values such as happiness, health, knowledge, self-realisation, 
perfection or general welfare are central to the consequentialist approaches. 
The emphasis on ‘good’ over the ‘right’ means utilitarian approaches are 
largely founded on moral principles such as truth and honesty. This approach 
however, may result in sacrificing justice in particular situations in the course 
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of maximising good over evil. 
 
Alternatively, deontological theories are rule-based – adopting the ‘right’ 
approach in accordance with the laws, prohibitions, prescriptions and norms 
regardless of whether consequences are of the maximum or minimum good. 
The problem of deontological approaches is their homogenising and universal 
assumption that there is one ‘right’ answer for every moral dilemma. The rules 
may be immoral, unjust or impoverishing to human life. Furthermore, rules 
can be embroiled in overly formalistic and legalistic arguments with narrow 
applications of norms to real-life circumstances.  
 
Hence, neither the consequentialist nor deontological approaches can offer a 
perfect solution to complex moral dilemmas that the researcher may 
encounter. In this study, both approaches were relevant and applied with 
careful balance.  
 
The ethics literature on research involving impoverished and vulnerable 
communities, including disaster-prone communities such as those who 
participated in the ACT and NCA evaluations, is extensive and continually 
expanding (for example, Nama and Swartz, 2002; Dickens and Cook, 2003; 
Collogan et al., 2004; Lott, 2005; Rhodes, 2005; Mackenzie et al., 2007; 
Flicker et al., 2007; Mfutso-Bengo et al., 2008; and Jesus and Michael, 2009). 
Ethical guidelines on conducting human research in disaster situations do 
exist, however, there is no comprehensive global consensus on the matter 
(Siriwardhana, 2007 and Social Research Association, 2003).  
 
As this study used intrusive data collection methods in the form of interviews 
and observations, involving personal and interpersonal interactions, there 
were two main options – a checklist or a consent form – to ensure ethical 
issues were observed. Consent forms with participants signatures were not 
considered appropriate due to the high rates of illiteracy throughout the study 
locations. Consistent with Patton (2002), a checklist of ethical issues based 
on appropriate moral and legal principles was deemed appropriate. Although 
existing guidelines were formulated by the developed world there are several 
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aspects that are universal and hence, can be applied to this research. The 
researcher developed an ethical guidelines checklist adapted from the Social 
Research Association (2003), which is illustrated in Table 15.  
 
This checklist was consistent with the Northumbria University Ethics in 
Research and Consultancy (NUERC) (2007) guidelines. The NUERC 
guidelines emphasise the application of beneficence ‘doing good’ and non-
maleficence ‘not doing harm’; respect for the rights of others; justice and fair 
treatment of others; and balancing qualitatively different values.  
 
This research material was collected at the invitation of organisations that 
solicited for the researchers consultancy services. Although in all cases, the 
participants’ consent was sought by the respective organisations, it was the 
responsibility of the researcher to ensure ethical standards were observed. 
Similarly, the researcher sought consent from all organisations to use the 
material for the purpose of a doctoral study. The guidelines demonstrated in 
Table 15 formed part of a toolkit, which the researcher and evaluation teams 
adhered to throughout the research process.  
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Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist 
Ethical 
Aspect 
Considerations Explanation
Guidance Notes 
Obligations 
to society 
Widening scope Social researchers should use the possibilities open to them 
to extend the scope of social enquiry and communicate their 
findings, for the benefit of the widest possible community. 
The evaluation reports were published and available 
to the wider humanitarian community. The researcher 
has published articles to ensure the greatest 
dissemination of results. 
Consider 
conflicting 
interests 
Social enquiry is predicated on the belief that greater access 
to well-grounded information will serve rather than threaten 
the interests of society. Nonetheless, in planning all phases 
of an inquiry, from design to presentation of findings, social 
researchers should consider the likely consequences for 
society at large, groups and categories of persons within it, 
respondents or other subjects, and possible future research. 
The impacts on all members of Somali society – men, 
women, boys and girls – were thoroughly considered 
prior to establishing recommendations or publishing 
information. 
Pursuing 
objectivity 
While social researchers operate within the value systems of 
their societies, they should attempt to uphold their 
professional integrity without fear or favour. They must also 
not engage or collude in selecting methods designed to 
produce misleading results, or in misrepresenting findings by 
commission or omission. 
The researcher used well known evaluation methods; 
triangulation of results occurred throughout; and 
methods, results and discussions were transparent to 
participants, evaluation teams, field staff and 
humanitarian organisations involved.  
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Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued 
Obligations 
to funders & 
employers 
Clarify 
obligations 
and roles 
Social researchers should clarify in advance the respective 
obligations of employer or funder and social researcher; they 
should, for example, refer the employer or funder to the 
relevant parts of a professional code to which they adhere. 
Reports of findings should (where appropriate) specify their 
role. 
Headquarter level briefings were held with all 
organisations evaluated to ensure both evaluators and 
the contractors had shared objectives and understanding 
of how the results were to be utilised. The researcher 
always made clear of their adherence to the ‘do no harm’ 
principle and the core principles of humanitarian 
intervention – neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
Assessing 
alternatives 
impartially 
Social researchers should consider the available methods and 
procedures for addressing a proposed inquiry and should 
provide the funder or employer with an impartial assessment of 
the respective merits and demerits of alternatives. 
All data collection method options including their 
strengths and limitations were discussed during initial 
briefings. 
Guiding 
privileged 
information 
Social researchers are frequently furnished with information by 
the funder or employer who may legitimately require it to be 
kept confidential. Methods and procedures that have been 
utilised to produce published data should not, however, be 
kept confidential. 
Issues of confidentiality were raised by the researcher 
during initial briefings and all organisations agreed 
evaluation reports and findings should be published and 
transparent provided they do not increase risks or have 
negative impacts on participants. In such cases, any 
sensitive material would remain confidential. 
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Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued 
Obligations 
to 
colleagues 
Maintaining 
confidence in 
research 
Social researchers depend upon the confidence of the public. 
They should in their work attempt to promote and preserve such 
confidence without exaggerating the accuracy or explanatory 
power of their findings. 
The researchers methods and results were 
transparent to other evaluators and humanitarian 
organisations thus limiting any possibility of 
exaggeration or misrepresentation of findings. 
Exposing and 
reviewing their 
methods and 
findings 
Within the limits of confidentiality requirements social 
researchers should provide adequate information about their 
methods to colleagues to permit procedures, techniques and 
findings to be assessed by others. Such assessments should be 
directed at the methods themselves rather than at the 
individuals who selected or used them. 
The researchers methods are well known to the 
humanitarian community and all techniques were 
transparent to other evaluators and humanitarian 
organisations.  
Communicating 
ethical 
principles 
To conduct certain inquiries, social researchers need to 
collaborate with colleagues in other disciplines. In these cases 
social researchers should make their own ethical principles clear 
and take account of the ethical principles of their collaborators. 
The researcher always explained the nature and 
objectives of their research and her ethical principles. 
Ensuring safety 
and minimising 
risk of harm to 
field 
researchers 
Social researchers have a moral obligation to attempt to 
minimise the risk of physical and/or mental harm to themselves 
and to their colleagues from the conduct of research. Research 
managers may, in addition, have a legal obligation in terms of 
health and safety regulations to ensure that risk to field 
researchers is minimised. 
The safety of field teams was always the priority of the 
researcher and on several occasions the researcher 
was required to make evacuation decisions. The 
researcher followed the security advice of the United 
Nations, field staff and security guards.  
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Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued 
Obligations 
to Subjects 
Avoid 
undue 
intrusion 
Social researchers must strive to be aware of the intrusive potential of 
their work. They have no special entitlement to study all phenomena. 
The advancement of knowledge and the pursuit of information are not 
themselves sufficient justifications for overriding other social and 
cultural values. 
The researcher maintained the highest respect 
for participants and the time and information 
they provided. The researcher was well aware 
of the sensitive nature of a number of topics 
discussed.  
Informed 
consent 
Inquiries involving human subjects should be based as far as 
practicable on the freely given informed consent of subjects. Even if 
participation is required by law, it should still be as informed as 
possible. In voluntary inquiries, subjects should not be under the 
impression that they are required to participate. They should be aware 
of their entitlement to refuse at any stage for whatever reason and to 
withdraw data just supplied. 
All participants were made aware of the nature 
of each evaluation and made aware of their 
right to refusal. Participants were also informed 
about their right to confidentiality. 
Respecting 
rights in 
observation 
studies 
In observation studies, where behaviour patterns are observed without 
the subject’s knowledge, social researchers must take care not to 
infringe what may be referred to as the “private space” of an individual 
or group. This will vary from culture to culture. Where practicable, 
social researchers should attempt to obtain consent. In any event, they 
should interpret behaviour patterns that appear deliberately to make 
observation difficult as a tacit refusal of permission to be observed. 
Observations throughout this research were 
conducted in public areas of public daily 
activities for example collecting water. Thus, 
the infringement of private space was limited. 
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Table 15 Ethical Guidelines Checklist Continued 
Obligations 
to subjects 
To withhold material information from, or to misinform, subjects 
involves a deceit, whether by omission or commission, temporarily 
or permanently. Such manipulation will face legitimate censure and 
must not be contemplated unless it can be justified. Instead, 
consideration should be given to informing subjects in advance that 
material information is being withheld, and when or if such 
information will be disclosed. 
Protecting 
the 
interests of 
subjects 
Enabling 
participation 
Social researchers have a responsibility to ensure inclusion in 
research projects of relevant individuals or groups who might 
otherwise be excluded for reasons of communication, disability, 
comprehension or expense. 
The researcher made every effort to ensure all 
relevant individuals and groups were included 
particularly those often marginalised for example, 
the elderly, women, girls, IDPs, the disabled and 
the poorest. 
(Source: Adapted from Social Research Association, 2003). 
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4.11.1 Positionality 
The researcher’s positionality was an important consideration of this research.  
While this research aimed at contributing new knowledge to disaster studies 
through empirical evidence, the fact that the researcher has not themselves 
lived through a disaster, mean some biases could have influenced the 
research process.  
 
There is an expansive body of literature on positionality and reflexivity (for 
example, England, 1994; Penslar, 1995; Rose, 1997; Maxey, 2005; Sidaway, 
2000; Sultana, 2007; Huisman, 2008; and Moser, 2008), which has informed 
the research process of this study. The literature emphasises the importance 
of researchers to acknowledge their partiality, subjectivities and biographies 
through reflexivity. This helps researchers to fully understand their research 
process, the researched and the research context, particularly in the context 
of post-structural and post-modern multiple axes of difference, inequalities 
and geopolitics, which has an impact on knowledge production. Several 
aspects that were related to the researcher’s positionality were considered. 
 
The researcher was contracted through external agencies, with some higher 
level of Western education, power relations between the researcher and 
research participants, could have affected access to participants, the 
outcomes and knowledge production (McCorkel and Myers, 2003). For 
instance, participants could have framed their responses in an attempt to 
please the researcher or encourage further humanitarian aid to their village or 
town. Furthermore, as a female researcher in a Muslim country there was a 
risk that male participants would not be forthcoming or active. Fortunately, this 
was not the case; however, evidently the positionality of the researcher could 
have had an effect on the knowledge production process. 
 
Evaluations are generally undertaken on behalf of funders. The constant 
exposure to project documentation could manifest in what Allen (2005) refers 
to as ‘docility’ whereby the researcher intuitively and uncritically becomes 
oriented towards satisfying the needs and demands of the funder. 
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To deal with issues of positionality, the researcher observed a number of 
strategies. Firstly, the study adopted what Patton (2002) terms ‘pragmatism’ 
or ‘methodological appropriateness’ where a range of multiple methods were 
employed. Depending on circumstances, group or individual interview 
techniques were employed including meetings, workshops and focus and 
open discussions. Consistent with Chacko (2004), active measures including 
openness about the agenda and activities undertaken, self-disclosure, making 
conscious accommodations for the research participants’ time constraints, 
mutual sharing of information and explicit recognition of participants’ expertise 
through ‘lived’ experiences were strategies adopted to equalise the power 
balance between the researcher and participants.  
4.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the evaluation framework that was used to identify 
and extract lessons from the evaluations of ACT and NCA to inform and 
develop adaptive capacity and resilience and reduce vulnerability. The 
evaluations relied largely on qualitative research techniques to gather in-depth 
case material and data. The researcher was satisfied with the participatory 
approach adopted and the effort and enthusiasm of the evaluation teams and 
field staff and their capacity to grasp both the purpose of the evaluation 
process and data tools was impressive. Information gathered was always 
triangulated through adopting a range of methods. The principles of ‘do no 
harm’, neutrality, impartiality and independence were at the forefront of each 
evaluation and upheld throughout the research process. Chapters five and six 
present the research findings. Although, other project areas are included in 
one of the case studies such as education and food security, both case 
studies are heavily focused on water, hygiene and sanitation projects. 
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Chapter 5 
Action by Churches Together Programme, Bari and 
Nugaal, Somalia 
 
5.1 Action by Churches Together 
 
Action by Churches Together (ACT) International was established in 1995 and 
as of January 2010 became known as the ACT Alliance. ACT is composed of 
over 100 member organisations working in long-term development and 
humanitarian aid. ACTs members operate in over 130 countries with 
approximately 30,000 staff and volunteers and mobilise around US$1.5 billion 
per year.  
 
ACTs vision and mission statements comprise of the following: 
 
 “The ACT Alliance works towards a world community where all God’s 
creation lives with dignity, justice, peace and full respect for human rights and 
the environment” (Act Alliance, 2010, para. 2). 
 
“Members of the alliance work together for positive and sustainable change in 
the lives of people affected by poverty and injustice through coordinated and 
effective humanitarian, development and advocacy work. We work with and 
for people of all faiths and none” (Act Alliance, 2010, para. 2).  
 
The ACT Alliance is a member of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian 
Response (SCHR) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). 
ACT is a signatory to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and is committed to the 
Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. 
This demonstrates ACTs commitment to the delivery of quality, transparent 
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interventions that uphold the humanitarian imperative and fundamental 
principles of humanitarian interventions.   
Through its member organisations, ACT implements programmes that aim to:  Overcome poverty; Adapt to changes in the environment and reduce the risk of future
disasters; Cope with and be better prepared for emergencies; Recover from major setbacks due to conflicts or war; and Influence governments and other decision makers to fulfill their duties
in protecting basic human rights.
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is a member of the ACT Alliance and has been 
operational in Somalia since 1993. Norwegian Church Aid is funded by the 
ACT Alliance to provide humanitarian aid to the Bari and Nugaal regions of 
Somalia. They were selected because of their resources, expertise and 
experience of operating in Somalia. Norwegian Church Aid began work in 
these areas in 2004 and implements the following programmes:  Water, sanitation and hygiene; Livelihood and trade; Religious communities and peace building; Women, peace and security; and Education.
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5.2 Bari and Nugaal 
Bari and Nugaal are adjoining regions in north eastern and central Puntland 
respectively. The Bari region is divided into two administrative regions – Bari 
in the North and Karkaar in the South (see Map 6). Bari is the largest province 
in Puntland and is bordered by the Sanaag and Sool regions to the west, 
Nugaal to the south, the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the 
east. Bari consists of six districts – Bossaso, Galgala, Qardho, Iskushuban, 
Qandala and Bender Beyla – as demonstrated by Map 7.  
Map 6 Puntland, Somalia 
(Source: Weinstein, 2000) 
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Map 7 Bari and Nugaal 
 
(Source: Adapted from FSAU, 2005) 
 
Nugaal is one of the smallest administrative regions in Somalia and consists 
of three main districts – Eyl, Burtinle and Garoowe (see Map 7) – and one 
relatively new and small district – Dongorayo. Nugaal is bordered by Ethiopia 
and the contested Somaliland region of Sool to the west, Bari region to the 
North, Mudug region to the South and the Indian Ocean to the East. A major 
geographic feature of the Nugaal region is the Nugaaleed Valley, a large 
shallow drainage basin, fed by the Nugaaleed and Dheere rivers during the 
April-June rainy season.  
 
Throughout Bari and Nugaal the Majerteen are the dominant clan in the 
region although, Carab Saalax (Meheri), Warsengeli (Maakhirans), Awrtable, 
Dishishle, Leelkase, Jambeel, and the Madibaan clans also have significant 
representation in the regions (Somalinet, 2009).  
 
It is estimated that Puntland hosts up to 70,000 Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs), most of whom live in congested settlements in and around major cities 
and towns (OCHA, 2007). Bari and Nugaal have benefited from relative 
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stability since the establishment of the Puntland state, unlike their 
neighbouring regions - Sool, Sanaag and Mudug – which have all 
continuously suffered periods of major conflict and instability. Puntlands 
relatively peaceful state particularly, during the years of raging civil war in the 
south have continuously attracted large numbers of IDPs. The rising 
population in Puntland combined with the number of IDPs in these areas have 
stretched resources. Furthermore, standards of living for the host populations 
have been detrimentally impacted as through the extensive traditional Somali 
family and clan network, hosts are obligated to assist wherever possible.  
 
5.2.1 Livelihoods 
Livelihoods in Bari and Nugaal centre around livestock, fishery and agriculture 
(see Map 8). The majority of people depend on livestock and approximately 
65 percent of the Puntland population are nomadic pastoralists and fishermen 
(Ministry of Planning and Statistics, 2003). Puntland has an eight-month 
fishing season and during this time the fishing industry provides direct 
employment for thousands of people as well as indirect employment for many 
people in coastal enterprises such as hotels, restaurants and shops. Fishing 
populations are vast and diverse with large populations of yellow fin tuna, 
groupers, snappers, sharks and rays. The fishing industry is the second 
highest income earner for the population of Puntland, after livestock.  
 
Livestock production is the main economic activity of Somalia and is dominant 
throughout Puntland. Accurate livestock population figures are lacking in 
Puntland however, a survey conducted in collaboration between the Ministry 
of Planning and Statistics and the World Bank in 2002 indicated there are 
20.7 million goats, 9.9 million sheep and 3.6 million camels in Puntland 
(Ministry of Planning and Statistics, 2003). This sector, however, has been 
seriously affected over recent years as four years successive droughts and 
flash floods have caused many livestock to perish. The livestock sector further 
diminished through trade restrictions, as countries such as Saudi Arabia have 
placed intermittent bans on the import of Somali livestock making income 
unreliable (NCA Progress Report, 2005). Subsequently, fishing became a 
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larger aspect of livelihoods and the fishing industry became increasingly relied 
upon by more people. The resident coastal communities of Puntland depend 
heavily upon the commercial fishing of lobsters, shark and kingfish for export. 
Pre-Tsunami, the majority of households purchased 90-95 percent of their 
food using income from fishing or fishing related sources. Hence, livelihood 
options in Bari and Nugaal are limited and consequently, highly susceptible to 
shocks.  
 
Map 8 Puntland Livelihoods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: FSAU, 2009). 
 
The abundance of marine resources and lack of law enforcement made these 
coastal areas popular for illegal foreign fishing trawlers. This risk of over 
harvesting one of Puntlands most key natural resources prompted the 
Puntland State to quickly establish a Ministry of Fisheries with an aim of 
protecting future fish stocks (Puntland Government, no date). The United 
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Nations Environment Programme estimates that Somalia loses approximately 
US$300 million each year to illegal foreign fishing vessels (Godoy, 2010).   
 
Piracy is a major issue along the Puntland coastline and many pirates claim 
they are defending their waters from illegal fishing vessels. Reports estimated 
these pirates earned US$170 million during 2011, which is greater than 
Somalia’s national budget (Mayton, 2012). This money has contributed 
substantially to the economy of Puntland, improved living standards and has 
even been traced down to show it is reaching even the poorest members of 
society (Harper, 2009). Eyl town in Nugaal is Somalia’s main pirate town with 
the majority of ships captured transported there. As of 2008, over a dozen 
ships were in captivity held by pirate crews in Eyl (BBC, 2008).  
 
5.2.2 Current Situation in Puntland 
In Puntland extreme poverty is defined as the inability of a household to pay 
costs of a basic monthly food basket from the market, which usually equates 
to the international standard of extreme poverty of living on less than US$1 
per day. The last socio-economic survey of Puntland was conducted in 2002 
by UNDP. The results indicated that 43.2 percent of the population are living 
in extreme poverty and 30.2 percent of the population are living in moderate 
poverty, classified as living on less than US$2 per day (UNDP, 2002). It is of 
little surprise therefore, that a large proportion of Puntlands population suffers 
food insecurity and 36 percent of children under five years of age are 
underweight. As of 2010 only 58 percent of boys and 37 percent of girls in 
Puntland were enrolled in primary education and only half of these children 
continue on to secondary education. Adult literacy rates in Puntland are poor 
and only around 32 percent of adult women are classed as literate 
(Government of State of Puntland and UNDP Puntland, 2010). 
 
In Puntland, neither wastewater networks nor treatment facilities exist at any 
level. There is a broad evidence of contamination of water tables particularly 
near the surface through soil infiltration. Water of acceptable quality (still 
generally requiring basic treatment) can be found only by drilling deep wells or 
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boreholes to 150-400m deep. Despite this, the majority of people rely on 
shallow wells and have no sanitation facilities (Geopolicity, 2012).  
 
The 2004 Asian Tsunami devastated many of Puntlands coastal communities 
and displaced some 50,000 people (AsiaNews, 2005). Water and sanitation 
facilities were destroyed or contaminated, food stores swept away, roads and 
other infrastructure were damaged and hundreds of fishing boats were lost, 
devastating lives and livelihoods and leaving people vulnerable, exposed and 
in need of emergency assistance. 
 
“It was a calm midday, things were all normal. Then the sea disappeared it 
went three miles back. The beach was full of fish, lobsters and shrimps so 
everyone ran to the beach to collect the catch. After 15 minutes we heard a 
roaring noise so loud and terrifying you would not believe it. Then the wave 
came, we could see it coming towards us. It was 10-15m high and coming 
straight to our beach. Everyone ran, they ran as fast as they could up the hill. 
People were screaming and terrified. It destroyed our houses. It destroyed our 
fishing nets and boats. It destroyed everything. The next day’s people tried to 
catch fish and lobster for food but there was nothing in the sea. The sea died” 
(Village Chief, El Dhirdir, 2007). 
 
The areas most affected by the Tsunami were the Hafun, Bender Beyla and 
Eyl Districts in the State of Puntland. Prior to the Tsunami, approximately five 
percent of the population was in a state of humanitarian emergency while 40 
percent of the population was facing livelihood crises9 (NCA Interim report, 
2006).  
 
Approximately 600 boats were destroyed by the Tsunami and an estimated 75 
percent of fishing equipment was lost or destroyed. The delicate livelihood 
                                            
9 Persons in a humanitarian emergency, who access less than 7.5 litres of water per 
day, face complete loss of livelihood assets and are unable to meet their dietary 
needs (this is the second worst humanitarian condition). Persons in acute livelihood 
crises are able to meet their daily dietary needs through asset stripping and receive 
little more than 7.5 litres of water per day (this is the third worst humanitarian 
condition) (NCA, 2005). 
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strategies in these areas with a heavy reliance on the fishing sector meant 
coping strategies for survival quickly became limited. The Tsunami struck in 
December, peak fishing season, making the impact on livelihoods most 
devastating. Households adopted various coping strategies, which mainly 
included reducing expenditure on food through reducing meals per day; 
seeking credit on food and water; securing donations from Diaspora; selling 
assets; and migrating to urban centres and less affected villages to seek 
employment. The majority of people affected however, quickly became 
completely reliant on humanitarian organisations for the provision of food and 
water. 
  
Immediately after the Tsunami struck people began using salvaged materials 
to erect temporary shelters. The loss of fish meant food shortages and people 
became totally reliant upon existing livestock. Water and sanitation was a 
major issue with the majority of fresh water springs contaminated and no 
income from fishing left people unable to purchase water trucks. Even when 
expensive water trucks were successfully purchased they had to travel long, 
treacherous journeys to reach the coastal towns and many were hijacked 
along the way whilst others simply broke down due to the poor quality of the 
roads. The situation swiftly became desperate as many were undernourished 
and forced to rely on contaminated sources of water, causing cases of water-
borne diseases including diarrhea and dysentery to spread rapidly.  
 
5.2.1 The Humanitarian Response 
In response to the Tsunami, UN agencies, intergovernmental organisations 
and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), in cooperation 
with local government authorities, conducted a multi-sector assessment. The 
Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA, the 
humanitarian wing of the Puntland Government) and UN OCHA coordinated 
the response, allocating different Agencies to different areas to avoid overlap 
and duplication of activities (OCHA, 2005). A Tsunami Task Force was 
established to facilitate the coordination of the humanitarian response on a 
daily basis (UNDP, 2005).   
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The ACT Alliance responded to the Tsunami disaster in Somalia through their 
implementing partner, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Norwegian Church Aid, 
in collaboration with HADMA, selected 15 villages and towns in the Districts of 
Bender Beyla and Eyl that were in serious need of assistance. NCA initially 
planned to provide relief services in the fields of water and sanitation, and the 
provision of fishing equipment. Further assessments and information from the 
inter-agency coordination forums, however, identified that few Agencies had 
scheduled relief programmes in the water and sanitation sector in comparison 
to the fishing sector. Therefore, NCA decided to concentrate all its 
intervention activities in water and sanitation projects and community capacity 
building for sustainability.  
 
NCA introduced projects in 15 villages and towns that included: nine 
mechanised water projects in areas directly affected by the Tsunami and six 
berkad10 water projects in areas indirectly affected by the Tsunami. The 
mechanised projects used water pumps at natural springs and then either 
diesel generators or solar power to pump the water to various points and taps 
within each of the towns and villages. NCA constructed seven and 
rehabilitated two mechanised water systems. The towns and villages with 
mechanised water systems also benefited from improved sanitation that 
involved the construction of 96 Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP)11 latrines and 
one slaughter house. NCA implemented the water and sanitation projects 
through a mixture of contracting arrangements and in-house construction 
methods. NCA additionally collaborated with a local implementing partner – 
The Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) (see Box 5) – to develop a 
capacity building element at each of the 15 water and sanitation projects.  
 
                                            
10 A berkad is a traditional human-made reservoir usually filled by rainfall and runoff. 
They are typically shaded with small bushes, have a capacity of 30 to 400 m3 and 
used for both livestock and human consumption. Berkads were traditionally privately 
owned by households and provided a source of income. 
11 A Ventilation Improved Pit latrine is a pit toilet with a ventilation pipe fitted to the pit 
and a fly screen at the top outlet of the pipe. They overcome the disadvantages of 
simple pit latrines as the smell is carried upwards by the chimney effect and flies are 
prevented from leaving the pit and spreading disease.  
 176
 
 
 
 
NCAs response to the Tsunami was driven by one overall goal that was 
underpinned by two main objectives in delivering humanitarian assistance to 
these areas:  Goal: The aim of the project is to restore human dignity and to restore 
survival chances for over 44,000 people affected directly or indirectly 
by the Tsunami by providing clean drinking water for the human 
population and livestock, and adequate sanitation.  Objective A: Provide clean drinking water to 44,000 affected people in 
15 villages in Bender Beyla, Dangoroyo and Eyl Districts.  Objective B: Improve on environmental sustainability, by mobilising 
and supporting the communities to dig pit latrines in the villages/towns 
directly affected by the Tsunami. 
(Source: NCA, 2006). 
The Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) is an exclusively 
indigenous organisation. It was founded in 2001, taking over the Life and 
Peace Institute’s (LPI) Horn of Africa Programme. The LPI has been 
involved in the Somaliland and Somalia peace building process since 
1992. FOPAG was established, owned and governed by the civil society 
organisations in Somaliland and Somalia in 2001. It is a non-political and 
non-profit NGO. The institution is community-centred, research and action 
oriented and operates in both Somaliland and Somalia in affiliation with the 
IGAD sub-region, focusing on peace and governance and underlying 
factors that cater for their achievement. 
 
FOPAG’s mission is to contribute to the development of a democratic 
system of governance within the framework of enhanced traditional 
participatory conflict transformation and peace building processes and 
mechanisms. 
Box 5 FOPAG 
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5.3 Evaluation of ACTs Response 
ACT contracted the researcher to lead an evaluation of their response to the 
Tsunami disaster. The purpose of the evaluation was to:  Evaluate the immediate and longer-term impact of the emergency 
response in order to determine how adequately men, women, children 
and the most vulnerable people in the affected population were 
assisted by ACT member NCA;  Evaluate the sustainability of achievements and impact, including the 
participation of the assisted communities;   Assess the degree to which the key goal and objectives (outlined 
above) have been achieved; and  Provide learning that may be applied to future operations, including key 
issues to consider when transitioning between humanitarian assistance 
to long-term development.  
 
The researcher used the following evaluative criteria for the purpose of this 
research:  Relevance and appropriateness;  Effectiveness;   Efficiency; and  Impact and Sustainability 
  
Other criteria used for this evaluation in order to address ACTs purpose of the 
evaluation were:   Transparency;  Accountability;  Gender sensitivity  Flexibility; and  Adherence to Sphere Standards and the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Code of Conduct and Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation.   
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NCAs projects are discussed in more detail below. Following this each of the 
evaluation criteria is taken in turn and the various projects and relief efforts 
are examined through these criteria. Through the findings and layers of 
analysis conducted for both case studies the researcher identified an 
alternative approach to delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex 
emergencies: a cohesive dual approach that has a strategy for meeting the 
acute needs and a strategy for addressing the chronic needs of the 
community. These strategies must be integrated, flexible, coherent and have 
synergies so that whatever is implemented in one complements the other.  
 
In addition to an alternative approach the researcher established five themes 
that provide a structure for grouping findings together that enables a more 
comprehensive analysis and discussion: 
1. The Community; 
2. Hardware; 
3. Software, Culture and Religion; 
4. Local Management; and 
5. The most vulnerable.  
 
Following an overview of NCAs humanitarian response, the following findings 
are grouped accordingly into either one of the five key themes outlined above 
or the broader strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in chronic complex 
emergencies.  
 
5.3.1 Implementation  
During the peak fishing season pastoralists would normally travel to coastal 
areas to fish therefore, the total number of people directly and indirectly 
affected by the Tsunami is difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, both the coastal 
year-round residents and seasonal fishermen and their families rely on fishing 
for subsistence and to purchase food and water. The loss of this food source 
and income combined with the contamination of water sources along the 
coastline during the peak fishing season was devastating. Villages and towns 
initially paid what they could for water trucking and when their money quickly 
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ran out, they relied completely upon humanitarian organisations trucking 
water to them. Water trucking however, is nether sustainable or reliable. 
Hence, NCA implemented 15 water and sanitation projects. Based on the 
number of projects implemented and the size of the villages and towns, it is 
estimated that NCAs projects have directly and indirectly affected between 
30,000-44,000 people. 
 
5.3.1.1 Water 
NCAs water projects comprised of nine mechanised projects and six berkad 
projects. The six berkad sites were implemented in villages indirectly affected 
by the Tsunami and are fully functional and still providing adequate water 
supplies to-date. Since installation six of the mechanised projects had been 
fully functional and were providing safe water to the communities. In two of 
the mechanised water project sites (Falah Falah and Suuj) the water pumps 
had been stolen. The communities of Falah Falah and Suuj however, 
apprehended the thieves and retrieved the stolen pumps. NCA has since 
assisted the communities in re-installing the pumps. Hence, eight of the nine 
mechanised water projects are now fully functional.  
 
One of the mechanised water project sites is not functional due to a blockage. 
The local community want this water source covered to prevent future 
blockages, however, the nomadic community that rely upon this water point 
for their livestock do not want it covered. This project has suffered two 
previous blockages and NCA had removed these. Continuously unblocking 
the water source is not a sustainable option and therefore, NCA are not 
planning to remove this blockage until the local community and nomadic 
community reach an agreement to prevent future blockages or cover the 
water point. Overall, NCA has succeeded in supplying clean drinking water to 
14 of the 15 villages/towns. 
 
5.3.1.2 Sanitation 
NCA constructed 96 Ventilation Improved Pit (VIP) latrines in six locations 
(Aris, Baq Baq, Dhuudo, Dhuur, El Dhirdir and Suuj). NCA had planned to 
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construct latrines in the nine locations where they were implementing 
mechanised water projects. NCA decided early on that it would not be 
effective or appropriate to construct latrines at the six berkad sites during this 
phase and that funds would be better spent on the water projects themselves 
in these areas.  
 
During the early phases of the projects NCA requested a number of 
communities to begin digging pit latrines and then NCA would later provide 
the final superstructure. In several locations such as Dhuudo and Baq Baq, 
the community were requested to dig and prepare 10 pits, however, they 
actually prepared 26 and 20 pits respectively. A break down in 
communications amongst NCA staff constructing the pit latrines on the ground 
and staff at the head office in Puntland resulted in NCA providing the 
superstructures for all the pits dug in Dhuudo and Baq Baq. This meant 
resources to construct latrines were not available for a number of other project 
sites (Bender Beyla, Falah Falah and Qundheed). Thus, in these three 
locations NCA was unable to fulfill its objective. Table 16 below indicates the 
number of VIP latrines installed at each project site. 
 
NCA has undertaken a number of measures to prevent this from re-occurring 
in the future. NCAs Team Leader who made the decision to overspend in 
some locations has been replaced. NCA Nairobi staff visited Puntland and 
held workshops and meetings with the staff covering a range of issues 
including the limitation of funds and resources and the importance of not 
overspending in one location and the consequences this has on other 
projects. The town of Bender Beyla is now recovering well from the Tsunami 
and their fishing economy has stabilised. Subsequently, since NCA 
implemented the water project and trained a Water and Environmental 
Sanitation (WES) committee particularly covering issues surrounding the 
importance of good hygiene and sanitation, households began constructing 
their own latrines without support from NCA. It is estimated that over 100 
households in Bender Beyla now have latrines. NCA is continuing its work in 
Puntland and has planned to construct latrines in the remaining two locations 
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that did not receive latrines as planned during the initial phase of their 
operations.  
 
Table 16 Number of VIP Latrines Implemented 
Location Number of VIP Latrines Installed 
Aris 10 
Baq Baq 20 
Dhuudo 26 
Dhuur 15 
El Dhirdir 15 
Suuj 10 
 
5.3.1.3 Training and Water and Environmental Sanitation Committees 
In addition to the hardware elements of NCAs projects there was an equally 
important software element to each of the projects. NCA provided training in 
the 15 villages/towns. In each community a Water and Environmental 
Sanitation (WES) committee was established. At the nine mechanised water 
projects, 11 community members were trained for the WES committee and at 
the six berkad water projects, five community members were trained for the 
WES committee. This training had two aspects, firstly training specific to water 
and sanitation and secondly training surrounding broader environmental 
issues including rubbish disposal and the importance of a clean, 
uncontaminated environment. In all locations visited by the evaluation the 
environments were clear of most rubbish and in several locations garbage pits 
had been dug and were being successfully utilised. This indicates the projects 
are having a much broader positive environmental impact. 
 
NCA initially discussed the roles and responsibilities of a WES committee with 
the communities and provided criteria to help guide their selection of 
members. The criteria emphasised that several members should be literate 
and others should at least be respected, trusted and able to carry out the 
necessary tasks. NCA also highlighted that as women are the primary 
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collectors and users of water the WES committee should contain female 
members, however, NCA did not force this issue or request that WES 
committees comprised of equal numbers of men and women instead they 
allowed the communities to decide. All the communities established WES 
committees and there are female members present on 13 of the 15 
committees.  
 
The WES training was intensive over five days and covered many topics 
including:  Water management, including establishing and maintaining a payment 
mechanism;  Disease transmission and prevention;  Water source contamination and prevention;  The importance of good hygiene and how to establish and maintain 
good hygiene;  Sanitation and how to establish and maintain good sanitation; and  The importance of training and educating the wider community on good 
hygiene, sanitation and environmental health.  
 
In regards to the nine mechanised water projects, all the communities decided 
that female members of the WES committee should take charge of operating 
the communal water points and collecting payments as in Somali society 
women are most trusted with money12. Two male members of these WES 
committees were selected to receive an additional two days of training to 
become technicians. These men conduct the daily maintenance of the 
generators, pipes and other equipment and oversee the general running of 
the water system. Most WES committees (certainly the ones met by the 
evaluation) meet on a regular basis with their elders committees and 
village/town Chiefs to discuss current issues and any problems.  
 
                                            
12 The trustworthiness of women with money was something reiterated at the majority 
of project sites from village elders and religious leaders. 
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Initially NCA decided to contract a local NGO to train the WES committees. 
The Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) was selected and they 
designed a training manual and training materials. They worked in 
collaboration with NCAs Community Development Officer. The Community 
Development Officer identified any gaps in the hygiene and disease 
transmission elements in the training manual and collaborated with FOPAG to 
ensure these topics would be effectively covered. FOPAG trained six 
communities – Baq Baq, Dhuudo, Dhuur, Aris, Bender Beyla and El Dhirdir – 
and the NCA Community Development Officer was present during each 
training session to ensure quality and consistency. The Community 
Development Officer would also identify any weaknesses or specific issues for 
each community and then ensure these topics were covered thoroughly or in 
greater detail.  
 
After the completion of the sixth training session, FOPAG received an 
opportunity for work elsewhere and therefore, could not conduct any further 
training for NCA. NCAs Community Development Officer hired co-facilitators 
and used the same resources to train the other communities. Due to the close 
collaboration with FOPAG, NCAs Community Development Officer was able 
to provide the remaining communities with the same level and standard of 
training as FOPAG had provided. The WES committee technicians at each 
site were all trained by NCAs technician and engineer to assure they had a 
thorough understanding of their individual water system and would be capable 
of conducting relevant repairs and maintenance work.  
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The WES committee training programme established by FOPAG was based 
upon the Qur’an, local Somali proverbs and Somali poems. These were 
utilised to illustrate the importance of hygiene and cleanliness. While 
humankind in general usually considers cleanliness to be a pleasing attribute, 
Islam insists on it. Box 6 below discusses the importance of sanitation, 
hygiene and the sustainable use of water in Islam. 
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(Source: Islamreligion.com, 2011; Kasem, 2007; and Abumoghli, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
Islam ascribes the most sacred qualities to water as a life-giving, sustaining, and 
purifying resource. “It is the origin of all life on earth, the substance from which 
God created man” (Qur’an 25:54). The Qur’an emphasises its centrality: "We made from 
water every living thing" (Qur’an 21:30). "And it is He who created the heavens and the 
earth in six days, and his Throne was upon water". (Qur’an 11:7). In Islam major 
importance is placed upon purity, cleanliness and good hygiene. 
 
Muslims are required to take care of their personal hygiene by assuring that they are well 
groomed, and that their bodies, clothing, and surroundings are clean.  The Prophet 
Muhammad reinforced the importance of cleanliness when he said, “cleanliness is half of 
faith”. Islam is the only religion that requires its believers to follow certain hygienic 
procedures that safeguard the human from infectious diseases.  
 
The word ‘water’ occurs 66 times in the Qur’an and there are many verses covering how 
it should be used and managed sustainably for example, “Don’t waste water even if you 
are on a running river”. Islam stresses the importance of preventing the pollution of water 
resources. Urinating in stagnant water, urinating in a place of bathing, urinating on soft 
ground and discharging wastewater into a water stream are all forbidden acts in Islam. 
The Prophet Muhammad said: "No one should bathe in still water, when he is unclean”. 
 
In the Shariah, there is a responsibility placed on upstream farms to be considerate of 
downstream users. A farm beside a stream is forbidden to monopolise its water. After 
withholding a reasonable amount of water for crops, the farmer must release the rest to 
those downstream. Furthermore, if the water is insufficient for all of the farms along the 
stream, the needs of the older farms are to be satisfied before the newer farm is 
permitted to irrigate. This reflects the importance in Islam of using water resources 
sustainably. According to jurists such as Malik and Ibn Qudamah, these same principles 
apply to the extraction of groundwater and they said a person has no right to adversely 
affect his neighbours well by lowering the water table or polluting the aquifer.         
Box 6 Islam and Water 
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Norwegian Church Aids 15 water and sanitation projects that were 
implemented on behalf of Action by Churches Together are examined below 
in accordance with the evaluative criteria selected for the purpose of this 
research – relevance and appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; and 
impact and sustainability. 
 
5.3.2 Strategy 
ACT selected Norwegian Church Aid to be its implementing partner in 
responding to the Tsunami disaster in Somalia. NCA were appointed due to 
their experience of working in Somalia and understanding of Somali culture 
and their experience of responding to sudden onset disasters in complex 
emergencies. The Tsunami disaster caused a loss of livelihoods, housing, 
infrastructure, services, water sources and food stores for many people. NCA 
have expertise and skills in most of these sectors – rebuilding livelihoods; 
shelter; education; water and sanitation; and food security. Hence, NCA were 
an appropriate organisation to implement ACTs emergency response to the 
Tsunami disaster.  
 
NCA Somalia has a strong regional headquarters in Nairobi who have the 
capacity, experience and resources to support an emergency programme in 
Puntland. NCAs long history in the Gedo region of Somalia meant they had an 
excellent understanding of the country, the people, religion, traditions and 
cultures. This enabled NCA to quickly establish a local team and propose an 
effective response.  
 
Key Finding 1 
An organisation that has experience and knowledge of operating in a country 
or culture is key to ensuring an appropriate emergency response is 
developed. 
 
Numerous humanitarian organisations responded to the Tsunami in Somalia. 
Most engaged in providing fishing equipment; food aid and water trucking 
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services. NCAs decision to respond was immediate and during January 2005 
NCA carried out a joint needs assessment with Save the Children UK (SC 
UK). Unfortunately, this needs assessment was not useful to NCA. The needs 
assessment contained chapters on food security, health, education and 
shelter. It highlighted water and sanitation as the most immediate and priority 
need of the affected communities, but there was no further information 
provided on water and sanitation and the actual needs of the affected 
communities. Information from the inter-agency coordination forums, 
established to coordinate the response to the Tsunami, confirmed water and 
sanitation as a priority need throughout the region. NCA therefore, decided to 
concentrate all its efforts in the water and sanitation sector. The decision to 
focus on implementing water and sanitation projects was definitely 
appropriate to the needs of the affected population. The needs assessment 
team from NCA consisted of the Programme Coordinator and a Water and 
Sanitation Consultant. They were to provide SC UK with the necessary 
information on water and sanitation, which would be included in the needs 
assessment report, however, the Water and Sanitation Consultant failed to 
provide the relevant information and SC UK published the needs assessment 
without a water and sanitation section. This hampered the timeliness of NCAs 
response.  
 
The first joint needs assessment conducted by NCA and SC UK did not prove 
cost effective to NCA and they had to undertake a second needs assessment 
to identify actual needs in water and sanitation and identify possible project 
sites. NCA ensured the second needs assessment would be much more 
efficient through hiring experts in engineering water and sanitation projects 
and requesting them to design the projects as they conducted the needs 
assessment. NCA undertook a second needs assessment during April 2005. 
NCA delayed in undertaking the second needs assessment to ensure they 
hired appropriate and capable specialists. Subsequently, a separate visit to 
the project sites to prepare engineering plans and designs was not needed 
after the needs assessment. This reduced the time between conducting a 
needs assessment, producing designs and plans, and actual implementation, 
and therefore, improved the overall efficiency of the programme.  
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Key Finding 2 
Including appropriate experts to conduct a needs assessment enables 
realistic proposals and designs to be scoped out during the needs 
assessment and thus, improves the efficiency of responding to crises. 
 
A number of outside factors hampered the efficiency of NCAs interventions. 
When the Tsunami struck organisations were not able to enter areas and 
begin planning projects, as they needed to coordinate with one another first to 
prevent overlap. Somalia has good telecommunication services and soon 
after the Tsunami the government were well informed as to which 
communities had been affected both directly and indirectly. The Government 
of Puntland is relatively new and inexperienced in managing or coordinating a 
disaster response. The government established HADMA (Humanitarian 
Affairs and Disaster Management Agency) and with assistance from UN 
OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance) began coordinating the response. This slowed the coordination 
process but was necessary to ensure a holistic approach was adopted; strong 
working relationships were developed between the government and the 
international community; and capacity within the government was 
strengthened for future emergencies. With government advice from HADMA 
and several needs assessments, NCA selected its project sites.  
 
Prior to implementation, the Puntland State Agency Water, Energy and 
Natural Resources (PSAWEN) accompanied NCA to each of the 15 project 
sites. PSAWEN introduced NCA to the communities, elders committees and 
local authorities. The reassurance provided by PSAWEN meant communities 
quickly trusted NCA and were willing to support and actively participate in the 
projects. These introductory meetings also enabled NCA to discuss in depth 
with the communities their needs and priorities. In communities where 
corruption, illegitimate organisations and organisations that fail to deliver 
promises have been prolific, gaining trust and confidence can prove difficult 
for organisations. PSAWEN are highly respected amongst local communities 
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and therefore, through their visible support for NCAs projects, communities 
trusted NCA from the onset. Consequently, this allowed NCA staff and each 
of the communities to quickly form strong relationships. This enhanced the 
efficiency of the projects, as NCA had trust and respect, local communities 
were willing to actively participate as far as possible in each phase of the 
project. 
 
Key Finding 3 
Efficient implementation of projects with community participation demands 
trust. Using a trusted third party to introduce communities and organisations 
helps establish initial trust on both sides. 
 
 
The security situation in the region means caution must always be taken. 
Organisations receive regular security briefs and must follow the necessary 
steps to ensure safety, for example, evacuation procedures must be in place 
and travel at night particularly outside cities and towns is not advised. The 
issues of security, coupled with the limited infrastructure in the region, means 
transporting equipment is a slow and expensive process.  
 
During the initial phase of NCAs response, water pumps and equipment not 
obtainable in Puntland were purchased in Nairobi and flown to Garowe. The 
aircrafts and flight operators were not specialised in transporting these goods 
and several pieces of equipment including a number of generators were 
damaged during transportation. This caused delays in implementation as NCA 
Puntland staff had to repair damaged equipment upon arrival before it could 
be dispatched to project sites. NCA examined the logistics and discovered the 
required equipment was available in Dubai for shipping direct to Puntland 
ports. The procurement route was subsequently changed and as a result 
equipment no longer arrives damaged or in need of repair and thus, the 
efficiency of NCA operations has improved. The Government of Puntland has 
also removed taxes on shipping imports of equipment for international NGOs, 
which further reduced the costs. Other materials were sourced locally 
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wherever possible to both reduce costs and the time required for 
procurement. 
 
Key Finding 4 
When procuring materials and equipment all options should be initially 
examined to ensure the most cost effective option is adopted from the onset. 
Additionally, should any problems arise with the primary procurement 
process organisations will already have details of alternative sources and 
methods of procurement. 
 
NCA has implemented 15 water and sanitation projects. Prior to NCAs 
interventions these villages and towns were paying what they could for water 
trucking and when their money ran out they relied completely on humanitarian 
organisations trucking water to them. The insecurity in the region combined 
with a lack of roads and other infrastructure caused many problems and made 
water trucks highly unreliable.  
 
NCAs projects have ensured all members of the community have immediate 
and reliable access to water, without which life would not be possible. These 
new water sources are protected and clean resulting in fewer incidences of 
water related illnesses and since NCAs interventions there have been no 
serious outbreaks of cholera, dysentery or diarrhea in any of their project 
sites. Hence, NCAs activities generated immediate health improvements 
within the communities, increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability, 
especially amongst the children.  
 
Key Finding 5 
A humanitarian emergency demanded a long-term strategy that addressed 
underlying vulnerabilities in order to ensure interventions were sustainable. 
 
After the Tsunami fresh water was extremely scarce and several communities 
informed the evaluation that many conflicts began to erupt over access to 
 191
water sources. NCAs water projects ensured all members of the community 
had access to sufficient quantities of water and as a result, conflicts over 
water in these towns and villages stopped immediately. The prevention of 
conflicts can also be attributed to the detailed discussions of ownership and 
access held between NCA and village/town leaders and representatives from 
the communities. This is discussed further in section 5.3.3 The Community 
below.  
 
Where NCA have implemented water and sanitation projects survival chances 
and human dignity have certainly been improved for men, women and 
children. In the nine locations with mechanised water point’s survival chances 
and adaptive capacity have been significantly improved as communities sell 
their water to purchase food and other items.  
 
Key Finding 6 
The provision of effective and sustainable water sources have much wider 
impacts, increasing resilience, reducing vulnerability and promoting the 
adaptive capacity of communities. 
 
NCA constructed 96 Ventilation Improved Pit (VIP) latrines in six project sites. 
NCA utilised local labour and local materials to construct these latrines and 
also encouraged members of the community to build their own. The latrines 
had a number of immediate impacts. The safe disposal of human waste 
creates the first barrier to excreta-related diseases reducing transmission 
through both direct and indirect routes. The provision of appropriate facilities 
for defecation is essential to the dignity, safety, long-term health and 
wellbeing of men, women and children. The risk of contracting genital 
infections, particularly for women, is significantly reduced and it provides a 
safe place that can be used in daylight, which means women do not have to 
wait for darkness and as such their risk of attack is greatly lowered. The 
change from defecating outside to using a latrine has additional indirect long-
term benefits, for example, the safe disposal of human excreta improves 
health enabling more people to work and more children to attend school. As 
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more people improve their hygiene and standards of cleanliness less families 
risk contracting preventable diseases and as a result the long-term health and 
survival chances of families is improved. Additionally, the reduction in outside 
defecation means contamination of the environment and water sources is 
reduced.  
 
5.3.3 The Community 
NCA involved each communities from the onset. Water and sanitation 
engineers conducted NCAs second needs assessment and during this 
process they had a series of discussions with the communities about the 
effects of the Tsunami and their priorities for the area. In all locations water 
was flagged as the ultimate priority. The local communities were able to 
outline their needs, priorities and ideas and then the engineers would discuss 
how these needs and priorities could be met; ideas put into practice; or 
alternative options for communities if their initial ideas were not technically 
feasible. Communities were involved as far as possible in the needs 
assessments and were kept informed of all ideas and plans. During the 
planning stage, NCA staff discussed the project designs with the community 
and the community decided with technical advice from NCA where the 
systems should be located and in particular where the communal water taps 
would be placed. The communities then decided how many people they would 
provide NCA to carry out the manual labour for the projects. They understood 
the more people who participated the faster the project would be completed 
and as this was their priority there were many people willing to actively 
participate. The communities provided most of the manual labour for all the 
projects, for example, at the mechanised water project sites an average of 50 
people from the community provided labour inputs. The high level of 
community participation throughout each project meant the work was carried 
out effectively and received the full support of the community.  
 
All communities excluding one, rated water and sanitation as their top priority. 
The community, which did not, stated their first priority was a new slaughter 
house and their second priority was water. NCA examined the old slaughter 
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house and found it in extremely poor condition, furthermore, the existing 
slaughter house was sited nearby the proposed water source, which could 
pose potential contamination problems. NCA in collaboration with the 
community, built a new slaughter house much further away from the water 
source. Following this they implemented a water and sanitation project with 
the community. The new slaughter house served a great purpose as it firstly 
reduced the likelihood of contamination to the water source and secondly 
demonstrated a bottom up approach with the community as the decision 
makers and owners of the project. This level of community ownership and 
decision making powers led to the community investing great energy, time, 
finances and materials into the water and sanitation project. In essence the 
community ownership established generated much greater positive impacts 
with a more sustainable project.   
 
The six communities selected for berkad projects are largely inhabited by 
pastoralists. However, due to livestock losses over recent years, men in these 
communities had begun travelling to coastal areas to fish during the peak 
seasons. The loss of income from fishing as a result of the Tsunami meant 
few of these pastoralists could afford to purchase water for themselves and 
their livestock. These communities had previously sourced water from 
berkads and when the berkads dry up during the long dry season they would 
purchase water from nearby communities. Pastoralist communities in this 
region find berkads the most appropriate source of water as they provide an 
efficient method of watering livestock and require little maintenance, which is 
ideal when men must often walk their herds for days to find grazing areas. 
 
NCAs decision to implement berkads in these areas was appropriate to both 
the needs of these communities during an emergency response and the 
livelihoods of these communities where large numbers of livestock require 
watering. The new berkads were also appropriate to the surrounding nomadic 
population who rely on these water sources for their livestock. Boreholes or 
mechanised water projects would not have been appropriate in these areas 
as during the peak fishing season many people migrate, which would leave 
expensive equipment vulnerable to vandalism or theft. This could also 
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encourage attacks on these communities, which are inhabited mostly by 
women and children during the peak fishing season who would not be able to 
defend their water system against thieves or militia groups.  
 
The nine mechanised water projects were developed within coastal 
communities directly affected by the Tsunami. Most of the communities 
previously relied on fresh water springs and these were contaminated by the 
Tsunami. For various reasons berkad projects would not have been 
acceptable or appropriate in these areas, for example, berkads were not 
previously used in these communities, few people have significant numbers of 
livestock in the area and the environment is hilly therefore, it would prove 
difficult to find a suitable location for a berkad. The nine mechanised water 
projects were appropriate to their locations and the communities livelihoods 
and needs. 
 
Key Finding 7 
Humanitarian projects must be aligned with community priorities. Projects 
should be compatible with and complement local livelihoods.  
 
Solar power was selected by NCA in conjunction with the communities for use 
in four projects. Solar power was opted for in these areas as the solar panels 
could generate enough power to meet the needs of these smaller towns and 
villages and using solar power would mean no fuel costs. Communities 
throughout this region have an understanding of solar power as UNICEF and 
several other organisations have implemented solar power projects in towns 
and villages in the past. Unfortunately, two of the solar projects were 
damaged soon after their implementation. The technology was appropriate to 
the environment and the need; however, the lack of security in these areas 
mean the technology is prone to theft and vandalism. Additionally, due to the 
insecurity in other regions, large numbers of IDPs have since settled in many 
of these areas causing populations to swell resulting in pressure on the solar 
powered water projects. Hence, the solar power projects have become less 
appropriate to these areas than originally envisaged. Despite the benefits of 
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no fuel costs, the expanding populations as a result of the civil conflict in the 
south and the general lack of security in these areas mean community solar 
powered projects are vulnerable and inadequate.    
 
Generators were selected for use in five of the mechanised water projects for 
two reasons. Firstly, these locations had larger populations and solar panels 
would be unable to supply sufficient quantities of power to pump water to the 
various community water points. Secondly, at these locations it is necessary 
to pump the water over farther distances or have the water pumped up steep 
hills and cliffs for which solar power would be ineffective. Although generators 
require regular fuel supplies, they are the most appropriate option for 
supplying water and adequately meeting the needs of large communities.  
 
Each mechanised water project required a water tank. NCA constructed water 
tanks that were appropriate to the size of the local communities and the 
emergency context of the programme. Despite population growth within the 
communities since the interventions, the water tanks have remained 
functional and appropriate. Over-sizing water tanks based on possible 
population movements would have been inefficient and not cost-effective. 
Furthermore, most communities have been able to extend their water tanks 
through the profits accrued from selling their water.  
 
NCA prioritised the nine mechanised water project sites as most in need. 
They decided to complete the nine locations and then begin the six berkad 
projects. This ensured NCAs staff were not overstretched. The engineers 
developed an implementation timetable that allowed them to concentrate on 
one-three locations at any time. This was the most efficient course of action 
as it enabled the engineers to be present on-site during the majority of 
implementation work, which allowed them to immediately identify and correct 
any problems or issues.  
 
When NCAs field staff were more established and a number of the 
mechanised projects had been completed they hired two local contractors – 
SWV and KDO – to complete the six berkad projects. SWV and KDO 
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underwent a thorough tendering process to obtain these contracts. This 
ensured only reputable and highly capable organisations were hired to 
undertake activities. Hiring two local contractors meant work was ongoing in 
more than one location at any one time. Local contractors are often able to 
source labour and local materials cheaper than an international organisation. 
NCA staff monitored these projects closely to ensure the contractors fulfilled 
their agreement and work occurred in a timely fashion. During construction at 
all berkad sites limestone rock was unexpectedly encountered. This hard rock 
delayed the projects and both contractors hired specialist equipment to 
remove the limestone. Despite the problems encountered as a result of the 
unpredictable limestone rock all the berkad projects were completed 
successfully, within budget and in good time. Hiring local contractors proved 
cost-effective and built local capacity.  
 
Key Finding 8 
Opportunities for contracting and collaborating with reputable local 
organisations should always be sought in order to strengthen local capacity 
and prevent resentment or hostility from local organisations.   
 
NCA Puntland hires vehicles locally as opposed to purchasing their own. 
During the emergency phases of the response this was highly efficient as 
there was no time required for the sourcing of appropriate vehicles. In these 
locations vehicles require high maintenance and breakdown frequently due to 
the terrain. Through hiring vehicles, NCA did not face these problems or 
delays, and should a hired vehicle breakdown or require maintenance the 
local hiring agency would replace the vehicle, and replacements usually occur 
within the same day. This helps build the capacity of the local vehicle hiring 
agencies, provides employment for local drivers and is highly cost effective. 
 
To commence their emergency response in Puntland, NCA utilised Somalia’s 
traditional Hawala finance system. This Somali banking system is extremely 
effective and quick. It is based on trust within clans and has been operational 
for generations. A payment is made for example, to the appropriate Somali 
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member or bank in Nairobi (or in most countries throughout the world) and 
they telephone or email the relevant person in Somalia and the money is 
released to the agreed contact usually within the same day. This financing 
method was extremely appropriate given the emergency nature of NCAs 
response. The Hawala system, however, is expensive with charges as high as 
five percent. Once NCA were established in Puntland they explored other 
possibilities and negotiated an improved agreement as a trustworthy NGO. 
They now receive a charge of only two percent, which is much more cost 
effective. 
 
Key Finding 9 
International organisations need to be flexible and capable, if necessary, of 
using traditional and local methods in order to implement emergency 
interventions. NCAs experience and extensive knowledge of the Hawala 
system enabled them to utilise the system and begin operations in a timely 
manner, which was critical given the state of emergency. 
 
NCA decided through collaboration with the communities to implement 
Ventilation Improved Pit (VIP) latrines. These latrines have been constructed 
and used throughout Somalia and hence the majority of Somalis have seen 
them before and some already had a good understanding of how they 
operate. A handful of households (6) had basic pit latrines prior to the 
Tsunami but these were destroyed. The VIP latrines are simple to construct 
and the materials are available locally, therefore they are easy to maintain 
and re-produce. These latrines were appropriate to the needs, livelihoods and 
resources available to these communities.  
 
After the projects were completed a number of communities contacted NCA in 
regards to theft or damage of equipment. In Falah Falah and Suuj the water 
pumps were stolen and they contacted NCA for replacements. NCA explained 
it was the communities’ responsibility and if NCA replaced it this would 
actually encourage more thefts in more locations in the future. NCA 
suggested the communities attempt to catch the thieves and retrieve the 
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pumps. In both Falah Falah and Suuj the communities successfully found the 
thieves and retrieved the pumps. NCA then re-visited the areas and provided 
technical support to reinstall the pumps. In Dhuur one of the solar panels was 
vandalised which has prevented the system operating at full capacity. The 
community requested a new solar panel from NCA who explained the same 
issues. Subsequently, this community began saving money and almost has 
sufficient funds to purchase a generator and NCA have agreed to provide 
technical assistance for its installation. 
 
Key Finding 10 
An organisation that replaces stolen goods without discouraging future thefts 
is actually encouraging an increase in crime that could create a vicious cycle 
of thefts and dependence on humanitarian organisations. 
 
 
Two months after each project was completed PSAWEN accompanied NCA 
staff to the village or town for a handing-over ceremony. NCA waited two 
months before handing over projects to ensure there were no immediate 
problems and this also demonstrated NCAs dedication to each community. 
During initial discussions with each community it was made clear this was the 
communities project and they would own it and be responsible for its 
management. The formal handing over ceremony ensured all members of the 
community understood they were responsible for the future of their project. 
This reinforces the issue of ownership and therefore, improves sustainability.   
 
Key Finding 11 
Ownership must lie with the community if a project is to prove sustainable 
and this ownership must be emphasised from the onset and throughout the 
various phases of the project. 
 
Upon completion of the project in Bender Beyla town the project suffered a 
number of minor breakdowns, which all required savings to be spent on new 
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parts. The Mayor of Bender Beyla hosted a community meeting to discuss the 
likelihood of future problems and the poor outlook for the project as he 
explained running costs were exceeding payments for water. Three local 
businessmen offered to establish a private organisation and they would use 
their own funds to purchase spare parts, fuel and salary payments for the 
water technicians. The community agreed this was the most sustainable 
option and now the private organisation – Anjeel – oversee the running costs 
and management of the project. The WES committee remains active and 
regularly audit and verify Anjeel’s accounts and their work. Anjeel also provide 
security for the system to prevent theft and vandalism. Anjeel has installed 
water meters and taps in 180 households and each month collect the 
payments. This has transformed the lives of these households and greatly 
raised the standard of living. The most vulnerable households, schools, 
hospitals and mosques still receive free water. The community is extremely 
pleased with the system, which has never broken down since Anjeel’s 
takeover. The community also emphasised that water-borne diseases are 
now uncommon in this area.  
 
The Mayor of Bender Beyla visited Aris town to inform and educate the 
community of the new system in place in Bender Beyla. The community of 
Aris later contacted Bender Beyla to enquire whether Anjeel could take over 
their project. Aris town had also realised their payment scheme was not 
sufficient to cover any spare parts and the protection of their water system 
was becoming difficult to police particularly with the increasing number of 
IDPs in the area. By this time Anjeel were well established and had the 
capacity to take over the Aris town water project. The Aris community is very 
pleased with Anjeel’s work and say the threat of theft or vandalism is no 
longer a problem. 
 
In El Dhirdir NCA had originally constructed a floating pontoon on the spring 
as this maintained low costs and was appropriate under the emergency 
nature of the programme. The pontoon suffered minor problems particularly 
during a flood in August 2006, but the communities were able to carry out the 
necessary repairs. Then a major flood in May 2007 completely blocked the 
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system and damaged the pontoon. The community had saved US$800 from 
the selling of water and intended to purchase a permanent structure to 
replace the pontoon, however, this money was stolen. In June 2007 the 
community of El Dhirdir contacted Anjeel and requested them to take over 
their project. Anjeel have replaced the pontoon with permanent concrete 
anchor blocks and the spring has been sealed to prevent future contamination 
from flooding. NCA provided Anjeel with technical assistance for this work. 
Subsequently, the community of El Dhirdir is extremely pleased with Anjeel’s 
management of their system. The communities’ initiative and the handover of 
the projects to a trustworthy and reliable private organisation combined with 
the WES committee’s oversight and verification of work has greatly improved 
the sustainability of these projects. 
 
Key Finding 12 
Community involvement and ownership is vital for the sustainability of any 
project. Communities must be able to adapt their projects and develop their 
own models of management. This should be encouraged and supported by 
implementing organisations in order for impacts to be long-term. 
  
The berkad projects were constructed with labour inputs from the community 
and used locally available materials. The berkad projects visited by the 
evaluation all had sufficient quantities of water for the local communities, 
which, demonstrates their sustainability despite the lack of rainfall in the 
region. At these locations the communities had also copied the new design of 
berkads and replicated them. At both Budan Buto and Badweyn village there 
was one berkad completed through NCA and a second identical berkad that 
had been completed later by members of the community who were able to 
purchase the necessary materials. Communities that continue to develop 
projects themselves and duplicate the work of an organisation provide a good 
indication the project has been effective and will be sustainable.  
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Key Finding 13 
Utilising local materials and labour wherever possible in a project improves 
efficiency and ownership thus, increasing the likelihood and opportunity for 
that project to be well maintained and duplicated by the community 
themselves thus, proving more sustainable. 
 
Communities explained in detail to the evaluation the work and various tasks 
they had undertaken to aid the completion of the project. There were also 
visible signs the communities had been deeply involved in the 
implementation. A number of the communities copied NCAs designs and 
constructed more latrines, additional water tanks and Berkads after NCA left 
the area. A community that is able to reproduce an organisations work 
demonstrates their understanding of the original project and their knowledge 
of the required materials, methods and labour.    
 
Key Finding 14 
Active community participation throughout a project is key to improving its 
effectiveness, ownership and sustainability. Furthermore, this builds local 
capacity and skills.  
 
It is important in Somali society to respect the traditional roles of both men 
and women. Upon entering a community NCA staff would always meet first 
with the village elders committee and village chiefs (all males). This is the 
correct protocol in Somalia and a sign of respect for the community. An 
organisation that does not respect this procedure is likely to receive little 
support from the community. NCA would then be introduced by the elders 
committee to any education committees, women’s committees and the wider 
community.  
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Key Finding 15 
Following correct local protocols for entering a community is key to the level 
of participation, ownership and ultimate success of any project in Somalia. 
 
Women are the main collectors and users of water in Somalia. Therefore, it is 
vital they are included in the decisions surrounding water, as the system will 
ultimately rely on them to make it work. The women have the best 
understanding and knowledge of the daily water needs and issues and their 
input in designing and planning a water system is vital. Thus, NCA involved a 
number of men and women from the communities throughout the 
implementation of the projects.  
 
Key Finding 16 
The design and key decisions surrounding a project must involve the main 
intended end users to ensure it is effective and sustainable.   
 
The communities divided the WES committee tasks between the men and 
women according to what is appropriate in Somali society. The women 
manage the communal water taps and collect payments as women are 
generally more trusted with money than men in Somalia; the male water 
technicians who received two days additional technical training carry out 
maintenance and minor repairs on the system; and both male and female 
members of the committee encourage latrine construction and undertake 
education and awareness raising within the community. The WES committees 
organise regular meetings with their community, elders and chiefs to raise 
awareness of issues. Then female members would identify any households 
not using the appropriate behaviours and visit them to encourage better 
hygiene and sanitation. In most communities, however, all members of the 
community adopted good hygiene and sanitation practices due to its 
importance for their religion. NCA respected and supported the division of 
labour. These small steps in men and women working together have given 
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women great respect and emphasised their important role and status within 
the community.  
 
“Before women never sat with us and were not included in our meetings now 
they are always in our meetings. Men and women work very good together” 
(Village Elder, El Dhirdir town).  
 
Key Finding 17 
Including women in projects whilst respecting traditional gender roles 
ensures their inclusion is accepted and not resented and is more likely to be 
sustainable. 
 
5.3.4 Hardware 
The five mechanised water projects powered by generators have proven 
highly effective. They deliver sufficient quantities of clean water to all 
members of the community. In each of these locations NCA constructed 
several water taps in various areas of the towns to guarantee accessibility and 
prevent long queues or conflicts over access to water. Hence, it is highly 
unlikely any member of these communities would collect water from an 
alternative unsafe water source.  
 
The solar powered water project in Dhuudo town is operating effectively. The 
solar panels for the project in Aris town were stolen, however, the community 
were able to purchase a generator through money saved from selling their 
water. NCA assisted Aris community to install the generator. The community 
has also replaced the original two-inch piping with three-inch piping to cope 
with the new demands as the population grew rapidly in this area during the 
emergency response. Subsequently, SC UK has established a housing 
project in Aris that was previously not possible due to a lack of water available 
to produce the bricks. Hence, this project has proven extremely valuable and 
effective in this area in meeting the needs for water and improving the lives of 
the community. The solar powered water project in Dhuur town was partially 
damaged. One of the solar panels was vandalised. The system is still 
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operational but not to full capacity and as a result many people have reverted 
to using unsafe water sources including the nearby river and open shallow 
wells. Hence, this project has proven less effective in delivering clean water to 
the community. The community, however, are currently saving for a generator 
and NCA have agreed to assist with the installation.  
 
The solar powered water project in Baq Baq town is currently not functioning. 
The nomadic community in this area protested against covering the water 
source and therefore it was left uncovered. The water source has been 
contaminated and blocked with rubbish twice and both times NCA assisted in 
unblocking the water point. The resident community requested the water 
source to be covered however, the nomadic population continued to protest. 
Recently the source was blocked again and continuous assistance from NCA 
would only drain resources and prove unsustainable. NCA have decided not 
to intervene until the community have reached a decision with the nomadic 
population as to whether the source will be covered and if not how they can 
prevent continuous blockages. Hence, the disagreement between the resident 
community and nomadic community has made this project less effective in 
delivering safe water to this area. 
 
Key Finding 18 
Organisations must recognise when it is no longer effective to implement 
operations. 
 
In this case, it would have proven more effective for NCA to divert resources 
from unblocking the water source to opening dialogue and positive 
engagement between the resident community and nomadic population. Thus, 
enabling a long-term solution to be sought.    
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Key Finding 19 
To deliver effective projects, organisations need flexibility when delivering 
humanitarian relief in order to respond to local situations and changing 
circumstances.  
 
UNICEF and CARE International had both previously assessed the water 
situation in El Dhirdir and Suuj. They informed the communities it would be 
impossible to implement an effective and sustainable water system that would 
be cost-effective and maintainable. In El Dhirdir and Suuj the fresh water 
springs are at the base of steep cliffs and most organisations believed large 
and expensive power cables would be necessary. NCAs engineers, however, 
designed a simple overhead cable system whereby small, inexpensive cables 
could be utilised.  
 
Key Finding 20 
Innovative, quality and skilled staff are key to the effectiveness and wider 
impact of a project. 
 
These two projects in particular have proven highly effective and have 
transformed these communities. The daily collection of water was previously 
lengthy and treacherous costing the lives of many women and children. Since 
NCAs projects the collection of water is now safe and efficient and children 
are able to attend school on time. Other international humanitarian 
organisations including SC UK have since entered these communities and 
begun building local hospitals and schools, something they could not do 
previously due to the lack of water available for the construction work. A 
number of international organisations including UNICEF, have visited these 
sites to record the details of the engineering work and have begun replicating 
these systems at similar locations elsewhere in Puntland, which means these 
projects have had a much wider impact than initially intended.    
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Traditional berkads are used throughout Somalia, however, their basic open 
design means risk of contamination and loss of water through evaporation is 
high. NCA improved the traditional design in consultation with the 
communities. The improved berkads were covered to reduce contamination 
and the covering was sloped allowing rainwater to run off into the berkad. The 
covering also reduces water loss through evaporation. There were a series of 
channels dug to direct the rainwater into the berkad. These channels all led to 
a siltation pit, which prevents rubbish, debris, sand and silt from entering the 
berkad. The berkad projects were all in use and operating effectively. At 
several locations visited a number of old style berkads were present, 
however, all these berkads were completely dry. The communities highlighted 
that without the new berkads the women and children would have to walk long 
distances each day to collect water that would be mostly contaminated. Thus, 
NCAs interventions within these locations have proven highly effective as the 
communities have access to adequate quantities of safe water. 
 
Key Finding 21 
Well designed hardware that is appropriate to the local environment and 
community is critical to any humanitarian project in a chronic complex 
emergency.  
 
As mentioned in section 5.3.1.2 Sanitation, - three locations – Falah Falah, 
Qundheed and Bender Beyla – did not receive latrines as planned due to the 
over installation of latrines in other locations. The proposed sanitation 
activities in Falah Falah and Qundheed13 have subsequently not been as 
effective as originally planned in for example, reducing outside defecation or 
improved hygiene practices. NCA has maintained a dialogue with these 
communities and is hoping to deliver VIP latrines in the future, which would 
greatly enhance the effectiveness of the WES committees and the hygiene 
and sanitation practices in these areas. 
 
                                            
13 The hygiene and sanitation situation in Bender Beyla has improved and this is 
discussed further in section 5.3.1.2 Sanitation 
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Key Finding 22 
It is important to manage expectations from the onset and ensure boundaries 
and limitations of any project are clearly discussed with both communities 
and staff. This avoids disappointment and improves the transparency and 
communication between organisations and communities.    
 
5.3.5 Software, Culture and Religion 
In each community a Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committee 
was established. The WES committees were selected through lengthy 
discussions with the communities and the WES committees were trained 
significantly for their roles. This detailed training has improved the 
sustainability of each committee. The researcher is aware that short training 
sessions of one-two days and limited discussions with communities generally 
produces short-lived committees, which lack the dedication or confidence to 
continue their work effectively. At the nine mechanised water projects 11 
community members were trained for the WES committee and at the six 
berkad water projects five community members were trained for the WES 
committee. Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committees were 
trained according to the type of project – berkad or mechanised – to ensure 
they received training that was appropriate and relevant to their needs and 
situation. At the mechanised water project sites, for example, two members of 
the WES committee were selected by the community to receive an additional 
two days training to become technicians and oversee the daily running and 
maintenance of the equipment. At the berkad sites this training was not 
necessary and therefore the training focused upon other relevant issues 
including contamination prevention.  
 
NCA discussed the roles and responsibilities of a Water and Environmental 
Sanitation (WES) committee with each community and provided criteria to 
help guide their selection of members. These criteria emphasise that several 
members should be literate and others should at least be respected, trusted 
and able to carry out the necessary tasks. NCA also highlighted that as 
women were the primary collectors and users of water the WES committee 
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should contain female members. NCA did not however, force this issue or 
request that WES committees contain equal numbers of men and women 
instead they allowed the communities to decide. Each community established 
a WES committee and there are female members present on 13 of the 15 
committees.  
 
At the nine mechanised water project sites each community decided that 
female members of the committee should take charge of operating the 
communal water points and as women in Somali society are most trusted with 
money they were additionally made responsible for collecting payments. Two 
men were selected by each community to be the technicians on their WES 
committees. These men conduct the daily maintenance of the generators, 
pipes and other equipment. Most WES committees meet on a regular basis 
with the elders committees and village/town Chiefs to discuss current issues 
and any problems. This highlights the value of the WES committee to the 
community and has also proven effective in ensuring that women are 
represented and active in community debates and discussions.  
 
Key Finding 23 
Gender equality is not about having equal numbers of men and women 
participate. In this context it is about liberation and the ability of both men 
and women to participate and have their views, opinions and participation to 
be held of equal value and importance. Adapting traditions and cultures must 
be for worthwhile reasons; community driven; and facilitated and encouraged 
respectfully if it is to be effective and sustainable. 
 
Key Finding 24 
To create an effective and sustainable committee that is accepted and 
respected by the community, members must be selected by the community. 
An organisation can offer guidance and facilitation but the final decision must 
ultimately lie with the community.  
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In Somali society women are respected and trusted however, it has not been 
common practice for women to be on the same committees as men. Thus, 
NCAs training, which has established WES committees with both men and 
women present, as part of emergency interventions has proven highly 
effective. Most importantly the female members of the committee are not 
tokenistic, they are valued members of the committee who play an active role 
in discussions and decisions. This was evident throughout the evaluation 
focus group sessions and observations.   
 
Initially NCA contracted the local NGO FOPAG to train the WES committees. 
FOPAG trained six communities – Baq Baq, Dhuudo, Dhuur, Aris, Bender 
Beyla and El Dhirdir. NCAs Community Development Officer identified any 
particular weak areas in each community such as drinking river water or 
littering, and then ensured these topics were emphasised or covered in 
greater detail during the training.  
 
Key Finding 25 
Standard training manuals, materials and courses should have a level of 
flexibility and where necessary be adapted to meet the particular training 
needs of a group.   
 
NCAs Community Development Officer hired co-facilitators and used the 
same training manuals and techniques to train the other WES committees. 
Due to the close collaboration with FOPAG, NCAs Community Development 
Officer was able to provide the remaining communities with the same level 
and standard of training as FOPAG had provided. The WES committee 
technicians were all trained by NCAs technician and engineer to assure they 
had a thorough understanding of their individual water system and would be 
capable of conducting relevant repairs and maintenance work. 
 
The WES training was five days with an additional two days training for the 
technicians at the nine mechanised project sites. The training covered many 
topics such as, water management including payments; disease transmission 
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and prevention; sanitation management; good hygiene practices; and 
community health. Each WES committee was trained according to a 
programme based heavily upon the Qur’an. Upon understanding the 
importance of hygiene, water and sanitation to the Qur’an, these issues 
became of the utmost importance to WES committees. Utilising the Qur’an 
provided WES committees with the most powerful tool for dictating behaviours 
and behavioural change in Somali society. Somali’s view the Qur’an as not 
only their religion but their way of life. Relating water, sanitation and hygiene 
directly to the Qur’an assured instant behavioural change. These new learned 
behaviours included: 
  Washing hands and feet several times a day, especially before meals;  Only drinking water from safe, clean sources;  Urinating and defecating far from water sources;  Managing water resources responsibly and sustainably;  Those with latrines, wash them daily; and  Berkads and water points are kept free from rubbish. 
 
The training methods and techniques were appropriate for these projects. 
This ensured these new topics were placed in a relevant, local context and 
therefore, the actions and procedures introduced to achieve good hygiene 
and sanitation was adopted effectively throughout the community. Once WES 
committees realised the importance of good hygiene and sanitation to their 
religion as well as to reduce illness and improve health they firstly adopted 
good hygiene practices themselves to set an example for others and then 
became highly active in spreading the messages to the rest of their 
communities. Behavioural changes amongst WES committee members and 
the wider communities became instantaneously embedded into daily lives and 
routines as a result of understanding the importance of these changes for 
their religion. The cultural relevance of the training methods and materials 
was one of the most significant aspects of NCAs emergency programme.  
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Key Finding 26 
Using traditional, cultural or religious beliefs as a basis for educating and 
training or techniques to raise awareness of issues is the most appropriate 
method of educating people. Behavioural change generally takes many 
years however, educating people through culturally and religiously relevant 
material generated instantaneous and sustainable behavioural change. 
 
Key Finding 27 
Meaningful consultation is about working with communities to support their 
needs, priorities and ideas and ensuring they influence the design and 
implementation of a project. 
 
Each community could relay good hygiene behaviours covered in the training 
to the researcher, for example, the various actions to prevent contamination of 
water and food and the importance of cleanliness and good sanitation to 
prevent diseases. More importantly, there were signs evident in all 
communities visited they had adopted good hygiene and sanitation practices. 
Dhuudo for example, previously had serious problems with litter, outside 
defecation and contaminated water sources. Since the establishment of the 
WES committee a series of garbage pits were created and the area 
surrounding the water points and nearby river were cleaned. The community 
informed the evaluation this area had previously suffered greatly from regular 
outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea and dysentery, however, there have been no 
serious outbreaks since NCAs interventions.  
 
In El Dhidir, diarrhea, dysentery and genital infections, particularly amongst 
the women, were extremely common but the women were pleased to highlight 
that since the hygiene training and establishment of latrines these were no 
longer major problems. The reduction in number of infections and diseases 
was a point emphasised by all the communities, which is a good indicator of 
the effectiveness of these projects. Furthermore, in all the communities visited 
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with latrines, it was evident they were used, well maintained and regularly 
cleaned. 
   
The training provided for the technicians ensured they had a good 
understanding of how their systems operated; were able to carry out daily 
inspections; and understood how to maintain the equipment. Importantly, NCA 
provided the technicians with a set of tools, which enabled them to put their 
new training into practice. Providing people with tools as opposed to training 
alone is an empowering process. The new technicians have proven effective 
in most communities; they carry out daily maintenance on the systems and 
are able to correct minor malfunctions or problems themselves without 
requesting assistance from outsiders.  
 
Key Finding 28 
To effectively empower communities organisations must ensure any training, 
awareness raising or education can be acted upon and where necessary the 
appropriate tools are provided to enable the use of this new knowledge. 
 
Overall the WES committees and training they have received has proven 
effective and with the exception of the Baq Baq WES committee (refer to 
section 5.3.4 Hardware for further details) they are all active and functioning 
well.  
 
NCA provide all their staff with regular training. Within the NCA Puntland 
team, the Team Leader, Technical Project Supervisor, Community 
Development Officer and Field Accountant have all attended training sessions 
in Nairobi (Kenya), Bosaaso, Hargaisa or Garowe. Regular training 
encourages staff development, motivation, staff retention and ultimately 
improves project quality. NCA Puntland staff echoed these statements and 
believes their regular training heightens the quality and effectiveness of their 
work.  
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Key Finding 29 
Continuous staff development and training are key to the effectiveness and 
quality of any project. 
 
5.3.6 Local Management 
NCA worked with each community to establish a local management structure 
for each project. NCA recognised this as key to ensuring the continued 
ownership and sustainability of any project. 
 
All communities where NCA implemented latrines had decided to privatise 
them and had determined which members of the community should have 
access and ownership to them. This mainly resulted from the large numbers 
of IDPs entering the towns and villages. The original residents decided the 
latrines would only be cleaned, well maintained and sustainable if the number 
of people using them were limited. In most areas there were five households 
per latrine. This has proven extremely effective. Firstly, the latrines 
constructed with assistance from NCA are in use and cleaned daily on a 
rotational basis by the families with access. Secondly, as the materials are 
inexpensive and available locally this has encouraged other members of the 
community and IDPs to construct their own latrines. At all locations visited by 
the evaluation where NCA had implemented latrines the communities had 
built additional latrines themselves. 
 
Key Finding 30 
Beginning with fewer quality projects with comprehensive training and a 
sound local management system can be more effective, far reaching and 
sustainable than trying to ensure everyone is included from the onset. 
 
The 15 villages and towns agreed with NCA that schools, hospitals and 
mosques in their areas should receive free water and this had a number of 
immediate impacts. This strategy acknowledged the importance of mosques, 
which secured long-term support for each project from religious leaders. In 
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addition, clean, free water in schools gives a small incentive for children to 
attend and they are able to do so more regularly as their health has generally 
improved and fewer children are sick from water-related illnesses.  
 
Key Finding 31 
Taking a community-wide approach and considering cultural priorities 
ensures a wider impact and that opportunities for indirect benefits are 
maximised.   
 
After NCAs interventions, communities no longer needed to pay for expensive 
water trucking and were able to purchase other necessities including food and 
fishing equipment that had been lost in the Tsunami. At the nine mechanised 
project sites a payment scheme has been established and people pay on 
average 1,000 Somali Shillings (US$ 0.40) per 20 litres of water. This money 
is utilised to pay for fuel for the generators, spare pieces of equipment to 
repair breakdowns, and to provide the technicians with an income. The 
technicians are required to spend large quantities of their time maintaining the 
systems and must be dedicated to the water system therefore, the 
communities decided they should receive an income for their work to ensure 
their positions are sustainable.  
 
Several communities with the new mechanised water sources have been able 
to sell their water to trucking companies. The profits have been used to 
purchase fuel and spare parts enhancing the sustainability and long-term 
impacts of the project. A number of international organisations that were 
previously unable to introduce any projects within these villages/towns due to 
a lack of water for construction have now been able to implement activities, 
for example, Save the Children UK (SC UK) have began constructing a school 
in two of the locations and a housing project in another. 
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Key Finding 32 
The implementation of a proper management system in each project location 
has been central in maintaining the positive impacts of each community and in 
particular in the mechanized project sites where a payment mechanism is in 
place this has promoted the adaptive capacity of local communities.  
 
5.3.7 The Most Vulnerable  
NCA understood that each community would have a number of more 
vulnerable members for example, internally displaced persons, female 
headed households and those who had lost all assets and resources in the 
Tsunami. Similarly however, this does not mean that each internally displaced 
person or female headed household is always the most vulnerable. The issue 
of how to protect the most vulnerable members of each community was raised 
in dialogue with the Elders Committees and WES committees. Subsequently, 
each community identified a number of households that would be unable to 
afford paying for water and therefore, the communities decided that these 
families will receive free water. In Bender Beyla, for example, the community 
identified 20 vulnerable households and these households are not charged for 
water. These community decisions have greatly enhanced the sustainability of 
the projects and the livelihoods of the most vulnerable. 
 
Key Finding 33 
Mechanised water sources require a payment mechanism to secure their 
sustainability through regular maintenance and repairs. Payment 
mechanisms, however, must also consider and protect the most vulnerable 
people.  
 
Water collection is primarily the responsibility of women and children. NCAs 
mechanised projects included the construction of several communal water 
points in each village/town. As a result the time taken to collect water has 
been reduced from almost a whole day to less than a couple of hours during 
peak demand allowing women and children to focus their efforts on other 
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activities including income generating activities and more time in school. The 
water points are in central locations meaning water collection is much safer 
for women and the risk of attack is reduced. In a number of the towns, in 
particularly El Dhirdir and Suuj, women had to walk up steep cliffs carrying 
water from the freshwater springs below. As a consequence, miscarriages 
were common in these areas and many women and children died carrying 
water up the steep cliffs. Due to NCAs interventions, the risks to women and 
children associated with collecting water in these areas have declined and 
their survival chances have increased. 
 
Key Finding 34 
The sighting of water points in any water project is key. Correctly located 
water points improve safety and water collection efficiency thus, reducing 
vulnerability and promoting adaptive capacity. 
 
5.3.8 Summary 
Chapter 5 provides 34 key findings framed through the key themes laid out in 
section 5.3 Evaluation of ACTs Response. Upon detailed analysis of the 
findings and discussion presented, the researcher identifies five main findings 
that form principles for implementing humanitarian projects and an 
overarching programme strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in chronic 
complex emergencies: 
  Project Principle 1: Community Owned  Project Principle 2: Culturally and religiously embedded  Project Principle 3: strong software component  Project Principle 4: Community level management   Project Principle 5: Protection of most vulnerable  Programme: A coherent dual strategy  
 
Project Principle 1: Community Owned 
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Projects must be completely owned by local communities. In order to 
generate this ownership, communities must own the project from its onset, for 
example they should lead the identification of the type of project to ensure it is 
in accordance with local needs. Communities should then be involved in 
designing and locating their project and be involved in all decisions 
surrounding the project. Communities should be encouraged to provide any 
inputs possible to the project including financial, materials, labour and 
hospitality for project staff. This level of involvement and investment instills a 
sense of community ownership and stewardship over a project thus, 
increasing the potential for sustainable impacts.  
 
Project Principle 2: Culturally and religiously embedded 
Humanitarian projects in chronic complex emergencies should be culturally 
and religiously embedded. This drastically improves the speed of influence 
and impact of any project, which is critical to the emergency nature of these 
projects. Secondly, embedding projects in local cultures and religions upholds 
the humanitarian ideals and secures the longevity and continued impacts of 
any project.   
 
Project Principle 3: strong software component 
A software component is needed for every humanitarian project and these 
should be run in parallel to the implementation of any hardware. Software 
components should be tailored to each community and project and ensure 
thorough training is provided for those involved.  
 
Project Principle 4: Community level management  
Humanitarian projects should implement a community management structure. 
This clearly defines community members’ roles and responsibilities thus, 
supporting Project Principle 1 but also promotes the sustainability of any 
project and its impacts. Management systems for example, could include 
cleaning rotations for latrines and payment mechanisms for water systems, 
without which such systems would quickly become dysfunctional. Finally, a 
management structure enhances a communities’ ability to organize and 
problem solve.   
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Project Principle 5: Protection of most vulnerable 
Humanitarian projects must protect and promote the resilience and reduce the 
vulnerability of the most vulnerable members of the community. The 
identification of the most vulnerable members of the community must be 
conducted sensitively and always uphold the principle of Do No Harm. 
Projects with payment mechanisms for example, must incorporate a method 
for securing access of the most vulnerable to the project resources in order to 
enhance their resilience and prevent their marginalisation.  
 
Programme: A coherent dual strategy  
Humanitarian efforts in chronic complex emergencies must incorporate a 
strategy for addressing both the acute and chronic needs of local populations. 
These strategies must be coherent, flexible, integrated, complimentary and 
aim to reduce the vulnerability, enhance the resilience and promote the 
adaptive capacity of communities.  
 
These principles and strategy are discussed further in Chapter 7, the 
Conclusions and Discussion section. 
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Chapter 6 
Norwegian Church Aid, Gedo, Somalia 
 
6.1 Norwegian Church Aid 
Norwegian Church Aid is an international non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) that began in 1947 as a small fundraising drive by Norwegian 
churches. Today they are one of the Nordic countries’ largest aid 
organisations. Originally, they were engaged solely in short-term emergency 
response activities. During the 1960s however, it became evident to 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) that large numbers of the world’s population live 
in a state of permanent need and as such they began embarking on long-term 
development projects. NCA is operational in over 30 countries across Africa, 
Asia and Central and Latin America (NCA, 2008). They provide emergency 
assistance in disasters and work for long-term development in local 
communities. NCA are a member of the Action by Churches Together (ACT) 
Alliance, one of the world’s largest humanitarian alliances. The alliance 
consists of church-based organisations throughout the world and cooperates 
with organisations across religious faiths.   
 
Norwegian Church Aid works in three ways:  Emergency preparedness and response: saving lives to protect people 
in emergency situations.  Long-term development aid: supporting local communities to achieve 
development over time.  Advocacy: promoting democracy and human rights by influencing 
decision-making processes. 
(NCA, 2008a). 
 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) has been operating continuously in Gedo in 
southern Somalia since 1993, with support from a variety of donors, including 
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the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The physical, social, economic, 
political and security environment of Gedo make it one of the world’s most 
demanding environments for humanitarian intervention. Gedo’s environment 
is difficult both for the local population and humanitarian organisations. The 
scarcity of agencies willing to work in Gedo indicates the difficulty of working 
there. 
 
6.2 Gedo 
Gedo is an administrative region (formerly part of the historic Upper Juba 
Region) in southern Somalia. The Gedo region was created in 1980 and its 
capital is Garahaarreey. Gedo is bordered by the Ogaden region of Ethiopia 
to the north, the north eastern province of Kenya to the west and the Somali 
regions of Bakool to the north east, Bay to the east and Jubbada Dhexe 
(Middle Juba) to the south (see Map 9 below).  
 
Map 9 Gedo, Somalia 
 
(Source: MapZones, 2010)  
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The Gedo region has one of the most varied landscapes and scenery in 
Somalia. Two major rivers run through Gedo – the Dawa and the Juba. Red 
sand is found in all areas although there are white sand dunes across the 
Jubba Valley. The Daawo and middle regions of Gedo have rocky mountains 
and gorges that are filled with flowing streams and rivers during the rainy 
season. The north and western areas have largely red, sandy, flat land.  
 
Gedo consists of seven districts – Baardheere, Balet Hawo, Ceelwaaq, 
Doolow, Garbahaarreey, Luuq and Buurdhuubo (see Map 10 below). The 
Marrehan clan are dominant, particularly in southern Gedo however, other 
clans inhabiting the region include the Rahanweyn, Ogaden, Harti and some 
Bantu (UNOSOM, 1994). 
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Map 10 Gedo Districts 
 
(Source: Baardheere, 2008) 
 
6.2.1 Livelihoods 
There are an estimated 380,000 people in Gedo. The majority (75 percent) of 
the population are nomadic pastoralists with camel, cattle, sheep and goats 
(UNOSOM, 1994). Agriculture is practiced largely along the Juba and Dawa 
river valleys. In addition to subsistence agriculture, the main products farmed 
include tobacco, onions and citrus fruits (FSNAU, 2012). Gedo also has 
strong interregional and international cross-border trade with Kenya and to 
some extent in Ethiopia (Care, 2008). Map 11 illustrates the main livelihood 
zones across Gedo.  
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Map 11 Gedo Livelihoods 
 
(Source: FSNAU, 2012). 
 
6.2.2 Socio-Political Situation in Gedo 
The Gedo region has historically been one of the most underdeveloped areas 
of Somalia, with minimal infrastructure, a weak economic base and only very 
basic health and education services available to the communities. The region 
is largely food insecure due to its dependence on erratic rainfall for the 
production of crops and pasture.  
 
The central Government of Somalia collapsed in 1991 and since then Gedo 
has been in a state of chronic emergency, with frequent periods of acute 
emergencies including droughts, floods and conflict. De facto governance 
remains in the hands of local community leaders, who are mostly members of 
the Marehan Clan. There is ongoing inter and intra-clan conflicts however, 
largely related to the control of resources.  
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Gedo’s physical environment creates further problems. The insufficiency and 
unreliability of rain is the most significant of these. Droughts are frequent and, 
paradoxically, they often end in floods. Major floods occurred on the Juba 
River in 1993, 1997 and again in 2006; these floods devastated the 
agricultural system, destroyed irrigation canals and washed away irrigation 
pumps. In 2005 the early Gu rains were below normal, the late Dehr rains 
were poor and it was clear that malnutrition was widespread. In October 2005 
a nutritional survey by the Red Crescent, Gedo Health Consortium (GHC) and 
NCA found that in Mother and Child Health centres about one third of children 
were malnourished with acute malnutrition rates over 20 percent, an indicator 
of severe nutritional emergency. Therapeutic feeding was necessary and the 
emergency situation continued into 2006. Drought and food emergency 
continued into 2006. The scarcity of water sources caused by the droughts 
and then contamination or destruction of any remaining water sources by the 
flood led to violent conflict and competition over water, further exacerbating 
insecurity in the region. 
 
Gedo was one of the worst affected areas and at moderate risk of famine 
throughout 2006. The communities of Gedo are beset by years of high 
malnutrition and morbidity rates; chronic food insecurity; localised clan 
fighting; consecutive bad harvests; national instability; and a continuous 
stream of IDPs, mostly from Mogadishu.  
 
6.2.3 Current Situation in Gedo 
In February 2002, May-June 2004, December-July 2004-05, October 2011 
(Mohamed, 2012) sub-clan conflicts in different areas of Gedo led to deaths, 
injuries, displacement and severe humanitarian need. 
 
Erratic rainfall patterns resulting in regular droughts and floods, coupled with 
fragile livelihoods that rely heavily on pastoralism and agriculture have 
created chronic food insecurity in Gedo. Recent studies estimate there are 
24,600 malnourished children under the age of 5 years old in Gedo. Conflict 
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continues between Al-Shabaab and the TFG for control over parts of the 
region and it is estimated there are currently 99,000 IDPs who require 
humanitarian support in the region (UNOCHA, 2011). 
 
Access to safe water is a significant problem in Gedo that has been 
aggravated by the destruction and looting of water supply installations during 
the civil war; continuing conflict; and a lack of maintenance. Less than 20 
percent of the population of Gedo has access to a protected water source or 
access to an acceptable sanitation facility. Domestic water supplies are met 
primarily from rivers and unsafe wells. During the dry season, many women 
estimate they have to walk a round trip of 18km to the nearest water source 
(Oxfam, 2012). The spread of waterborne disease continues to be a threat for 
most people particularly those malnourished and without access to health 
facilities (UNOCHA, 2011).  
 
NCA is one of very few agencies with a long-term presence in Gedo. At times 
the level of severe violence and conflict in the continuing complex political 
emergency in Gedo is extreme. Since 1991, there has been no effective 
territorial or administrative control by any Government or structure of 
ministries in Gedo. Hence, there has been no overarching body through which 
NCA could coordinate activities. The lack of government agencies in Gedo 
also severely threatens the sustainability of interventions since there is no 
long-term agency to which responsibility can be transferred. 
 
Currently the security risks in the region are linked to external threats and 
influences associated with the political situation at the national level 
intertwined with the internal conflict. Three of the five operational districts are 
controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and two are 
under the Al-Shabaab control (UNOCHA, 2012). Guerilla tactics are used by 
Al-Shabaab with many surprise attacks on towns and mining of roads. This 
limits humanitarian access and compromises supply chains.  
 
The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is now attempting to extend its 
control over Gedo and has appointed a new District Commissioner (DC) in 
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Garbaharey; NCA has established a link with the DC who, during the time of 
the mission, allocated a plot of land to NCA for the construction of a field 
office, storage site and accommodation. 
 
6.3 Norwegian Church Aid’s Interventions 
The principle of do-no-harm and the development of rights-based 
programmes are priorities underlying all of NCAs interventions in Gedo. NCAs 
operations in Gedo have three elements. Firstly, longer-term capacity building 
interventions responding to the continuing chronic state of emergency in 
Gedo:  Food security programme: this component targeted six locations 
including three rain-fed and three riverine farming areas. NCA 
implemented these projects through two local NGOs – Social Life and 
Agricultural Development Organisation (SADO) and Advancement of 
Small Enterprises Program (ASEP).  Education programme: NCA directly supports 23 schools. NCA hires, 
trains and pays teachers. They provide learning materials and organise 
school examinations and certificates. NCA also helped the 
establishment of community education committees and conducted 
capacity building to ensure they have the knowledge and skills to 
undertake their duties.  Water and sanitation programme: NCA has rehabilitated water systems 
in two towns – El Gudud and El Adde – with plans to begin work on a 
third – Burdhubo. This work has included the extension of water 
distribution pipes and construction of eight water points. NCA have 
rehabilitated eight shallow wells and have constructed eight VIP 
latrines in El Gudud and El Adde. NCA have constructed VIP latrines 
for their 23 primary schools. Water and sanitation committees are 
established for each water point however, these committees have not 
yet received training. Training was delayed due to insufficient staff to 
carry out the training. This has been addressed with the recruitment of 
two new staff members – a Water Technician and Hygiene and 
Sanitation Officer.  
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Secondly, NCA responds to acute emergencies. During 2006, NCA 
responded to a number of natural and anthropogenic triggered tragedies in 
Gedo. Severe drought during 2005 continued into 2006, with water resources 
becoming scarcer leading to conflict between users. In April 2006, the drought 
ended in a major flood that devastated the livelihoods of farmers along both 
Juba and Dawa Rivers. Conflict between the Islamic Courts and TNG in 
Mogadishu led to the displacement of approximately 400,000 people, many of 
whom fled to Gedo (IDMC, 2007). NCA responded to the drought and then 
the flood by establishing nine emergency schools with support from UNICEF 
for the temporary buildings (tents) and teaching materials; distributing food to 
communities and schools with support from WFP; and trucking 143,000 litres 
of water to 1,700 households whose supplies had been contaminated or 
damaged. These emergency activities supplemented NCAs longer-term 
activities in education, water and sanitation, and food security. 
 
Thirdly, NCA implements cross-cutting activities in HIV/AIDS, gender-based 
violence, women’s empowerment, female genital mutilation (FGM), peace 
building and capacity building of staff and stakeholder institutions. In its long-
term chronic emergency programme NCA focuses on a limited number of 
activities, avoiding over-extension, seeking synergies between the different 
areas of activity. This is sought by geographically concentrating the 
implementation of activities and embedding the cross-cutting issues into all 
projects for example, a community involved in a water and sanitation project 
would also be educated on issues of HIV/AIDS and gender based violence.  
 
A key aspect of NCAs strategy is their 14-year history of interventions in the 
region and the continuity of relations with communities and longer-term 
planning this has allowed. Thus, in effect the planning of the chronic 
emergency interventions has been a cumulative and continuous process 
since 1993. This continued presence has enabled NCA to respond when 
necessary to acute emergencies such as the droughts, floods and conflicts. 
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6.4 Evaluation of NCAs Activities in Gedo 
NCA contracted the researcher to participate in an evaluation of the 
operations in Gedo. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the 
impact of the programme on the beneficiary communities given the 
constraints and the many problems encountered; identify the lessons learnt; 
and recommend on the best way forward for NCAs interventions in Gedo. The 
specific objectives of the evaluation were:  Review the way in which the project was designed and implemented with 
a view to learning lessons for replication in the future.  Review the appropriateness of the project’s purpose and the results in 
respect to the core problems faced by the project; taking into account the 
physical and socio-economic environment in which the project operates.  Assess the appropriateness and relevance of the methods used by NCA.  Assess the efficiency of project implementation considering timing, 
targeting, technical solutions and community involvement.  Assess the appropriateness of the do-no-harm and rights based 
strategies used in the programme.  Assess the perception of the stakeholders in terms of NCAs added value 
and the level of participation and ownership of projects by the target 
communities.  Review the quality of the day-to-day programme management and 
coordination with local authorities and beneficiaries.  
 
The following evaluative criteria were used for the purpose of this research:  Relevance and appropriateness;  Effectiveness;  Efficiency; and  Impact and Sustainability 
 
Other criteria used for this evaluation in order to address NCAs purpose of the 
evaluation included:  Coordination  Communication 
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 Adherence to the Do-No-Harm and Rights based principles  Cross-cutting issues: 
o HIV/AIDS,  
o Gender and women empowerment and  
o Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) 
 
In the following sections each of the evaluation criteria is taken in turn and the 
various projects and relief efforts are examined through these criteria. 
Through the findings and layers of analysis conducted for both case studies 
the researcher identified an alternative approach to delivering humanitarian 
aid in chronic complex emergencies: a cohesive dual approach that has a 
strategy for meeting the acute needs and a strategy for addressing the 
chronic needs of the community. These strategies must be integrated, flexible, 
coherent and have synergies so that whatever is implemented in one 
complements the other.  
 
In addition to an alternative approach the researcher established five themes 
that provide a structure for grouping findings together that enabled a more 
comprehensive analysis and discussion: 
6. The Community; 
7. Hardware; 
8. Software, Culture and Religion; 
9. Local Management; and 
10. The most vulnerable.  
 
The following findings are grouped accordingly into either one of the five key 
themes outlined above or the broader strategy for delivering humanitarian aid 
in chronic complex emergencies.  
 
6.4.1 Strategy 
The people of Gedo are living in poverty in a state of chronic humanitarian 
crisis compounded by episodes of acute emergencies. Structuring the 
projects as short-term responses to severe emergencies and longer-term 
 230
support to the chronic emergency situation that has existed since 1991 is the 
best approach to humanitarian assistance in this context. If interventions were 
solely in response to extreme events there would be no development of local 
capacity to improve responses to future events or reduce their impacts. Each 
recurrence of an extreme event would (inadvisably) be treated as an isolated 
event. NCAs interventions in Gedo that are tailored to both the chronic and 
acute emergencies, are relevant and appropriate to the needs of the people 
living in Gedo. This approach aims to reduce the vulnerability and enhance 
the resilience of local communities.  
 
Key Finding 35 
Chronic and acute emergencies are connected and impact upon each other 
and across all sectors. Operating in a chronic complex emergency demands 
a holistic humanitarian approach that targets both chronic and acute needs. 
 
The high prevalence of moderate malnutrition amongst the population and 
episodes of outbreaks of acute malnutrition together with a lack of safe water 
and sanitation facilities in Gedo led NCA to prioritise interventions in food 
security and water and sanitation. Gedo suffers high levels of illiteracy and 
NCA acknowledges in order to sustainably improve the resilience and 
adaptive capacity of future generations then education must be a key 
component of any interventions hence, the development of their schools and 
education programme in Gedo. 
 
NCA responds to acute emergencies in Gedo through the provision of non-
food item (NFI) kits; emergency education; food aid; and emergency water 
provision. These are areas where NCA has the skills and experience of 
delivering in emergency settings. NCA does not for example, deliver 
emergency healthcare with the exception of water and sanitation and 
HIV/AIDS. Interventions in water and sanitation are preventive and do not 
involve curative health, which requires specialist and trained personnel. NCA 
does not have the skills or experience of operating in the health sector. 
Strategically NCA has concentrated on a limited range of chronic and acute 
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activities, which are appropriate to their experience, capacity and capabilities 
and to the needs of the local population.  
 
Key Finding 36 
To deliver an effective humanitarian response, humanitarian organisations 
should deliver activities where they possess the relevant skills, experience 
and competency. Equally, to deliver a thorough and adequate response it is 
important not to overstretch resources.  
 
NCA has dispersed stocks of NFI kits (as discussed earlier) throughout Gedo 
that enables them to efficiently respond to a range of emergencies, including 
floods, fires and conflict.  
 
To an extent Somalia is a dual culture with separate men’s and women’s 
worlds. NCA has made great efforts to advocate and support the 
empowerment and protection of women. NCA implements its cross-cutting 
activities through two methods. Firstly, NCA embeds its cross-cutting issues 
into all its projects. In their schools, the cross-cutting issues are taught 
sensitively and age appropriately. In their food security and water and 
sanitation projects the discussions and training all include the cross-cutting 
issues. Secondly, NCA targets the various cross-cutting issues in their own 
right. This dual approach ensured the constant reinforcement of consistent 
messages and increased the reach of NCAs work on these issues. Including 
discussions, for example, surrounding FGM and sexual and gender based 
violence in the training of the agricultural programme and education and water 
and sanitation committees improved the timeliness of targeting the cross-
cutting issues. These committees then carried these messages to the wider 
community.  
 
Key Finding 37 
When implementing a humanitarian project, opportunities to raise 
awareness of other important issues should be explored and incorporated 
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where appropriate and feasible. 
 
NCAs field staff are trained and experienced in dealing with various acute 
emergencies including droughts, floods, fires and conflict. Hence, when an 
emergency arises NCA can implement an efficient response. This 
preparedness is appropriate and necessary when implementing projects in 
Gedo and Somalia.  
 
Key Finding 38 
A variety of acute emergencies erupt frequently in Gedo and Somalia and 
any humanitarian agency operating in these areas should be equipped to 
adequately respond or cope with these and the impacts they have on the 
people and their humanitarian activities.  
 
NCA field staff in Gedo have satellite telephones and are in daily contact with 
their regional Headquarters in Nairobi. When an acute emergency occurs field 
staff are able to quickly brief the NCA Country and Regional Directors 
enabling them to jointly establish whether NCA should and can respond and if 
so how. This regular and reliable communication allows NCA to plan and 
respond efficiently to acute emergencies in Gedo.  
 
Key Finding 39 
Communication between field staff and decision makers is critical to 
efficiency and effectiveness when responding to an acute emergency.  
 
NCAs main projects and cross-cutting issues are proving highly effective. 
Through careful analysis of emergencies and need, NCA selected a number 
of communities to work with in Gedo. The effectiveness of these projects has 
been on the basis of continuity and intense working as opposed to striving for 
geographical coverage. NCA has geographically concentrated its projects in 
Gedo. This prevents overstretching resources and improves the effectiveness 
and efficiency of each project. Education projects for example, have been 
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supported by the establishment of clean water sources and improved food 
security. Through careful logistics planning this has also enabled the efficient 
transportation of equipment and personnel to and from project sites. This 
overall strategy is highly effective and any disbursed or isolated project 
especially regarding the cross-cutting issues would likely have no effect and 
limited impact. 
 
NCA decided to hire vehicles for their operations in Gedo. The terrain, 
environment and conflict means vehicles regularly break down. Vehicle hiring 
companies quickly replace dysfunctional vehicles, which minimises delays to 
NCA and removes the maintenance and repair costs for vehicles. 
Furthermore, this supports local hiring companies, which subsequently 
generates wider support for NCA and their work.  
 
NCA established a local office on the Kenyan side of the border with Gedo. 
Local and regional staff and goods can generally be efficiently transported 
across this part of the border. This has secured the supply chain for items not 
available in Gedo. Additionally, this proves an efficient method of transporting 
staff to and from Nairobi when needed.  
 
Key Finding 40 
Supply chain security and reliability is critical to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of any project and opportunities to maintain and improve it 
should be explored and sought early on. 
 
6.4.2 The Community 
There are no central government agencies operating in Gedo. Despite this, 
NCA made early contact with the nascent local administrative system, village 
elders and religious leaders throughout Gedo. This was appropriate to secure 
wider support and no resistance or resentment towards NCA and their work 
and also provided an opportunity to sensitise those in power to critical issues. 
These links are also made in the hope that these bodies may eventually 
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develop as functioning entities able to provide structures to support the 
delivery of programmes. NCA were transparent, informing both individuals 
and groups of their project plans and limitations. This managed expectations, 
did not raise false hope and has since been the founding of great respect 
between NCA and the communities of Gedo. Developing these relationships 
and dialogue demanded time, resources and in some cases delayed the 
implementation of projects. They were however, vital and provided a solid 
foundation for NCA to commence work, significantly improving the 
effectiveness and impact of all NCAs work in Gedo.  
 
Key Finding 41 
Discussions, dialogue and building relationships may impede the timeliness 
of implementing projects but they are essential to the overall efficiency, 
effectiveness and impact of a project. 
 
NCA began operations in Gedo through carefully selecting and recruiting local 
staff. All candidates had to formally apply and were interviewed. NCA 
recruited skilled, knowledgeable, competent local staff that are trusted 
amongst local communities. Employing skilled local staff has improved the 
effectiveness of all the projects and built local capacity. Their local knowledge 
of the people, environment and context has enabled them to negotiate access 
to project sites and vulnerable people. Gedo suffers regular outbreaks of 
conflicts during which other organisations such as the United Nations have 
evacuated and ceased activities and as a result communities have little 
confidence or respect for these organisations. NCAs dominant use of local 
staff however, means they have never stopped or withdrawn activities from 
Gedo thus, enabling the continuity of its projects which has proven invaluable 
in gaining respect and trust amongst communities and improving the 
effectiveness of its projects. The negotiation skills of the local staff has 
secured their safety and enabled the efficient implementation of their work. 
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Key Finding 42 
Continued presence and operations particularly, during outbreaks of conflict 
is critical in gaining much needed respect and trust, which in turn is vital for 
any successful project in Somalia. 
 
NCAs entry into any community is always firstly through meeting the village 
elder’s committee and village chiefs. As discussed in section 5.3.3 The 
Community, this is the correct protocol in Somalia and if an organisation were 
to not follow this procedure they would receive little support for any project 
from the community.  
 
A crucial element of NCAs strategy is the importance placed on working with 
the community and facilitating their empowerment through training and 
advocacy. The elders and religious leaders are critical links in this relation, 
both in allowing access to beneficiaries and in advocating for changes in the 
ways in which Gedo society works. It was clear during the research that 
continuing dialogue and negotiation with the elders and religious leaders is 
key to progress.  
 
Community participation in all NCAs projects was achieved through careful 
negotiation with key stakeholders and gatekeepers within the clan and 
religious systems. It has been essential to have a working relationship with 
warlords, militias and those involved in sub-clan conflict, even if this is more 
through dialogue than co-ordination. Such relations depend on the sensitivity 
and relationships of local NCA staff to powerful groups; some of the local staff 
are critically important to these relationships. Though there have been tense 
episodes that could have led to withdrawal, NCA has managed to achieve a 
successful modus vivendi with these potentially disruptive powers, which has 
enabled them to maintain community access and involvement. The tenacity of 
NCA in maintaining a presence in Gedo when others such as the UN 
withdrew during periods of insecurity has been a powerful aid to their 
credibility and reputation among local communities and has secured their 
acceptance and support throughout Gedo. 
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6.4.2.1 Water and Sanitation Programme 
Communities participated throughout the implementation of the water and 
sanitation projects. To rehabilitate and establish the water systems in El 
Gudud and El Adde, NCA worked in collaboration with the communities to 
select locations throughout the towns for the sighting of water points. NCA 
designed the water points in consultation with the communities to ensure they 
were appropriate to the various methods of carrying water. For instance, 
water points throughout the centre of the towns were designed for jerry cans, 
whilst water points on the outskirts of the town had both water troughs for 
livestock and points for jerry cans. This has proved very effective as the 
diffusion of water points throughout the town and separation of water points 
according to user has reduced waiting times and the likelihood of conflict as 
large numbers of people and livestock are not congested trying to access one 
water point. Furthermore, the risk of contamination is reduced as fewer 
livestock move through the centre of the towns and no longer surround water 
points where water is sourced for human consumption. The rehabilitation of 
these mechanised water systems and the design of the water points were 
appropriate to the needs of these people. 
 
Key Finding 43 
Consultation and the involvement of beneficiaries is crucial when designing 
and implementing humanitarian projects to deliver effective and sustainable 
interventions. 
 
Prior to the implementation of these projects NCA held lengthy discussions 
with the Elders committees and communities to outline their important role in 
the project and ensure they understood that ultimately the ownership of the 
water systems lay with each community and therefore, they would be 
responsible for its management and maintenance. Each town then provided 
NCA with a list of materials and labour they would supply. NCA used local 
materials and labour wherever possible. This strategy is appropriate, effective 
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and necessary to build capacity; promote ownership and sustainability; and 
reduce the likelihood of needing future support for maintenance and repairs. 
 
NCA implemented eight shallow well projects. The design of the wells was not 
standardised but rather developed through consultation with local 
communities and examination of pre-existing structures. Communities will not 
use shallow wells implemented by external agencies if they perceive their 
design to be incorrect. Hence, these consultations were important to ensuring 
the effective use of shallow wells through appropriate and acceptable designs.  
 
Key Finding 44 
Understanding the user group and having beneficiary involvement in 
designing and decision making for a project is critical to its successful 
implementation. 
 
The effectiveness of the shallow wells could be improved through minor 
alterations in well design. The shallow wells constructed in Gedo were not 
covered. Communities informed NCA they had always used and wanted to 
continue using uncovered wells as they believe permanently covered wells 
are ‘not good’. A number of uncovered shallow wells however, often silt up 
during the rainy season particularly with flash floods. Temporarily covering 
these flood prone wells during the rainy season would prevent this. This would 
require extensive community consultations to maintain confidence in the water 
point and reassure that ownership lies with the community, however, the 
researcher undertook several discussions with one community whose shallow 
wells had become silted up. The researcher discussed the potential to prevent 
silting of the wells through temporary covers and communities saw this as an 
acceptable possibility. Other than one silted well, all other shallow wells 
implemented by NCA were fully operational and well utilised and as such they 
have proven effective.  
 
NCA implemented eight community VIP latrines in both El Gudud and El 
Adde. VIP latrines are recognised and understood by most the population of 
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Gedo. Despite this, these latrines were largely unused. The researcher 
discussed this issue with various groups from these towns. The majority of 
people, particularly the women did not like the idea of using latrines shared by 
so many people. They would prefer to have one latrine for a small group of 
families who could all share responsibility for its cleanliness. During 
implementation, NCAs resources were limited to the supply of eight 
communal latrines. The implementation of VIP latrines was appropriate to 
these towns however, the implementation of communal latrines was not 
appropriate and as such these latrines have not been effective.  
 
Key Finding 45 
Implementing facilities and amenities for beneficiaries does not ensure their 
use – building hardware alone, even when much needed, can prove 
ineffective. Local consultation and engagement is vital to the successful 
design and implementation of any project. 
 
The water and sanitation committees are currently working to encourage 
people to construct their own latrines. 
 
“People will make their own VIP latrines, maybe one per six households or 
something like this. But they will make the latrines now with guidance and 
help from us as now they will see how important they are. But these 
communal latrines are no good, people would like to use a latrine used by 
everyone else” (WES Committee member, El Adde). 
 
6.4.2.2 Food Security Programme 
Communities were involved extensively throughout each food security project. 
Each project began through consultations with local leaders, district councils, 
religious leaders and local community-based associations including women 
traders’ associations. Beneficiaries were required to provide resources 
wherever possible. Communities of Bardera and Burdhubo for example, 
contributed 43 percent of fuel costs and 15 percent of irrigation water pump 
costs. As a result, expenditures on the project were reduced by US$ 28,000. 
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In addition, the farmers provided donkeys and oxen for training while ASEP 
and SADO provided ox ploughs, sub-soiler, yoke and harnessing equipment. 
Through encouraging the contributions and inputs of beneficiaries and local 
organisations NCA has drastically improved the efficiency of its food security 
programme. Most crucially however, through investing their own resources in 
a project, the communities are dedicated to these projects and will make 
every effort to ensure they succeed and continue to succeed.  
 
Key Finding 46 
Local communities must be encouraged to provide resources whether it be 
financial, labour or other, as this improves the efficiency of the project and 
increases local ownership and responsibility for the project. 
 
6.4.2.3 Education Programme 
Schools were designed and constructed depending on the size of the 
community. It was decided permanent schools would be built as part of the 
capacity building/development programme as these would provide a greater 
sense of stability and permanence for communities. Also permanent 
structures were needed to offer a long-term educational environment and 
allow the education project to function effectively. Materials for construction 
were sourced locally and local labour was utilised wherever possible. Local 
men would provide labour and local women would provide meals for all those 
working on the project. Many communities also constructed semi-permanent 
buildings at the school sites for the storage of teaching materials and food. 
This community participation is vital in creating a sense of ownership towards 
the school. Furthermore, the construction of these additional buildings by the 
communities demonstrates their commitment and level of ownership over the 
project. Continuous community involvement and participation throughout the 
development of each school has improved efficiency, strengthened local 
capacity and created a sense of community ownership for the school, which 
improves the likelihood of parents enrolling their children thus, contributing to 
the impact and sustainability of the project.  
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The large number of people fleeing Mogadishu includes many teachers and 
other skilled and professional personnel. Many now live in Gedo either with 
relatives or in IDP settlements. Subsequently, it has been possible to locally 
source all teachers for the various schools.  
 
6.4.2.4 Acute Emergencies 
During several droughts, through discussions with NCA, communities 
constructed water storage pans known locally as Berkads. NCA then 
contracted private water suppliers to transport water to the communal water 
pans. Hence, even during acute emergencies, communities were actively 
involved throughout project implementation. Furthermore, NCA did not 
undermine local businesses as they utilised local private water suppliers 
where possible. Using private suppliers meant NCA did not have to purchase 
or directly hire water trucking vehicles or navigate and negotiate the logistics 
of distributing water, which made the emergency response highly efficient.  
 
A sense of community ownership over a project is key to its long-term 
effectiveness and sustainability. It was evident throughout NCAs projects in 
Gedo that communities held a strong sense of ownership towards their 
projects. Ownership was expressed partly through the level of participation in 
committees – Community Education Committees and Water and Sanitation 
Committees. Both Education and Water and Sanitation Committees take their 
responsibilities seriously and they are viewed as valuable amongst leaders 
and the wider community to the development of the village or town. 
Communities with help and advice from NCA, had selected strong community 
members including both men and women, to work on the committees. 
Committees hold weekly meetings and effectively motivate the wider 
community whenever necessary. Communities feel a greater sense of 
ownership towards projects such as schools and water and sanitation 
facilities, as they are continuously involved through the committees and are 
required to regularly provide inputs to ensure their sustainability. At 
Garbahare, for example, the community provided the school with a donkey 
cart so sufficient quantities of water could be collected for the pupils and the 
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community also paid for a sick teacher to go to hospital. 
 
In all projects community leaders have been involved in discussions and 
negotiations from the onset. Community members have also participated in 
projects as far as feasible through the provision of local labour, resources and 
materials. Consequently, community members and leaders are invested in 
each project and will continue to actively participate to ensure the continued 
success of their project.  
 
6.4.3 Hardware 
6.4.3.1 Water and Sanitation 
El Gudud and El Adde are large towns that previously had mechanised water 
systems supplying their water. Various conflicts and a general lack of 
maintenance, spare parts and repairs eventually made the systems 
inoperable. NCA rehabilitated these water systems. These towns provide 
water to the local populations, IDPs and nomadic pastoralists. NCA 
recognised that through rehabilitating and improving these water systems that 
large numbers of people would have access to safe water supplies. 
 
NCA implemented eight shallow wells. These were established in villages 
where the previous shallow wells had been destroyed, contaminated from 
floods or that had not been deep enough to reach a good quality source of 
water. Shallow wells are appropriate to the size of these communities 
whereas mechanised water sources would be too expensive to manage and 
sustain. Traditionally in Gedo, people use large branches, for ropes to be 
hauled against, to aid in water extraction from shallow wells. Traditional wells 
would have stones positioned to steady these branches. NCAs shallow well 
apron design did not accommodate for this. Users would typically add stones 
themselves to the apron adapting it for their use. Whilst effective, NCA could 
further improve their shallow well apron design to accommodate this, for 
example, see Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7 Shallow well apron design that accommodates traditional 
Somali water collection method of two large branches to be used 
effectively. 
 
(Source: Author, 2007). 
 
6.4.3.2 Food Security Programme 
NCA intervened in food security through the provision of seeds, pesticides, 
tools, irrigation pumps, fuel and training. NCA supplied kick-start diesel pumps 
and ploughs. Traditionally these farmers have struggled to irrigate their land 
due to the erratic rainfall and severe droughts and many have lost tools and 
harvests through conflicts. Additionally, most farmers would plough their land 
themselves, which has restricted the amount of land they can work and the 
number of harvests they can have. Plough demonstrations were given in the 
fields using ox and donkeys. Initial uptake of using animals with ploughs was 
limited but after continual training and follow up visits farmers began using 
animals regularly and seeing the benefits for themselves. The plough 
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equipment is now proving effective as farmers have adopted the new 
techniques and are now using donkeys and oxen to plough their fields. The 
water pumps on the farms visited were operational and proving effective. The 
farmers appeared highly competent in using the water pumps and ploughs, 
which suggests training was also effective. NCAs efforts are expected to 
increase acreage and income profitability and reduce vulnerability to erratic 
rainfall. The pumps and ploughs are user-friendly, easy to operate and 
appropriate for the users and the land.  
 
Key Finding 47 
The use of new techniques, practices and hardware is most effective when 
coupled with initial intensive training and continued coaching and support. 
 
NCA contracted two local organisations - Social Life and Agricultural 
Development Organisation (SADO) and Advancement of Small Enterprises 
Program (ASEP) – to implement its food security projects. These 
organisations had the skills and capacity to carry out this work. NCA 
contracted two organisations informing them that if they both worked 
efficiently and effectively, their contracts would be extended however, if one 
did not work well then their contract would not be extended. This provided 
NCA with some security, as should one of the organisations have proved to 
be incompetent, fraudulent or ineffective then the risk was reduced to one 
project. Whereas, should both organisations prove successful, then NCA has 
supported the development and built the capacity of two local organisations 
whilst improving the rate and number of projects possible. Both organisations 
are working effectively with NCA and this strategy of utilising local 
organisations to implement projects was appropriate to the capacity and use 
of NCAs resources. Without these organisations it would have taken NCA 
much longer to implement these projects. 
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Key Finding 48 
Opportunities to sub-contract local, competent organisations should always 
be explored to maximise efficiency and increase the impact and 
sustainability of a project. 
 
A major threat to these farmers remains their reliance on rivers and rainfall in 
a drought and flood prone region where early warning systems are fairly non-
existent.  
 
Key Finding 49 
Without sufficient early warning systems for floods and droughts farmers and 
their families will remain vulnerable. 
 
NCA, SADO and ASEP distributed seeds and tools and trained 140 farmers 
across six locations on conservation tillage using animal traction. NCA 
selected farmers in collaboration with communities through discussions. The 
farmers selected were local people who had farmed all their lives but were in 
a state of emergency as a result of recent droughts and/or floods. NCA aimed 
to begin their food security programme with only a small number of locations. 
This enabled them to ensure these projects received all the necessary time 
and resources and to ensure both ASEP and SADO were capable and 
competent in delivering the projects. The farmers are all working effectively 
and they all stated they have received continuous coaching and support from 
either SADO or ASEP.  
 
Excessive flooding meant two farmers were unable to exercise the skills learnt 
or plant seeds effectively during the first season. All farmers have since 
however, had productive harvests. The food security programme has 
improved livelihoods through drawing on effective and sustainable farming 
techniques and tools. The food harvested through these projects is used for 
both the subsistence of families and for sale. Money collected from selling 
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harvests is used to purchase future seed stocks and tools thus generating 
more sustainable livelihoods.  
 
Key Finding 50 
Implementing a new programme in a new area generally demands intensive 
support and resources. Thus, limiting the number and geographical spread 
of new programmes at any one time ensures the support and resources 
needed for effective implementation are available.  
 
6.4.3.3 Education Programme 
NCA constructed schools where there were large numbers of children and no 
existing education facilities. Education facilities are in short supply throughout 
Somalia and there are few secondary schools or places of higher education 
across the entire country. NCA hires, trains and pays teachers across 23 
schools, nine of which are emergency schools. The lack of any formal 
education system in Gedo means NCAs education programme is appropriate 
and vital to ensuring the education of many children. Each school has a 
feeding programme that is supported through WFP. Many parents in Somalia 
are reluctant to send their children to school regularly as they are needed to 
help work, collect water and care for other children. Providing a nutritious 
meal for children at school creates a major incentive for parents to enroll and 
send their children, who largely live in a state of chronic food insecurity. The 
school feeding programme also has much wider impacts. The overall health 
and nourishment of children is improved, which promotes their resistance to 
disease and sickness. Similarly, the curriculum itself educates pupils on 
issues of good hygiene and sanitation, which reduces their risk of disease and 
infection. Finally, the majority of children in Gedo have seen some level of 
conflict and many have been through traumatic experiences. The provision of 
a safe environment for children to learn and be amongst their friends and 
peers provides much needed stability and security for their mental wellbeing. 
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Key Finding 51 
Designing and implementing programmes that are complimentary whilst also 
considering local livelihoods and needs are most effective. 
 
The primary schools have provided a sense of stability and future hope to 
many people. NCA introduced formal school examinations and certificates to 
promote the employability; livelihood options; or likelihood of sponsorship for 
further education in other countries for these pupils. Learning materials 
supplied were of a good standard and the teachers appeared competent. 
Teachers are examined and interviewed before they are employed. All 
classrooms visited were full and pupils all had writing books full of work, which 
indicates that schools are operating effectively and attendance rates are 
good. Overall school enrolment rates have rose from 2,030 pupils when the 
programme began to 4,392 pupils to date, where female enrolment rose from 
766 to 1,940 and boys rose from 1,264 to 2,452. The continual increase in 
enrolment rates demonstrates the effectiveness of NCAs school programme 
in Gedo. 
 
To construct the schools NCA used local materials and local labour. This 
increased the experience of the labourers, reduced costs and enables local 
communities to carry out any future maintenance and repairs needed, which 
is appropriate to both the context and the need to build local capacity.  
 
The nine emergency schools were planned for six months however, they are 
still operational to date due to the continued need through further 
emergencies. The emergency nature of these schools – temporary structures 
- is appropriate as they are used largely by IDPs and communities affected by 
floods. The IDPs in the area agreed they would return home once the violence 
has ceased. However, as the annual and in some cases bi-annual floods and 
droughts continue to destroy food supplies and resources from the 
communities and similarly there is no end in sight to the national insecurity, it 
is appropriate to continue to provide education for these children. 
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Despite the temporary nature of these schools, NCA constructed two VIP 
latrines at each school. This was appropriate to support the education of the 
pupils and provide a safe and hygienic environment.  
 
The education programme and schools have been running effectively for a 
number of years and have proven sustainable through continued and growing 
attendance rates. Unfortunately, there are no secondary schools or further 
educational opportunities available throughout the region, which means the 
learning and subsequent livelihood options available for these children is 
limited and will continue to be until secondary or higher education is readily 
available in the region.  
 
Key Finding 52 
Education provides the skills and knowledge needed to maximise 
employability and livelihood options. Furthermore, the education of children 
is critical to the development and promotion of peace and diplomacy for any 
countries future. 
 
Should any secondary school or higher education opportunities however, 
become available these children will have formal qualifications to assist their 
applications. In a region where school attendance is generally low this created 
a further incentive for parents to send their children to school. Pupils with 
relatives in Mogadishu or Kenya are able to relocate to attend secondary 
schools, although, these opportunities are few. 
 
6.4.3.4 Acute Emergencies 
Upon notification of an emergency, NCA staff visit the area and meet with 
community members including the elders and leaders. Those in need of 
assistance are identified jointly by NCA and the community. NCA then 
transports and distributes the required number of emergency non-food item 
(NFI) kits or other necessary resources to the site. Through respecting and 
utilising the traditional community structures, NCA has been able to effectively 
access populations and those most in need during emergency situations. 
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During the evaluation, for example, a fire broke out in an IDP settlement. This 
settlement, similar to many others, was densely populated with dwellings 
constructed too close to one another and most were made of wooden sticks 
and tents. Hence, the fire spread quickly and many (84 households) people 
lost their homes and belongings. NCA responded through providing 100 non-
food item kits. These kits largely contain:  Plastic sheets;  Cooking pots;  Soap and washing powder;  Matches;  Blankets; and  Jerry cans 
 
NCA responded within 24 hours of the fire outbreak. They were able to 
respond so quickly as they have several stores of emergency NFI kits in 
warehouses throughout Gedo readily available for such emergencies.   
 
Key Finding 53 
In a large area prone to a variety of disasters, having dispersed resources 
for responding to disasters and staff trained on disaster preparedness and 
response is key to effectively and efficiently minimising the impact of a 
disaster on communities and aiding their speedy recovery.   
 
Somalia has been experiencing a decade-long drought. Crops failed in three 
consecutive seasons, thus exposing an estimated 230,000 residents of Gedo 
to famine conditions. NCA responded to the 2006 drought by distributing food 
in the districts of Garbaharey and Burdhubo in partnership with the World 
Food Programme (WFP). Food aid was appropriate to the famine conditions 
facing the region.  
 
NCA distributed 6069.17 MT of relief food to 18,327 households (109,962 
people). The food distribution was implemented in collaboration with local 
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communities through existing community structures. Members of these 
structures received training on relief distribution at each Emergency 
Distribution Point (EDP). This method of distribution was appropriate to the 
large scale and speed required. Furthermore, using the existing community 
structures is appropriate to the local population and creates a sound 
foundation for working relationships between NCA and local populations.   
 
During the drought NCA supplied 143,000 litres of water to 1,700 households. 
This was 40 percent of the planned output as the project was terminated 
midway when fortunately the rains began and water collection was possible. 
NCA had previously embarked on a water trucking project in response to a 
severe drought. Each household received 175 litres of water. This project also 
involved the distribution of water containers and hygiene promotion. Clean 
water containers and hygiene promotion are important as large numbers of 
people collecting water from one source increases the risk of contamination. 
These initial hygiene messages also support the longer-term water and 
sanitation project, which builds on these principles. No household that 
received emergency water from NCA reported human or livestock fatalities as 
a result of water shortages and there were no reported outbreaks of 
waterborne diseases among the targeted households throughout the 
operation.  
 
NCA completed the water trucking project successfully under extreme working 
conditions. Despite the emergency context of the project they were still able to 
actively involve communities and implement software elements to support and 
strengthen the hardware components. This project was implemented 
effectively and efficiently largely as a result of dedicated, experienced, well-
informed and high quality local staff. The flexibility embedded into NCAs 
interventions ensures their responses are appropriate to local needs. 
 
To combat dropout rates in schools during a drought, NCA implemented 
school-feeding programmes with support from UNICEF. The school feeding 
programmes ensured 4,351 pupils and 69 teachers received daily nutritious 
meals. This had a significant impact on the retention of pupils and teachers, 
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which enabled the education project to continue effectively. NCA, with funding 
from UNICEF and WFP, has continued the school feeding programme across 
its schools as it was recognised this vastly improved enrolment and 
attendance rates. In addition, this provided some level of blanket coverage in 
this chronically food insecure region.  
 
6.4.4 Software, Culture and Religion 
6.4.4.1 Water and Sanitation Programme 
NCA implemented the water and sanitation hardware elements of its 
programme and then began training a water and sanitation committee for 
each project site. Staffing resources due to other emergencies and projects 
meant the water and sanitation committees were unable to be trained prior to 
or in parallel to the development of the hardware elements. This initially 
hampered the effectiveness of the water and sanitation committees. Hygiene 
and sanitation training are equally important in the prevention of water borne 
diseases and good health as the supply of safe water. Water and sanitation 
committees established prior to or in parallel to the construction of water 
points or latrines can gain hands-on training during construction. They can 
also draw on the enthusiasm of the positive construction works to drive an 
awareness raising campaign surrounding the issues of sustainable and clean 
water use; and good sanitation and hygiene. Trained and active water and 
sanitation committees may have encouraged the use of latrines. During the 
evaluation period the water systems were fully functional however, had they 
have broken down or incurred problems prior to the technical training of 
members of the water and sanitation committees they would have needed 
further help from NCA to repair the systems. The lack of training during the 
implementation of hardware hampered the effectiveness of the water and 
sanitation projects. This training has now been conducted and the water and 
sanitation committees are active in their communities. It is hoped they will 
encourage the construction and use of latrines.  
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Key Finding 54 
Software is as equally important as hardware to the effectiveness of a water 
and sanitation project and one should not be implemented without the other. 
 
6.4.4.2 Education Programme 
The curriculum established at NCAs schools covers the software components 
of all NCA projects in Gedo, such as: 
  Sexually gender-based violence, FGM and HIV/AIDS. This is dealt with 
age appropriately, for example, younger children are taught the 
importance of respecting both boys and girls and how violence towards 
anyone is not acceptable;  Good hygiene and sanitation behaviours;  Good land use; and  Sustainable farming practices. 
 
These cross-cutting issues are key for children in Somalia as they will be the 
founders of future development and children. 
 
Key Finding 55 
Creating synergies across programmes and projects and using continued 
education to reinforce messages and training greatly enhances the 
effectiveness and sustainability of any project.  
 
Each school NCA constructed had 2 Ventilation Improved Pit latrines that 
were used by the majority of pupils. The effective use of latrines in the schools 
was due to the hygiene and sanitation promotion within the education 
programme. Hygiene and sanitation was taught to pupils by teachers using 
the Qur’an. They emphasised the importance of cleanliness and good hygiene 
through passages in the Qur’an. This method ensured the education was 
contextually specific and appropriate for the pupils. 
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Key Finding 56 
To maximise the effectiveness of projects, training and education techniques 
and resources should draw on local traditions, cultures and religion. 
 
NCA hosted discussions around sexual and gender based violence and 
female genital mutilation with religious leaders and elders. NCA recognised 
that without religious support for these issues in a country where religion 
dictates all aspects of life, no positive steps would be achieved. Conclusions 
from this dialogue were drawn that the Qur’an does not allow sexual and 
gender based violence and also there is no requirement in the Qur’an for 
female genital mutilation. The discussions were intensive and extensive but 
highly necessary and with the conclusions drawn have provided NCA with a 
solid foundation and useful tools for moving these messages forward. In 
particular, NCA uses Sheiks and Imams to engage communities in 
discussions of female genital mutilation (FGM). The religious leaders are 
continuing to further discourage FGM through preaching’s within Mosques.  
 
NCA additionally held discussions on the cross-cutting issues with elite men. 
NCA recognised that despite the chronic poverty and conflict, there are a 
number of elite men throughout Gedo – businessmen and Town or Clan 
Leaders. NCA understands that to drive behavioural change, education and 
preaching alone was not sufficient and they needed those in positions of 
power to lead by example. NCA actively engaged these men to encourage 
others to treat girls and women respectively and include them in discussions 
and decisions that would impact them. NCAs strategy and techniques of 
addressing the cross-cutting issues through engaging religious leaders and 
respected and powerful men has proven highly effective and without this 
higher approval, these projects would not be possible in Somalia. This work is 
still in its infancy and will take many years to re-educate people around such 
sensitive issues. In particular, FGM is viewed by many Somali men and 
women as necessary for any young girl.  
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Key Finding 57 
Securing religious and elite support for any behavioural and traditional 
changes is vital in Gedo and throughout Somalia. 
 
NCAs method of addressing the cross-cutting issues through both targeting 
them each in their own right but also embedding them into the training of all its 
other projects has greatly improved their impact. Behavioural and traditional 
change takes time and great effort. Through NCAs continual and consistent 
messages and training, behavioural changes in regard to the cross-cutting 
issues are taking place.  
 
Women are important participants in NCAs strategy, both as targets and as 
agents of change. Gender equality is particularly problematic in Somali 
society and NCA has adopted a gradualist and incremental approach to 
changing gender relations in the capacity building element of its programme. 
NCAs acceptance that it is not possible radically (and meaningfully) to alter 
gender relations in the short-term is realistic. NCA did not request Water and 
Sanitation Committees to be gender balanced. Rather they discussed the 
roles of women in collecting and using water and subsequently communities 
themselves came to the conclusion that the water and sanitation committees 
should include some female members. This allowed traditional roles to be 
respected whilst also enabling a gradual acceptance of women to be involved 
in decision making. In several villages the elders commented on how 
proactive and capable the women members of the committee have proven 
and they are now seeking more women to join the committee. The 
acceptance of women in discussions, committees and decision making is a 
big step forward and rather than equality in numbers, NCA focuses on the 
inclusion of quality female members who can and are influencing decisions. 
Female membership of committees (though not of the Elders Committee) is 
now ‘normal’ in NCAs project areas. 
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Key Finding 58 
Gender equality is not about having equal numbers of men and women 
participate. In this context it is about liberation and the ability of both men 
and women to participate and have their views, opinions and participation to 
be held of equal value and importance. Adapting traditions and cultures 
must be for worthwhile reasons; community driven; and facilitated and 
encouraged respectfully if it is to be effective and sustainable. 
 
Such community- and gender-focused appropriate approaches are of course 
in tune with NCA principles and practices, but in truth they constitute the only 
approaches that could work in Gedo and Somalia. 
 
Key Finding 59 
Improving gender equality in Somalia demands a sensitive and gradual 
approach that respects Somali culture and finds a balance with Somali 
tradition. 
 
6.4.5 Local Management 
NCA encourages every community surrounding a school to establish a 
Community Education Committee. The committee is elected by the 
community and has both male and female members. Each NCA school has a 
Community Education Committee and they have received training from NCA 
to enhance their capacities. Committees hold regular meetings and are 
responsible for mobilising the wider community when necessary. One area, 
for example, was suffering a serious outbreak of diarrhea, the committee and 
in particular the female members, mobilised the community to fetch clean 
water supplies daily to the school to prevent pupils becoming ill and to ensure 
attendance rates remained high. This was extremely successful and very few 
pupils were sick as a result of the community action taken. Community 
Education Committees enable other members of the community to have a role 
in their communities and in the education of their children. Most Community 
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Education Committees would include influential and respected members of 
the community to ensure the highest level of support for the school. 
 
Key Finding 60 
Community Education Committees are a critical component of education 
projects in chronic complex emergencies, creating wider support and 
improving the sustainability of schools.  
 
Water and Sanitation Committees are operational and actively managing 
water points with established payment mechanisms. NCA discussed the 
importance of water and sanitation committees and the importance of 
managing their water system with leaders and elders and as such, committee 
members were carefully selected by communities and their roles are 
respected by the wider community, which improves their impact and the 
sustainability of the water and sanitation project. Water and sanitation 
committees implemented a payment mechanism for water similar to that 
discussed in section 5.3.6 Local Management. This money is utilised to pay 
for fuel for the generators, spare pieces of equipment to repair breakdowns, 
and to provide the technicians with an income. The technicians are required to 
spend large quantities of their time maintaining the systems and must be 
dedicated to the water system therefore, the communities decided they should 
receive an income for their work to ensure their positions are sustainable. 
Mosques and schools receive free water as do a certain number of people 
identified by the community as unable to afford the water payments.  
 
Key Finding 61 
Mechanised water sources require a payment mechanism to secure their 
sustainability through regular maintenance and repairs. Payment 
mechanisms, however, must also consider and protect the most vulnerable 
people.  
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6.4.6 The Most Vulnerable  
Operating largely through local staff has enabled NCA to build close links and 
mutual understanding with de facto powers in the communities, principally the 
committees of elders. Through these relationships it has been possible to gain 
access to those most vulnerable and in need. These people were identified by 
the community leaders but then verified by NCA staff. This mode of 
identification used the communities’ knowledge and ensured there was no 
resentment of an attempt by an outside agency to interfere in community 
affairs in the tight sub-clan system. Identification of beneficiaries through the 
sub-clan system carries the risk of nepotism and may be subject to a different 
communal view of vulnerability and rights. NCA discussed what it means to be 
vulnerable or in need with village leaders and committee members to 
generate a shared understanding of who must be identified. It was agreed that 
once committees and leaders have identified those in need then NCA staff 
would assess and verify these people. This has proven an effective, efficient, 
culturally appropriate method. 
 
Key Finding 62 
Identifying beneficiaries is a sensitive process and must be conducted 
through engaging communities and using appropriate methods to minimise 
and prevent resentment and nepotism. 
 
NCA has begun working with several FGM practitioners to re-train them as 
part of their cross-cutting issues project. FGM practitioners, mostly women, 
have built their livelihoods on carrying out FGM and strongly promote it. 
Engaging FGM practitioners in the project prevents their marginalisation and 
loss of livelihood and encourages their wider support – through providing 
them with an alternative livelihood strategy they are more likely to help 
support a cultural shift away from the practice of FGM. This work has proven 
extremely effective and one of the FGM practitioners has since been 
employed by NCA to raise awareness amongst other FGM practitioners. 
 
 257
Key Finding 63 
When implementing a project, the various lives and livelihoods it effects 
must be understood to ensure it gains full support and does not marginalise 
any members of society.  
 
Statistics surrounding HIV/AIDS in Somalia are largely unknown due to the 
taboo of discussing the topic. NCA advocates for no sex before marriage and 
then faithfulness when married. Similar to all its cross-cutting issues it embeds 
these messages and discussions throughout all its operations in Gedo. This 
has improved the effectiveness of these projects through both increasing their 
reach and reinforcing good practices.  
 
6.4.7 Summary 
NCA has succeeded to a considerable extent in the difficult Gedo socio-
cultural environment in meeting its current targets and implementing its 
programmes. Much of the success is due to sound working relations with 
communities; continued presence and respecting and operating through 
cultural and religious beliefs, practices and traditions. 
 
Chapter 6 provides 29 key findings framed through the key themes outlined in 
section 6.4 Evaluation of NCAs Activities in Gedo. Upon detailed analysis of 
the findings and discussion presented, it is evident the findings support those 
in Chapter 5 for the five key principles for implementing humanitarian projects 
and an overarching programme strategy for delivering humanitarian aid in 
chronic complex emergencies (see section 5.3.8 Summary for further details):  
  Project Principle 1: Community Owned  Project Principle 2: Culturally and religiously embedded  Project Principle 3: strong software component  Project Principle 4: Community level management   Project Principle 5: Protection of most vulnerable  Programme: A coherent dual strategy  
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These principles and strategy are discussed further in Chapter 7, the 
Conclusions and Discussion section. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Changing communities from highly vulnerable to disasters with low levels of 
resilience and adaptive capacity to that of a community with low vulnerability 
and high resilience and adaptive capacity to disasters presents major 
challenges. This will require both humanitarian and development 
programmes. However, determining the extent to which such interventions 
enhance resilience and adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability is a 
substantive challenge in itself. Evaluation remains one of the approaches that 
can provide insights in helping us determine the contribution of humanitarian 
organisations to both the theory and practice of enhancing these variables. 
  
The following chapter draws on the key findings of Chapters 5 and 6. In some 
cases comparisons and generalisations of the findings from the case studies 
may be difficult to make given the different spatial, institutional and temporary 
scales at which they operated. The discussion is, however, guided by the 
purpose of addressing the research questions initially outlined in Chapter 1: 
 
1. What involvement or role do beneficiaries and affected populations 
have in the process of humanitarian interventions? 
2. When delivering humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies 
are interventions relevant and appropriate and if so how? 
3. To what extent are humanitarian interventions during complex 
emergencies effective and sustainable? 
4. To what extent can humanitarian aid deliver to long-term emergencies? 
a. Can these interventions have a real impact?  
b. If yes, what are the criteria for such projects and how do so 
many fail to be sustainable or have impact? 
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In order to approach this systematically this chapter is separated into three 
sections: project level; Somalia; and the evaluation of humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
7.1 Project Level 
Research question 1: What involvement or role do beneficiaries and 
affected populations have in the process of humanitarian interventions?  
Local investment and ownership is needed for the positive impact and 
sustainability of any humanitarian project. International organisations all 
advocate for local ownership however, the extent that they actually allow this 
ownership in practice is debatable. Most projects are allocated to a particular 
sector such as livelihoods, food security or water and sanitation early on by 
international staff at a regional or headquarter level. Many of these projects 
will already have certain elements embedded or designed in before they 
reach any local community for consultation (CDA, 2008). According to 
Pouligny (2009) many practitioners would consider there to a be a trade-off 
between the imperative to save lives and deliver aid quickly in order to 
alleviate the immediate suffering and the need to respect and support local 
capacity and ensure local ownership. It is only over the last few decades that 
humanitarian governance has incorporated the views of the local populations 
– and it is debatable how much energy humanitarians have put into these 
efforts. Humanitarians offer many reasons why it is difficult to adhere to 
modern standards of participation, but the implication is that the legitimacy of 
humanitarian governance does not depend on a process of deliberation, 
dialogue, or even consent (Barnett, 2011). Humanitarian governance stakes 
its legitimacy on its purpose.   
 
Several humanitarian programmes, however, including those presented in this 
research refer to a sense of community involvement and ownership as a key 
factor to their success (ibid; CDA, 2008). Furthermore, beneficiaries are not 
mere victims and passive recipients of aid. The Sphere Handbook 2011 
edition outlines a new standard, which aims for a people centred humanitarian 
response and emphasises: 
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“community self-help, explicit support to community networks and 
projects and the need to include individual and community action in the 
response and recovery (Sphere Project, 2011, p. 9). 
 
Norwegian Church Aid are an international NGO, however, despite this, they 
followed local protocols and listened to the needs and priorities of each 
community. NCA actively engaged each local community in the design, 
implementation and management of their project. Chapter 5 showed how 
NCA conducted a needs assessment using engineers. These experts 
engaged in meaningful consultation with communities and as Chapter 5 
found, meaningful consultation is about working with communities to support 
their needs, priorities and ideas and ensuring they influence the design and 
implementation of a project. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 identify, that it is not only right to involve beneficiaries and 
local populations in every project but it is essential to the effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact and sustainability of any humanitarian project. Their role 
should be comprehensive from project design through to its daily operations 
and management as Chapter 6 found consultation and the involvement of 
beneficiaries is crucial when designing and implementing humanitarian 
projects to deliver effective and sustainable interventions. Chapter 5 found 
that community involvement and ownership is vital for the sustainability of any 
project. Communities must be able to adapt their projects and develop their 
own models of management. This should be encouraged and supported by 
implementing organisations in order for impacts to be long-term. 
 
Maximising the contributions of beneficiaries and local populations including 
for example, use of local labour, local materials, financial contributions, 
provision of meals and accommodation for staff during project implementation 
were found across Chapters 5-6 to contribute to local support and ownership 
for each project. Chapter 5 highlighted that utilising local materials and labour 
wherever possible in a project increases the likelihood and opportunity for that 
project to be well maintained and duplicated by the community themselves 
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thus, proving more sustainable.  
 
Research Question 2: When delivering humanitarian assistance during 
complex emergencies are interventions relevant and appropriate and if 
so how? 
In order to establish whether humanitarian aid delivered in complex 
emergencies is relevant and appropriate the aid must be appropriate to the 
delivery organisations capacity and resources and also relevant and 
appropriate to the needs of the local population (ALNAP, 2006). Both of these 
issues are highlighted in the OECD-DAC evaluative criteria. In Chapter 5, 
NCA had planned to implement a project delivering fishing equipment 
however, through a range of needs assessments it was evident that fishing 
equipment was to be provided by various organisations whereas water and 
sanitation were identified as the sector in greatest need. Subsequently, NCA 
adapted its proposals to concentrate solely on the delivery of water and 
sanitation in line with local needs.  
 
Ensuring capacity and need however, does not alone establish an appropriate 
and relevant project. A key and recurrent finding in both case studies 
(Chapters 5-6) demonstrate the importance of delivering projects in a specific 
cultural context i.e. religion supported delivery. Norwegian Church Aid is an 
international NGO with international staff. The NCA Country Director for 
Somalia is not Somali, however, through his and Norwegian Church Aids 
experience they understand the importance of allowing the local context to 
shape their projects. The majority of NCAs field staff were local and their 
knowledge of Somalia and its people from the onset shaped how NCA 
engaged stakeholders and local communities. Understanding gained through 
these processes together with Somali religion and traditions influenced every 
aspect of NCAs work, which is both appropriate and necessary considering 
that Islam and the Qur’an influence every aspect of Somali life (Elmi, 2010).   
 
NCA followed local protocols for entering and engaging communities. Chapter 
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5 found that following correct local protocols for entering a community is key 
to the level of participation, ownership and ultimate success of any project in 
Somalia. Chapter 6 highlighted that discussions, dialogue and building 
relationships [with elders committees and local communities] may impede the 
timeliness of implementing projects but they are essential to the overall 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact of a project. These findings emphasise 
the importance of working through local systems.  
 
The cultural relevance of the training methods and materials was one of the 
most significant aspects of Norwegian Church Aids programmes in both Bari 
and Nugaal (Chapter 5) and Gedo (Chapter 6). Chapter 5 found that using 
traditional, cultural or religious beliefs as a basis for educating and training or 
techniques to raise awareness of issues is the most appropriate method of 
inducing behavioural change that could otherwise take generations to become 
embedded. NCA understood from the onset the importance of Somali 
traditions and religion and the impact these have on every aspect of Somali 
life. Hence, they ensured Somali traditions and religion influenced every 
aspect of their projects from training methods and training materials to 
engaging and working with various beneficiaries and stakeholders.   
 
Chapters 6 reinforced the importance of religion supported delivery. Chapter 6 
found that to maximise the effectiveness of projects, training and education 
techniques and resources should draw on local traditions, cultures and 
religion.  
 
Evidently, the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of humanitarian projects 
delivered in Somalia initially rely on the appropriateness and relevance of a 
project. Subsequently, creating an appropriate and relevant project relies on 
embedding the project in the people including their religion and traditions as 
opposed to embedding a project in technology. Islamic identity and Somali 
identity cannot be separated and as such in order to understand Somali’s and 
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how a project could be established successfully in Somalia it is essential to 
understand Islam and the Qur’an (Elmi, 2010). 
 
Water and sanitation projects across the world are struggling with how to 
motivate and sustain behavioural change to prevent open defecation; ensure 
the use of improved sanitation facilities; and conduct good hygiene 
behaviours (Mukherjee, 2011; ACTED, 2010). Adomako (2008) emphasises 
that changing behaviour is a long-term phenomenon, which requires an 
appropriate approach. The case material presented in this thesis found that 
behavioural change was immediate and sustainable. Through understanding 
the local context and using the appropriate motivator – religion – local 
communities adopted new water, hygiene and sanitation behaviours and 
practices without hesitation and as these changes are rooted in their religion 
they will be sustainable.  
 
Research Question 3: To what extent are humanitarian interventions 
during complex emergencies effective and sustainable? 
The previous section evidenced the importance of relevance and 
appropriateness to creating an efficient, effective and sustainable 
humanitarian response during a complex emergency. However, relevance 
and appropriateness alone do not create an effective and sustainable project.  
 
Many water and sanitation projects delivered through humanitarian assistance 
prove unsustainable. Any water system requires regular maintenance, spare 
parts and in the case of mechanised water points, fuel. Without continued 
financial input of the organisation the water systems become dysfunctional. 
Chapters 5 and 6 found that mechanised water sources require a payment 
mechanism to secure their sustainability through regular maintenance and 
repairs. Payment mechanisms, however, must also consider and protect the 
most vulnerable people. Norwegian Church Aid and the local communities 
discussed these issues and the communities themselves developed a 
payment mechanism that would cover the operational maintenance of each 
water system including spare parts whilst also providing free water to schools, 
mosques and a selection of families that could not afford the payments. 
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Chapter 6 identified that local communities must be encouraged to provide 
resources whether it be financial, labour or other, as this improves the 
efficiency of the project and increases local ownership and responsibility for 
the project. Chapter 5 supports this and found that utilising local materials and 
labour wherever possible in a project improves efficiency and increases the 
likelihood and opportunity for that project to be well maintained and duplicated 
by the community themselves thus, proving more sustainable. The more time 
and resources communities supply for a project the more invested in the 
project they become. This investment of both time and resources creates a 
sense of responsibility and ownership towards a project. Communities strive 
to protect their investments. One could say that communities take on a role of 
stewardship over a project working to protect, maintain and improve it.   
 
In order to create an effective and sustainable project the case material found 
that quality software was a crucial component. Chapter 6 demonstrates that 
software is equally important as hardware to the effectiveness of a water and 
sanitation project and one should not be implemented without the other. 
Furthermore, the use of new techniques, practices and hardware is most 
effective when coupled with initial intensive training and continued coaching 
and support. Software implemented through an appropriate cultural context 
provides the foundation of any project and ensures it becomes embedded 
throughout the lives of local communities.  
 
Chapter 5 found another key element to achieving an effective and 
sustainable project is that the design and key decisions surrounding a project 
must involve the main intended end users to ensure it is effective and 
sustainable. In the case of Somalia and water and sanitation projects, the 
main end users are women. Traditionally in Somalia women are marginalised 
and their opinions of less value than a man’s. Despite this culture, chapters 5 
and 6 found it is possible to meaningfully involve women. Chapter 6 
demonstrated that improving gender equality in Somalia demands a sensitive 
and gradual approach that respects Somali culture and finds a balance with 
Somali tradition. Chapter 5 found that including women in projects whilst 
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respecting traditional gender roles ensures their inclusion is accepted and not 
resented and is more likely to be sustainable. Ultimately, gender equality is 
not about having equal numbers of men and women participate. In this 
context it is about liberation and the ability for both men and women to 
participate and have their views, opinions and participation to be held of equal 
value and importance. Adapting traditions and cultures must be for worthwhile 
reasons; community driven; and facilitated and encouraged respectfully if it is 
to be effective and sustainable. 
 
7.2 Somalia 
Research Question 4: To what extent can humanitarian aid deliver to 
long-term emergencies? 
a. Can these interventions have a real impact?  
b. If yes, what are the criteria for such projects and how do so 
many fail to be sustainable or have impact? 
 
The very nature of chronic emergencies such as, that of Somalia negates a 
long-term response. Somalia is in a state of chronic humanitarian crisis and 
therefore, requires projects designed for the long-term that have a multi-
hazard perspective that is capable of responding to acute emergencies. The 
evidence presented in Chapter 5 found that in Somalia the humanitarian 
emergency demanded a long-term strategy in order to ensure interventions 
were sustainable. This was supported by the findings of Chapter 6, which 
found that Chronic and acute emergencies are connected and impact upon 
each other and across all sectors. Operating in a chronic complex emergency 
demands a holistic approach to developing and implementing an appropriate 
humanitarian response. It would appear that humanitarian projects delivering 
to long-term emergencies must work from a baseline of addressing a state of 
crisis and complete deprivation and vulnerability but with an aim of improving 
adaptive capacity and resilience, which ultimately improves the lives and 
livelihoods of local communities. This is essentially enabling communities to 
bounce forward. 
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The case material presented within this thesis illustrates that it is possible to 
deliver relevant, appropriate, effective and sustainable humanitarian projects 
in a chronic complex emergency. Despite this, there is no single recipe for 
designing and implementing a sustainable humanitarian project within a 
complex emergency. In order to deliver such projects there are a number of 
principles that should be embedded from the onset. In turn these principles 
should be examined by evaluations of humanitarian aid in chronic 
emergencies to determine the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness and 
sustainability of a project or programme. These principles include:  Community ownership: local populations, beneficiaries and/or 
stakeholders are and have been involved in the project from the onset 
including, its design, implementation and management.  Culturally and religiously embedded: local traditions, culture and 
religion are embedded throughout the project,   Software: projects have a robust and adequate software component.  Management system: The project has an agreed community 
management system in place. This can range from a rotation for 
cleaning latrines to a payment mechanism for water systems.   Protection of vulnerable groups: any project must protect and promote 
the lives of the most vulnerable members of the community. This must 
be given consideration when designing any management system.  
 
The above five principles should provide the foundations to any humanitarian 
project in a chronic emergency in order to achieve a relevant, appropriate, 
effective and sustainable project. In essence, evaluative criteria need to be 
adapted to assess how these principles fit within, use or build local systems 
through for example, using religion and/or local traditions. Evidently, 
evaluative criteria need to be adapted, developed and implemented through a 
local lens specific to each evaluation. 
 
7.3 Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance 
This research is not intended to replace the richness of the existing concepts 
of vulnerability, resilience or adaptive capacity, but rather to link these existing 
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conceptual frameworks to inform the humanitarian response to chronic 
complex emergencies. Humanitarian actors should play a significant role in 
implementing relief and response activities in ways that support local 
response plans and strengthen enabling conditions to enhance resilience and 
adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability.  
 
At the beginning of this work three key themes were presented. Firstly, the 
question was raised as to the nature of humanitarian assistance in the 21st 
Century. Humanitarian assistance is an ideal. Its delivery often breaches the 
ideal but that should not compromise the ideal itself. If the principals of 
humanitarian assistance were not there we would simply have to reinvent the 
same principles. The failure of the humanitarian community most notably in 
Rwanda 1993-94 led in a very broad sense to the erection of codes of 
conduct and standards that has drawn attention away from humanitarian 
ideals to expressions of physical performance. Although humanitarians might 
legitimate their presence and activities by seeking the explicit consent and 
active participation of local peoples, arguably more often they look to 
universal values. In other words, as Barnett (2011) describes, the roles they 
represent are not from the West and they are not from the locale, instead they 
are from the international community. To utilise values associated with a 
particular time and place is to give humanitarian governance a personality, 
when in fact it requires a customary quality to generate its moral standing. 
Humanitarian governance, to be successful, achieves a moral authority that 
derives not from any special place but rather from a shared humanity. It is not 
enough to be good; humanitarians also must do good.  
 
This research has demonstrated that it is possible to deliver via NGOs of a 
different religious persuasion from that of the beneficiaries a sustainable set of 
projects. What is evident is that instead of management by measure there 
should be self-management by pleasure i.e. the contours of the project have 
to reflect the customary communal framework that the beneficiaries 
themselves so cherish. Having said that, it only applies at project level. At a 
policy level the State continues to be instrumental in its use of humanitarian 
assistance certainly not wishing to link disaster and development practices 
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and budgets. Humanitarian assistance continues to be used as an alternative 
to foreign policy in failed states. It is important that humanitarian ideals are 
always restated politically rather than upheld technically. The key issue is to 
bear witness. But this bearing witness is a witness to human rights based on 
material necessity of food, shelter, water and disease prevention. This is only 
possible if there is political recognition of protecting people from harm and 
simultaneously ensuring that interventions do no harm.   
 
The second question was can anything be effectively done in chronic 
emergencies? The short answer to this is a qualified affirmative but it is 
important to emphasise that this is only possible if the beneficiaries have 
some level of ownership of the interventions. While the emphasis on a 
technical focus particularly reinforced by the Sphere project and the use of 
evaluation can lead to a top down process which gives more power to the 
donors it can be seen that if the cultural norms of a community are the starting 
point for project implementation there is every chance of a sustainable 
success. In order to build a useful knowledge, especially in State guided 
action in chronic emergencies, it is important that the richness of ecological 
and cultural variation that is the basis of project intervention and beyond that 
of livelihood construction is taken into account in the design and delivery. 
Beneficiaries in chronic complex emergencies tend to be IDPs. The recent 
Kampala Convention, which came into force in December 2012, is a 
continental instrument and the first of its kind that binds governments to 
provide legal protection for the rights and wellbeing of those forced to flee 
inside their home countries due to conflict, violence, natural disasters or 
development projects. It is yet to be seen however, how this will be effectively 
implemented especially if the effectiveness depends on local ownership of 
programme interventions.  
 
The three key themes were also part of the discussion in the literature where 
the issue of evaluation as a tool which, drifted power towards donors was 
raised in such a manner that suggested it was not possible to capture the 
voice of the beneficiaries. While at a policy level this might be true, leading to 
humanitarian aid serving just as an instrument for the delivery of foreign 
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policy, at project level it is possible to capture the voice of the beneficiary. In 
capturing that voice it is also possible to capture the practical issues that 
underlie the successes, particularly the sustainability of project interventions 
in chronic emergencies. A key assumption of evaluation namely that the 
policy itself shall not be questioned must be open to contention in all 
humanitarian assistance programmes. If the humanitarian ideal is either in 
jeopardy or is being misused for political purposes then it must be the duty of 
the evaluator, under the prescription do no harm to raise questions about the 
abuse of the humanitarian ideal. Finally, all evaluations must be 
contextualised in specific histories. For the timelines to enfolding emergencies 
and to rehabilitation are specific to people and place. There seem to be 
general lessons available in what to avoid but specific lessons in how to 
commit to progressive social change are still difficult to find. The progress 
from ‘do no harm’ to ‘do some good’ is a hard road. Although, it is the 
presence of faith that sustains humanitarianism and the possibility of 
progress, blind faith can be its downfall (Barnett, 2011). Evaluation of 
humanitarianism can challenge blind faith.  
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